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ABSTRACT 
 
Time is a hard-to-define concept in its most fundamental aspects. 
Different from space, to which it is commonly associated, time cannot 
be physically grasped, although we do try to measure it. What does not 
stop it from being simply ubiquitous, since we cannot escape or ignore 
it. The representation of time in fiction reflects its own social period. 
Having this in mind, this research understands that time has assumed 
different meanings in distinct contexts, since it reveals itself as a product 
of its historical times. Within this, the objective of this dissertation is to 
investigate time in times of change, understanding how the transitions 
and intersections of the Modern, Post-Modern and yet without a proper 
name Post-Postmodern periods affect the concept of time in film 
production, specifically in science fiction films. This dissertation 
analyzes science fiction films, since they seem to present a more 
conflicting and marked tendency in relation to time. Metropolis marks 
the modernist period with its notion of linear and futuristic time, 
strongly attached to an idea of industrial capitalism, in which the rhythm 
of the production conditions the workers. Blade Runner and Twelve 
Monkeys present a post-modern nostalgic vision of the future with a 
fragmented time, constructed through the character’s search of a past 
and identity. Lastly, Source Code and Interstellar seem to join a notion 
of digital cinema and time, proposing a more flexible temporality. In 
this last idea, space and time also influence one’s existence, that changes 
his/her ontology and starts existing in other realities and dimensions.   
 
Key-words: Time. Science Fiction Film. Digital Film. Modernism. 
Postmodernism.    
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
  
RESUMO 
 
Tempo é um conceito difícil em seus aspectos mais fundamentais. 
Diferente do conceito de espaço, ao qual ele é comumente associado, o 
tempo não pode ser fisicamente apanhado, apesar de tentarmos medi-lo. 
O que não impede que ele seja simplesmente ubíquo, pois não podemos 
escapar dele ou ignorá-lo. A representação do tempo em ficção reflete 
seu tempo social. Com isso em mente, essa pesquisa entende que o 
tempo tem assumido significados diferentes em contextos distintos, uma 
vez que se revela como um produto de seu tempo histórico. Em vista 
disso, o objetivo principal dessa tese é investigar o tempo em tempos de 
mudança, ao entender como as transições e intersecções dos períodos 
Moderno, Pós-moderno e o ainda sem nome definitivo Pós-Pósmoderno 
afetam o conceito de tempo na produção fílmica, especificamente em 
filmes de ficção científica. Essa dissertação analisa filmes de ficção 
científica, uma vez que eles parecem apresentar uma tendência mais 
conflituosa e marcante em relação ao tempo. Metropolis marca o 
período modernista com sua noção de tempo linear e futurista, 
fortemente atrelado a uma ideia de capitalismo industrial, em que o 
ritmo da produção condiciona os trabalhadores. Blade Runner e Twelve 
Monkeys apresentam uma visão pós-moderna nostálgica do futuro com 
um tempo fragmentado construído pela busca de passado e identidade 
dos personagens. Por último, Source Code e Interstellar parecem unir a 
noção de cinema digital e de tempo, ao propor uma temporalidade mais 
flexível. Nesta última ideia, espaço e tempo também influenciam na 
existência do ser, que muda sua ontologia e passa a existir em outras 
realidades e dimensões.      
 
Palavras-chave: Tempo. Filme de Ficção Científica. Cinema Digital. 
Modernismo. Pós-Modernismo.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Time is a challenging idea and a concept hard to define. This 
notion seems to be self-evident at first, but one should ask oneself how 
to answer the simple question: What is time? Doctor Who,1 who is a 
time lord alien and time travels across the universe, also has difficulties, 
defining time as “A big ball of wibbly wobbly timey-wimey… stuff.”2 
The reasons to such difficulty in finding a definition, or even in fully 
understanding time, vary. One of the explanations might be because it 
cannot be physically grasped. Nonetheless, we do try to measure it. 
Another reason might be time’s close relation to space; for example, 
clocks, pendulums and calendars may be tricky aspects, since they 
depend on space to be realized – a day is the movement of the Earth 
around itself, while a year is the movement of the Earth around the Sun.  
Most of all, time seems to be subjective, oscillating according to 
our experiences. Arthur Prior’s classic article – “Thank Goodness That’s 
Over” (1959) – for instance, explains that our notion of time may vary 
drastically depending on our emotional grounds. Literature has long 
understood this difficulty, as Marcel Proust demonstrates in his main 
character’s constant loops of memory in In Search of Lost Time (1922). 
More recently, the Turkish novelist Orhan Pamuk has consciously 
alerted us about its implications, defining that time is indeed an illusion: 
“I would like to say a few words about the illusion that is time, as there 
is one sort of time we can call our own, and another – shall we call it 
‘official’ time? – that we share with others” (489). Despite being 
difficult to define, time is ubiquitous, and as a referential instrument we 
cannot escape, or even ignore it.  
Science fiction has displayed a particular interest in the 
convoluted world of time. The filmic and literary references are vast and 
known, some examples include H. G. Wells’s The Time Machine 
(1895), Isaac Asimov’s The End of Eternity (1955), Stanley Kubrick’s 
film 2001: A space odyssey (1968), Robert Zemeckis’s film Back to the 
Future (1985), Harold Ramis’s film Groundhog Day (1993), and 
Stephen King’s 11/22/63 (2011). This genre’s scientific pretensions 
have strong interest on the experience of time and its manipulations 
more than other genres, as horror or fantasy. Bearing this in mind, this 
                                                        
1
 Doctor Who is a British science fiction television series first aired in 1963, and 
it is still being aired. 
2
 In the episode 3 “Blink” from season 10 with David Tenant as Doctor Who.    
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dissertation concentrates on science fiction narratives because the 
subject of time forms much of its imaginative ground.   
The Question of Time in Science Fiction Films also chooses film, 
because, as David Rodowick suggests, “what most powerfully affects us 
in film is an ethics of time.” The latter defends that more than 
representation film’s most powerful analogy is duration and explains 
that “what we have valued in film are our confrontations with time and 
time’s passing” (Virtual 73). Film as music unfolds in time. Thus, this 
dissertation focuses on time in science fiction films, and on how the 
representation of time has changed in this artistic narrative form. The 
hypothesis is that images of time from early films as Georges Méliès’s A 
Trip to the Moon (1902) are different from that of contemporary fiction 
as Christopher Nolan’s Inception (2010). In this sense, this research 
investigates how time has mutated from modernist to contemporary 
films, placing this inquire in the critical frameworks of modernism, 
postmodernism and post-postmodernism; conscious that the transition 
moments are never clear and always leave blurred areas of intersection. 
Modernism and postmodernism have been widely discussed. 
Both present layers of complexities and contradictions, which I shall 
further discuss in their respective chapters. For this initial discussion, I 
consider modernism that aesthetic movement that began around the mid-
19
th
 century with early writers as Flaubert3 and Baudelaire4 (Huyssen, 
After vii). Later, in the early 20
th
 century, the emergence of the avant-
gardes incited the l’art pour l’art movements, such as cubism, Dadaism, 
futurism, expressionism. Each movement, searching for their own 
unique aesthetic view, was marked by elitism, modernization, 
rationality, socio-technological progress, and art as transcendence and 
autonomous (Huyssen, After x).   
To briefly define postmodernism, I use Fredric Jameson’s much 
contested and discussed description in “Postmodernism or the Cultural 
Logic of Late Capitalism.” Because even if too pessimistic or making 
sweeping assumptions, it still provides a significant and forehand view 
on postmodernism. He observes a new aesthetic tendency that is 
“chaotic and heterogeneous” (54) around the 60s. A crisis in the grand 
narratives caused “some radical break or coupure” with the hundred-
                                                        
3
 Some of his early works are Rêve d’Enfer (1837), Memoirs of a Madman 
(1838) and Madame Bovary (1857).   
4
 Some of his early works are Salon (1845), La Fanfarlo (1847) and Les Fleurs 
du Mal (1857). 
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year-old modern movement (53). Some of its traits are aesthetic 
populism, a waning of affect, and a predominance of nostalgia.  
The modernist and postmodernist frameworks help us 
understanding how a representation of time can be inserted in its own 
historical period, thus bearing a social value. An overall understanding 
is that modernism grew in light of and in opposition to5 the Industrial 
Revolution and the development of science, which “would reveal the 
hidden laws of nature,” leading the humankind to a perfect society 
(Baguer, 246). Utopic narratives grew out of this enthusiasm with 
technology. Mary Ann Doane describes the relevance of time to this 
period stating that “Time was indeed felt – as a weight, as a source of 
anxiety, and as an accurately pressing problem of representation. 
Modernity was perceived as a temporal demand” (4).  
To further develop this topic, the first chapter “The Modernist” 
begins discussing time and modernism, their relation to technology and 
cinema. Metropolis (1927) by Fritz Lang exemplifies a modernist 
aesthetic rendering of time through the subject of a changing society, 
helped by a technological drive. In this film, visions of the future 
reinforce ideas of development and progress, in which the past and 
future are stead points of a chronological line. Time reprimands the 
workers and is power to the factory owner Frederson. Metropolis works 
as a prototype to the other science fiction films discussed in the 
following chapters; its residual memory enduring throughout the history 
of science fiction cinematography.   
By its turn, postmodern fiction does not appear to bother much 
about time as a concept to be experienced. Some postmodern critics, 
such as Jameson, argue that postmodernism focuses on space. His 
argument is that an empty market-orientation leads postmodern fiction 
to a recycling nostalgic drive, which actually lacks a historical 
perspective (“Postmodernism” 64). The consequence is that postmodern 
texts are stuck in a reiterative present, and are dominated by the spatial 
experience. Jameson cites the Bonaventura Hotel in Los Angeles as an 
example of a space that is so disorienting that affects the individual’s 
spatial perception as a hall mark of postmodernism (“Postmodernism” 
80). In addition, postmodern skepticism towards technology (and 
anything in general) leads to a dystopic orientation, and changes, thus, 
focusing on nostalgia. 
                                                        
5
 A major issue to some modernist artists is the separation from mass culture 
and industrialized society. See Theodor Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory.   
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The second chapter “The Postmodernists” ponders on what 
postmodernism means, its relation to neo-capitalism and its alleged 
death. It continues with an analysis of two different perspectives on 
postmodern films, Blade Runner (1982) by Ridley Scott and Twelve 
Monkeys (1995) by Terry Gilliam. These films highlight two major 
temporal tendencies: the dystopian future and the postmodern nostalgia. 
These notions are complementary, since both emerge from the same 
disillusion with technology and the future. Time becomes a more 
ambiguous and evasive concept. Blade Runner’s futuristic Los Angeles 
is full of nostalgic references, merging the past into the future; while 
Cole’s future death has already happened in Twelve Monkeys’s past.  
This research main inquire is that recent films do not seem to fit 
into these postmodern characteristics of nostalgia and space orientation. 
Time appears to become a more flexible concept, not a linear idea as in 
Modernism, nor nostalgia as in Jameson’s Postmodernism. Indeed, late 
theoretical proposals have been flooded with new terms: the post-
postmodern (Linda Hutcheon), the post-cinematic (Steven Shaviro), the 
post-filmic (Garret Stewart), the new new Hollywood (Thomas 
Elsaesser), and the supercinema (Wiliam Brown). They all point to the 
death of postmodernism and the emergence of a new cinematic 
aesthetic, which has incorporated digitalization, media, internet and 
video-games into their narratives. What is this new cinema is still hard 
to define, but a recurrent argument is the strong influence of the digital.  
 The third chapter “The Post-Postmodernists” discusses time in 
light of these emerging theoretical proposals and attempts to 
demonstrate a new ontology of time, by analyzing Source Code (2011) 
by Duncan Jones and Interstellar (2014) by Christopher Nolan. A 
possible relation between new technologies and ontological positions is 
examined, questioning our understanding of reality and time. The 
hypothesis is that the integration of digitalization changes cinematic 
time. The digital possibilities affect not only the film’s format, used as a 
tool, but also its narrative and concept of time. If postmodernism already 
constructed ambivalent temporalities, in which the past and future mix, 
then post-postmodern searches to deconstruct it by proposing new 
possibilities to how the characters relate to time.   
In these last mentioned films, time appears to question its 
chronological nature, which leads to films that are bolder in their time-
travelling tricks. The consequences of time travel loops – if McFly 
(Michael J. Fox) from Back to the Future crosses his father with his 
mother, will he exist in the future? – are no longer the problems, but 
time in itself implies new challenges to the time traveler – if Cooper’s 
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(Matthew McConaughey) time from Interstellar is faster than his 
daughter’s, will she be alive when they meet again? The possibilities of 
computer graphics and the theme of the digital world merge into films 
like the latter, radicalizing our perception of time, space, and reality.   
Hence, this dissertation’s main objective is to discuss how the 
representation time has changed from modernism, to postmodernism 
and to post-postmodernism in science fiction films. By analyzing time, I 
expect to discuss the cultural changes associated with it, such as 
conceptions of space and technology. I understand how this analytical 
organization conveys a generalizing proposition in relation to these 
aesthetic periods. Nonetheless, my own postmodern disillusioned 
expectation is far from trying to find a “grand theory,” but rather to 
point to a few tendencies in some films, suggest explanations, and 
maybe show “what films can do” as in Brown’s argument: “one talking 
pig is needed to prove that pigs can talk, then similarly only one 
example is needed to show what film can do […] whether or not all 
films do the same thing” (7).  
In the last chapter, the dissertation’s arguments are retraced and 
compared. “Final Remarks” also encompasses last comments about the 
research, and observations for further investigation in the area. In the 
following sections, I shall introduce some theoretical aspects of time, its 
relation to cinema, and some considerations on science fiction, utopia, 
dystopia and nostalgia, which shall be relevant to the following 
chapters.  
 
TIME’S HISTORY  
 
One of the ways to understand time is through its cultural history. 
Although time is an independent phenomenon–it does not need clocks, 
calendar or astronomy to exist–it has a history that relates to how 
humans started manipulating it. Therefore, time is also a constructed 
concept, which means that our understanding of time can change. The 
concept of time is, thus, not stable and supports my further reading that 
it might be changing again with the most recent cultural productions and 
the many other areas of knowledge nowadays. 
At first, man used natural elements, such as the Sun, the Moon, 
water, and sand, to measure time; if the tide was high or low, or if the 
sun was rising or setting. This method implies a connection between 
man, nature and time, and conceptualizes time with solid references, the 
movement of the tide or the sun. So if one could go back in time and ask 
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these people “what is time?,” they would most probably answer: time is 
when the tide, sun or water moves from here to there. Simple as that.   
Russell West-Pavlov explains that as time passed people6 started 
developing new and more precise ways to measure time (16). The 
mechanical clock, the GMT (Greenwich Mean Time, or UT–Universal 
Time) and the digital watch gradually substituted the natural elements. 
By doing so, mechanical developments integrated a new logic of time 
into social life, which have affected people’s understanding of 
temporality. For instance, the cyclical phases of the Moon infer a 
repeated temporality, which still exists in an analog clock, but which 
totally vanishes in a digital watch. Time is disembodied from its 
concrete references, and becomes an abstraction. It becomes a human 
invention and works through an agreement of never stopping, a 
ubiquity.  
Economic interest also sponsored this universal time. A precise 
and universal measurement of time contributes to the whole 
organization of the economic system. West-Pavlov acknowledges this 
connection between money and time: “two important aspects of modern 
time consciousness (accuracy of calibration and the global reach of a 
single time scheme) […] were from the outset intimately bound up with 
expanding imperial capitalism” (15). To which, he provides two 
examples, the first is how latitude and longitude improved navigation, 
and the discovery of new territories, and the second is how North-
American train companies were the first to propose a universal time 
throughout the country, so that their trains could be properly scheduled 
(10). Similarly, a cyclical system was used to base economy with 
plantations and seasons, but as we move to a capitalist economy, we 
have no connection with products, their process of manufacturing and 
their producer. The image of time changes from a circle to a progressive 
linear arrow. Not to mention that mechanical developments actually 
change the way we experience time. For instance, the invention of 
                                                        
6
 It is important to note that such idea might not apply to all communities and 
that this notion of a single time was initially more widely accepted in Europe. 
Even the western world does not seem to have completely assimilated such 
idea, since some Latin American communities have not been affected by this 
new temporality. The Amondawa people from the Amazonian forest exemplify 
how the idea of time is not the same and has not changed for all. According to 
Sinha et al., this tribe does not use a linguistic organization that structures time 
through movement and space. For more information see “When Time is not 
Space” in Language and Cognition, vol. 3, issue 1 (March 2011): 137-169.      
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artificial light extended the working-hours; new modes of 
transportations accelerated our accessibility; new forms 
communications, as the analogue telephone, implies presence, and the 
digital format of the internet changed simultaneity in a way never 
imagined before. Stephen Kern writes that “instantaneous electronic 
communication, which made simultaneity a reality, affected the sense of 
the present, speed, form and distance” (6). For him “simultaneity was 
more directly influenced by technology, because electronic 
communication made it possible for the first time to be in a sense in two 
places at once” (88). Simultaneity exposes how the subject of time can 
be more complex than images of circles or arrows. In addition, Kern 
indicates cinema as the greatest influence to simultaneity:    
 
Perhaps the most far-reaching impact of the new 
simultaneity was due to the cinema, which was 
able to bring together an unprecedented variety of 
visual images and arrange them coherently in a 
unified whole […] the cinema also thickened the 
present. Any moment could be pried open and 
expanded at will, giving the audience seemingly at 
once a vision of the motives for an action, its 
appearance from any number of perspectives, and 
a multitude of response. (Kern 88) 
  
What Kern describes is a relation between cinema and time, in 
which the former compresses time and space, as it combines action into 
instances, or shots. Parallel montage is an example of how action and 
scenarios are multiplied in a single sequence, to convey a single idea. 
Events can happen in different places, but be experienced at the same 
time. Time joins the different actions, and thickens the present though 
simultaneously. In the following subsection, I will present more specific 
discussion on the intertwinement between time and cinema, an idea that 
is particularly relevant to this research.   
 
CINEMA’S TIME 
 
Henry Bergson and Gilles Deleuze play a particularly relevant 
role concerning the discussion of cinema’s time. They provide key 
concepts to this research, respectively: pure duration and time-image. 
The first was the leading theorist to inspire modernist writers and 
thinkers, and, most importantly, he provided the philosophical grounds 
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where Deleuze would propose his ideas on how image, movement and 
time construct cinema.  
In Time and Free Will, Bergson begins defining duration by what 
it is not. Time as duration is not a homogeneous medium, as the 
universal time described above, and “it is not a quantity, and as soon as 
we try to measure it, we unwittingly replace it by space” (Time 106). His 
explanation is that “we are compelled to borrow from space the images 
by which we describe what the reflective consciousness feels about 
time, and even about succession” (Time 91).  What he means is that we 
use space to measure time. As mentioned, a day is when the Earth turns 
around itself, or a year is when Earth circles around the Sun.  
To Bergson, pure duration is something to be felt or perceived 
through consciousness. A metaphor, that helps explaining duration and 
its subjectiveness  as something personal and processed through 
conscience, appears in the image of waiting “until the sugar melts”, as 
described by Bergson:  
 
[…] If I want to mix a glass of sugar and water, I 
must, willy-nilly, wait until the sugar melts. This 
little fact is big with meaning. For here the time I 
have to wait is not that mathematical time which 
would apply equally well to the entire history of 
the material world, even if that history were 
spread out instantaneously in space. It coincides 
with my impatience, that is to say, with a certain 
portion of my own duration, which I cannot 
protract or contract as I like. It is no longer 
something thought, it is something lived. It is no 
longer a relation, it is an absolute. What else can 
this mean than that the glass of water, the sugar, 
and the process of the sugar’s melting in the water 
are abstractions, and that the Whole within which 
they have been cut out by my senses and 
understanding progresses, it may be in the manner 
of a consciousness? (Creative Evolution 12-3) 
 
 In this quote, Bergson beautifully explains how the universal and 
mathematical time is not the same as that of duration, because the latter 
carries our feelings, our anxieties in waiting. The consequence is that 
rationalization would not work, but only the individual’s experience. 
The time that we deal with daily is an impersonal and imposed one. In 
fact, Bergson acknowledges that the days, hours, months, among others 
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can only be measured because they are artificial (Creative Evolution 
27). 
Another aspect of duration is its sense of wholeness, everything 
already and still exists, past and future are happening now, as part of the 
present. Bergson defines that “duration is the continuous progress of the 
past which gnaws into the future and which swells as it advances” 
(Creative Evolution 7). In discussing intuition, Bergson provides a 
useful metaphor to time by comparing it to a melody. The idea is that a 
melody is composed of notes, but we do not hear distinct notes; rather 
we experience the melody fully as sequenced notes (Creative Mind 
173). Such position conveys time as a flow, a continuity, a fluid stream, 
an organic whole. Past and future are divisions that we need to 
rationalize time, notes in the melody. But what allows us to understand 
duration is intuition (Creative Mind 82).   
Despite this affirmation for a whole time, the past plays a relevant 
role in Bergson’s theory, mainly because duration exhibits itself mostly 
in memory. Elisabeth Grosz’s reading of Bergson describes that 
“[m]emory is the present’s mode of access to the past” (178), meaning 
that we use memory to recollect the past. In doing so, we revive the past 
in the present. In adding, Bergson explains that even if the memory 
brings the past into the present, the former is still a virtuality:  
 
Wherever we are trying to recover a recollection, 
to call up some period of our history, we become 
conscious of an act sui generis by which we 
detach ourselves from the present in order to 
replace ourselves, first, in the past in general, 
then, in a certain region of the past–a work of 
adjustment, something like the focusing of a 
camera. But our recollection still remains virtual. 
(Creative Mind 133-4) 
 
Bergson’s famous SAB cone (see 
Figure A) helps us understand how the past 
weights on the present. He explains that “the 
base AB, situated in the past, remains 
motionless, while the summit S, which 
indicates at all times my present, moves 
forward unceasingly, and unceasingly also 
touches the moving plane P of my actual 
Figure A 
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representation of the universe” (Matter 152). The present (S) is, then, a 
continuation of the past (AB, A’B’, A”B”). The variations of the past 
into AB, A’B’, A”B” expose their closeness and distance to the present, 
which does not relate to how long something happened, but rather to the 
event’s relevance to the present. P is where our present touches the 
universe, “my direct contact with objects” (Grosz 181). In reading 
Bergson, Deleuze goes further and affirms that “the past is pure 
ontology; pure recollection has only ontological significance” 
(Bergsonism 56). Grosz adds that “the future, too, remains virtual, 
uncontained by the present but prefigured, rendered potential, through 
and by the past” (184). This proposition of the past and future as virtual 
or ontological dimensions will show its significance in my analysis of 
some more recent films. 
Deleuze’s philosophy of cinema is also a philosophy of time.  
He correlates time with the emergence of a new cinema after the World 
War II (Cinema 2 xi), as cinema produces time (Rodowick, Gilles xiv). 
To explain this emerging cinema, Deleuze defines two classifications: 
movement-image and time-image, which he developed in two of his 
most well-known works Cinema 1: The Movement-Image and Cinema 
2: The Time-Image.  
Movement-image describes a classic cinema and its name evinces 
the relevance of movement. The main idea is that this cinema produces 
images that move, as we all know, by showing us sequenced still images 
(generally 24-frames per second). Or rather, the moving images produce 
images that move, which leads to Deleuze’s statement that “[c]inema 
[…] gives us false movement” (Cinema 1 1). This basic premise of 
movies relates to how spectators understand films. The moving images 
produce images as perception, and images produce movement as 
involuntary action. Cinema misleads people to believe that still images 
are moving when they produce the perception of movement, of action. 
The viewer no longer sees the image, but the perception of it, the literal 
movement of the frames. The idea is that the moving images on the 
screen produce in the viewer a perception of action: “[a]s a result, 
cinematographic movement is both condemned as unfaithful to the 
conditions of perception and also exalted as the new story capable of 
‘drawing close to’ the perceived and the perceiver, the world and 
perception” (Deleuze, Cinema 1 57).  
As Alessandra Brandão explains, this idea of natural perception 
originates in Bergson’s, but Deleuze considers it problematic. This 
notion reduces cinema to a projection, “suggesting that the conditions of 
perception conveyed by cinema were similar to that of natural 
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perception, Bergson overlooks the specificities of the medium in its 
relation to movement” (Brandão 48). To Deleuze, movement is the 
condition of a film, “cinema does not give us an image to which 
movement is added, it immediately gives us a movement-image” 
(Cinema 1 2).  
In such filmic productions, the movement of the characters is 
identified with the action in a logical space, and produces a rational 
continuity in montage, which is called an action-image. For instance, if 
we want to show character A walking (moving), each frames has to be 
slightly different from the previous one in action, as well as space, and 
the sequence of these frames has to be continuous. David Rodowick 
explains that “this identification is the subordination of time to 
movement. Time is measured only dynamically, as a process of action 
and reaction rebounding across contiguous spaces through match-
cutting” (Gilles 3). Time and space are strictly dependent.  
Deleuze comprehends that the image of time is revealed in 
montage, since the latter is “the determination of the whole […] by 
means of continuities, cutting and false continuities” (Cinema 1 29). The 
classic construction of images that move conveys an indirect image of 
time, “Montage is composition, the assemblage [agencement] of 
movement-images as constituting an indirect image of time” (Cinema 1 
30). The image is indirect because it depends on movement and space, 
as this cinema demands a rational and continuous organization. Deleuze 
refers to this cinema as an organic regime, with which he associates four 
main schools: the American mainly with Griffith, the Soviet, pre-war 
French, and German Expressionism–the last three differ from and are 
variants of the first organic composition of Griffith’s cinema (Cinema 1 
30). This kind of montage presupposes a truth, since it conveys a linear 
action and logical organization. Digressions, flashblacks or 
flashforwards only contribute to this single narrative. Rodowick clarifies 
that “[t]he integration of parts into ensembles, and ensembles into 
wholes, culminates in a totality where image, world, and spectator are 
identified through a grand image of Truth” (Gilles 12). The result is a 
globalizing narrative in which situations will always presuppose action 
and a further resolution–SAS (Cinema 1 141-2).7 This position is the 
                                                        
7 
Deleuze describes that “The milieu and its forces incurve on themselves, they 
act on the character, throw him a challenge, and constitute a situation in which 
he is caught. The character reacts in his turn (action properly speaking) so as to 
respond to the situation, to modify the milieu, or his relation with the milieu, 
with the situation, with other characters. He must acquire a new mode of being 
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same to small situations–for instance if a glass falls, the viewer expects 
it to break–and to the whole of the film–if the girl is captured, the hero 
will have to rescue her. Nonetheless, this rational organic totalizing and 
classic organization would not last long. 
The paradigm above described goes through a crisis, which 
emerges mainly after WWII. As Deleuze proposes, many factors 
promoted such a change:  
 
[S]ome of which were social, economic, political, 
moral and others more internal to art, to literature 
and to the cinema in particular. We might 
mention, in no particular order, the war and its 
consequences, the unsteadiness of the “American 
Dream” in all its aspects, the new consciousness 
of minorities, the rise and inflation of images both 
in the external world and in people’s minds, the 
influence on the cinema of new modes of 
narrative with which literature had experimented, 
the crisis of Hollywood and its ode genres… 
(Cinema 1 206). 
 
This crisis indicates a change of thinking that culminated in the 
destabilization of a constructed truth. As Deleuze claims, WWII seems 
to be the main cause for a new arising perspective, which will affect 
content and form in filmic production. The change began with Italian 
neo-realism and the French new wave, where the films started 
surpassing the movement-image, and changing the way cinema relates 
to time and movement, thus creating the direct image of time, what he 
refers to as time-images.  
One of the impulses of a direct image of time is the substitution 
of action for gaze. If action-image presupposes a sensory-motor 
situation by action, Italian neo-realism presupposes a pure optical and 
sound situation,8 which through the portrait of ordinary situations give 
rise to gaze instead of action, “a cinema of the seer and no longer of the 
                                                                                                                     
(habitus) or raise his mode of being to the demands of the milieu and of the 
situation. Out of this emerges a restored of modified situation, a new situation” 
(Cinema 1 141-2).  
8 
“It is no longer time that depends on movement; it is aberrant movement that 
depends on time. The relation sensory-motor situation → indirect image of time 
is replaced by a non-localizable relation, pure optical and sound situation → 
direct time-image” (Deleuze, Cinema 2 41).  
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agent” (Deleuze, Cinema 2 2). For example, objects and settings are 
necessarily functional to a particular situation, presupposing an action, a 
prop, in movement-image. On the other hand, for Deleuze, in Italian 
neo-realism films objects and settings become autonomous, acquiring 
meaning in themselves, while “spaces are now neither co-ordinated nor 
filled” (Cinema 2 40-1), becoming empty references. The characters and 
viewers gaze the autonomous objects or empty settings, which appeal to 
their senses and create pure optical and sound situations.9  They reveal 
“a visual and sound nakedness, crudeness and brutality” (Cinema 2 3) of 
the ordinary life. The situation-action chain is lost, as the situation is 
followed by gaze and not action.  
The moving images of the screen no longer presuppose action, 
thus challenging the viewer’s perception. Such lack of action creates an 
aberrant movement, which leads to Deleuze’s conclusion that “the 
aberration of movement specific to the cinematographic image sets time 
free from any linkage” (Cinema 2 37). Time stops depending on 
movement, and as well as on action, which results in a direct image of 
time. The gaze into objects relates to how time appears in the framing, 
but time also relates to the whole of the movie, that is montage. In fact, 
Deleuze states “it is montage itself which constitutes the whole, and thus 
gives us the image of time” (Cinema 2 34).  
Montage in time-image films also changes after WWII. Deleuze 
builds on montage, as portraying the main concept of a film, which is 
similar to Eisenstein’s notion of the Idea (with a capital letter) of the 
film, “montage is the whole of the film, the Idea” (Cinema 1 29). As I 
mentioned, movement-image conveys a sense of unity in its continuous 
organic narrative, a truth and rational organization, because its montage 
rely on “the whole that changes” (Cinema 2 35), or rather on movement, 
as time depends on movement. On the other hand, time-image breaks 
with the unity of action as it emphasizes the gaze; seeing predominates 
over acting. Michelangelo Antonioni’s L’Avventura is an example of 
how powerful the gaze becomes over action, of how instances of 
contemplation mark the search for Anna (Léa Massari). The 
                                                        
9
 Yasujirô Ozu provides a further example when Deleuze acknowledges that 
“The bicycle [from A Story of Floating Weeds], the vase [from Late Spring] 
and the still lifes [from That Night’s Wife and Passing Fancy] are the pure and 
direct images of time. Each is time, on each occasion, under various conditions 
of that which changes in time. Time is full, that is, the unalterable form filled by 
change” (Cinema 2 17).  
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consequence is a rupture with linear action and continuous montage. 
Deleuze summarizes that:  
 
If normal movement subordinates the time of 
which it gives us an indirect representation, 
aberrant movement speaks us for an anteriority of 
time that it presents to us directly, on the basis of 
the disproportion of scales, the dissipation of 
centres and the false continuity of the images 
themselves (Cinema 2 37).  
 
This aberrant movement and direct image of time claim for a new 
regime, which Deleuze refers to as the crystalline regime. Rodowick 
clarifies that the latter differs from the organic regime in four aspects: 
“description, distinguishing between the real and the imaginary, 
narration, and the question of judgment or truth” (Gilles 86). The first 
aspect features how the crystalline regime bears the real and the 
imaginary indistinguishable (Cinema 2 126). According to Deleuze, 
“what we will call a crystalline description stands for its object, replaces 
it, both creates and erases it” (Cinema 2 126). At this point, the object is 
the description, while an organic description infers that the object exists 
despite and independently of the description.  
The second aspect, distinguishing between the real and the 
imaginary, relates to the first, description. The former appeals to how 
the crystalline description, the reflection, also becomes the object, and 
we cannot distinguish which one is real or reflection. In fact, both exist. 
The organic system does have images of “the unreal, the recollection, 
the dream and the imaginary but as contrast”, a meaning that it is always 
clear in the film when discontinuity appears. In the crystalline, “the real 
and the imaginary, the actual and the virtual, chase after each other, 
exchange their roles and become indiscernible”. The crystal-image is 
then defined as “the coalescence of an actual and its virtual image” 
(Cinema 2 127).  
The third aspect concerns narration. It is revealed when the 
moments of contemplation gain meaning over the story of the film, 
when “the story” loses a truth to rely on. Deleuze notices how 
“crystalline narration will extend crystalline descriptions, their 
repetitions and variations, through a crisis of action” (Cinema 2 129). 
The cinema of the seer and of pure optical and sound situations.  
What emerges from this new type of narrative is the fourth 
aspect: the power of false, “a new status of narration follows from this 
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[crisis]: narration ceases to be truthful, that is, to claim to be true, and 
becomes fundamentally falsifying” (Deleuze, Cinema 2 131). A sound 
example is Hiroshima Mon Amour’s10 discontinuous association of shot, 
a diegesis exists–a Japanese architect (Eiji Okada) and a French actress 
(Emmanuelle Riva) fall in love in Japan–but the film is constructed 
through a non-linear narrative of flashbacks, in which the spectator is 
never sure if they were true or part of an illusion; while Elle do not stop 
remembering, Lui says “You are not endowed with memory.” What the 
film provides is then an association of ideas between shots, which 
replaces continuation from movement-image films with an uncertainty, 
or at least the possibility of a doubt. A narration that presupposes a truth 
demands rational connection of spaces and an organic chronological 
time (Cinema 2 133), which is just not the case in these post-war films.   
Furthermore, to Deleuze, time-image was not exactly new. 
Aberrant movement and false continuity shots were already part of 
cinema, they were only not realized as such. He explains: “The direct 
time-image is the phantom which has always haunted the cinema, but it 
took modern cinema to give a body to this phantom” (Cinema 2 41). 
Such notion could suggest how contemporary cinema, what I refer to as 
post-postmodern, also proposes a similar direct image of time, a 
questioning of certainties. This 60s tendency might still be present in 
cinema, although the causes and context seem to be different. This 
section explored the concept of time, its history and relation to cinema. 
The following section presents a definition of science fiction film and its 
relation to time and technology, in which I also expect to justify my 
choice of corpora.   
 
SCIENCE FICTION GENRE  
 
This dissertation investigates science fiction films with the belief 
that this genre best expresses experiments with time. Science fiction 
seems to question reality through time more than other genres. To define 
genre is particularly tricky, since the variation between films are greater 
than most definitions can handle. Therefore, this research employs Steve 
Neale’s concept of genre as a hybrid, a shifting mode of cultural 
production. Neale reestablishes the relevance of the public to film genre, 
when analyzing the influence of the industry in the formation of genres 
(163). His argument relays on Tzvetan Todorov’s Russian Formalist 
                                                        
10
 From 1959, by Alain Resnais. Last Year at Marienbad (1961) from the same 
director infers a similar effect.   
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position (161), which favors the system of expectation, or the role of the 
spectator. To Neale, the system of expectation depends on 
verisimilitude, which does not mean a resemblance to reality, but a 
likelihood or probability to happen in a certain genre (161). Similar to 
Neale’s notion of verisimilitude, Kuhn acknowledges that science 
fiction films tend to use codes of visibility that are different from 
classical cinema, but are plausible to that story and genre.11 For instance, 
the public expects sound in outer space sequences, even if sound does 
not propagate in space. The advertisement industry and newspaper 
reviews feed these expectations by emphasizing them, they promote an 
image of the film. Industry and journalism influence the construction of 
film genres, and they compose what she refers to as intertextual relay 
(Alien Zone 163). 
Through this perspective, we should also consider a historical 
account of genres, as Neale states “genres are inherently temporal: 
hence, their inherent mutability on the one hand and their inherent 
historicity on the other” (169). In this way, genre is a process, a hybrid, 
which can be pushed by technology, market demand, popularity or 
canonization of the genre, to mention a few. Bearing this in mind, 
science fiction might have changed through the technological, economic 
and political upheavals of the transition from the modernist to the 
postmodern cultural backgrounds. Further relevant is that because 
genres are “always historically relative and therefore historically 
specific, they can be determined only empirically, not theoretically” 
(Neale 173). An up-down theory cannot encompass the complexity of a 
genre formation, which justifies a close analysis to specific films and 
genres. In this sense this research expects to contribute to the genre’s 
definition by pointing out a possible new argument: that contemporary 
science fiction films have a different impulse towards time, and this 
relates to modern technology.  
This research also considers Robin Wood’s understanding that 
genres are not discrete, nor autonomous (63). His argument is that 
aspects from different genres appear in most films. By doing so, he 
challenges the notion that each genre carries a main ideology. A science 
                                                        
11
 Annete Kuhn refers to this same process as codes of visibility, which relates 
to the visual construction of the films, its iconographies. Star Trek, for instance, 
creates a world of space trips, spaceships, friendly aliens, and technologies such 
as teleport or light speed travelling, which could not agree with our reality or 
with current physics, but which is acceptable and understandable to the viewer, 
as it is part of the genre’s iconographic conventions (Kuhn, Alien Zone 7).   
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fiction can be loaded with drama and comedy, since the genres also 
intermingle. Similarly, Kuhn agrees with the hybridization of genre, 
when she states that one of the reasons for the difficulty in defining 
science fiction is how “it overlaps with other types of films, notably 
horror and fantasy” (Alien Zone 1). She proposes that a definition of 
science fiction should consider its “cultural instrumentality,” reflecting 
not on what it is, but rather on what it does culturally. As this definition 
is of a filmic genre, it should encompass not only narrative themes and 
viewpoints–the conflicts between science, technology and human 
nature, spatial and temporal displacement, and points of view and modes 
of narration, (Alien Zone 5)–but also the cinematic language, which 
includes mise-en-scène, editing and proxemics. 
Having clarified these points, this dissertation relies on Darko 
Suvin’s definition of science fiction: “SF is, then, a literary genre whose 
necessary and sufficient conditions are the presence and interaction of 
estrangement and cognition, and whose main formal device is an 
imaginative framework alternative to the author’s empirical 
environment” (7-8). His focus is literature, but the traits he determines to 
science fiction are easily found in film as well. Suvin points two main 
aspects: estrangement and cognition. The first “differentiates SF from 
the ‘realistic’ literary mainstream”, as he explains (8); it is the element 
that introduces the new, the something different and strange to our 
reality, such as the outer space, aliens, spaceships and time-travel. The 
second is cognition, which “differentiates it [SF] not only from myth, 
but also from the folk (fairy) tale and the fantasy” (Suvin 8); this aspect 
respects, or attempts to respect, the empirical laws of physics. Suvin’s 
example is how a folktale can have a magic flying carpet, in which there 
will be no questions to why the carpet flies; while science fiction has to 
propose answers to its “magic,” even if they do not always comply with 
our scientific or physical reality.  
 
Science Fiction, Time and Technology  
 
In Metamorphoses of Science Fiction, Suvin acknowledges that 
around 1800, the genre science fiction went through a watershed, when 
“space loses its monopoly upon the location of estrangement and the 
alternative horizons shift from space to time” (89). The reason is not 
simply the lack of places to explore in the globe. Suvin points two 
factors. The first is that a space-based narrative “stunted within strict 
positivist ideology” (73), while a time-based narrative “setting the tale 
in the future immediately dispensed with any need for empirical 
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plausibility” (72). For Suvin, tales that focused on space limited 
themselves to empiricism, a logical expectation. On the opposite, future 
driven tales would allow a more creative and autonomous construction.  
Suvin’s second reason reveals a more interesting and convoluted 
parameter. He states that “the strong tendency toward temporal 
extrapolation inherent in life based on a capitalist economy, with its 
salaries, profits, and progressive ideals always expected in a future 
clock-time” (73). For Suvin, the capital way of life impelled a time 
tendency through a future based economy. He further explains that “a 
triumphant bourgeoisie introduces an epoch-making epistemological 
break into human imagination, by which linear or clock-time becomes 
the space of human development because it is the space of capitalist 
industrial production” (73). The notion of progress aligns a concept of 
time forward, of expectancy, and not of new spaces and exploration as 
previous 18
th
 century propensities. The feature of estrangement starts 
appearing not in places to be explored, but rather in futures to come. 
Utopia predominates, bringing the future as the source of hope. Such 
statements will complement with my discussion on the relation between 
modernist fiction and time.  
It seems that science fiction’s special drive towards technology 
emerges from this future tendency, and because of its obvious cognitive 
characteristic. New technologies challenge the spectator’s knowledge 
and bring the element of estrangement to the film. Special effects play a 
particular relevant role in science fiction films. Kuhn states that the use 
technology to convey spectacle is a particular feature of this genre 
(Alien Zone 7). Peter Ruppert understands that, in fact, the power of 
science fiction is not only on the narrative, but in its visual realization, 
that science fiction is indeed “a cinema of attractions and exhibitionism” 
(“Fritz” 26). The latter brings an example of Metropolis’s ambiguity in 
how the narrative downgrades technology, while the visual aesthetic of 
the film praises technological advancement. The scene in which the mad 
scientist creates the robot is visually quite impressive. The visual 
technology displayed in the transformation of the robot from steel to the 
figure of Maria enchants the spectator, but such transformation shall 
only lead to the film’s conflict.12  
In the sequence, this theoretical framework discusses tendencies 
of time: utopia, dystopia and nostalgia. These affective inclinations 
relate to the historical moment–modernism or postmodernism–and to 
                                                        
12 
This argument is further discussed in the first chapter “The Modernist”. 
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the genre, in which they emerged. Their relevance lies as guiding tools 
to understanding these periods. 
 
UTOPIA, DYSTOPIA, NOSTALGIA  
 
Utopia, dystopia and nostalgia are important concepts in this 
dissertation since they implicate one’s perception of time and space 
(future, present, past). These topics have been extensively researched,13 
but in this dissertation I will focus on utopian and dystopian views as 
they help to define the scientific genre in film, as associated with 
construction of time. The construction of a better future, or a bad one in 
dystopia, easily relates to themes of technology, temporal and spatial 
displacements, and natural disasters. Modernism and postmodernism 
present major tendencies of time, which relates to their ways of 
perceiving their economic and technological contexts. Nonetheless, this 
research attempts not consider these aspects as rigid concepts only 
applicable to specific periods, rather as fluid ideas that pervade 
differently in each text. These notions become tools to better understand 
time and their social contexts.  
Although utopia is a genre, its effect is not exclusive of the genre. 
In this sense, Suvin defines that utopia “is not a genre, but the socio-
political subgenre of science fiction” (61). Instead of an escapist fiction, 
utopia is a deeply engaged reflection on the author’s own period. Its 
resource is the idealization of realities’ political, social and economic 
flaws. In addition, Suvin recognizes that there are few “perfect” utopias, 
which indicate the connection between utopia and dystopia.  
Bernadete Pasold describes that “[u]topia is to be considered that 
literary piece which describes a perfectly organized and happy world 
from the point of view of the author, in an imaginary place and/or time” 
(18-9). Nonetheless, the present proposal considers utopia a positive 
representation or perception of technology and/or the future, and not 
necessarily in a specific imaginary place and time. The justification for 
such definition arises with the hypothesis that some fictions have 
constructed utopic spaces in contemporary scenarios, and not in new and 
imaginary worlds, but in new realities to this world.   
                                                        
13
 See Raffaella Baccolini and Tom Moylan’s Dark Horizons: Science fiction 
and the dystopian imagination, Linda Hutcheon and Mario L. Valdés’s “Irony, 
Nostalgia, and the Postmodern” and Bernadete Pasold’s Utopia x Satire in 
English Literature.  
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Some modernist films, such as Metropolis, also tend to portray a 
negative perception of futuristic technology, which we can call dystopia. 
M.H. Abrams has defined it as “a very unpleasant imaginary world in 
which ominous tendencies of our present social, political, and 
technological order are projected in some disastrous future culmination” 
(328). This dystopic attitude seems to indicate a transitory and 
intersecting moment between modern and postmodern periods, in which 
George Orwell’s 1984 (1948) is the best example. In relation to this, 
Steven Pinker already proposes 1984 as a postmodern novel, although it 
was published in the modernist period. His main argument is that 
O’Brian’s, the main character, worries are thoroughly postmodern (425).  
Lastly, nostalgia is a kind of utopia, but one which is turned to 
the past, to remembrance instead of creative projection. Linda Hutcheon 
and Mario Valdés define postmodern nostalgia as an intermingling 
between emotional longing and ironic distancing (22). The issue with 
postmodern nostalgia is that it idealizes the past, but this idealization 
cannot be returned to, as it never really existed. Furthermore, 
postmodern nostalgia carries an ironic twist, which demonstrates its 
consciousness of representing the past in the present. In Hutcheon and 
Valdés’s words:   
If our culture really is obsessed with remembering 
[. . .] then perhaps irony is one (though only one) 
of the means by which to create the necessary 
distance and perspective on that anti-amnesiac 
drive. The knowingness of irony may be not so 
much a defense against the power of nostalgia as 
the way in which nostalgia is made palatable 
today: invoked but, at the same time, undercut, 
put into perspective, seen for exactly what it is—a 
comment on the present as much as on the past. 
(23)  
 
Andreas Huyssen provides a significant explanation to historical 
representations in the postmodern period. He states that memory is 
always connected with the present, and not necessarily with the past: 
“the temporal status of any act of memory is always the present and not, 
as some naïve epistemology might have it, the past itself, even though 
all memory in some ineradicable sense is dependent on some past event 
or experience” (Twilight 3). A similar notion can be applied to 
utopic/dystopic fictions. The temporal status of an idealization of the 
future can be the present, and not the future in itself. The futuristic 
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construction mirrors the film’s society, its contemporary fears and 
anxieties.     
The present exists, as Prior argues, as an immediate reflection of 
our current emotions, desires, afflictions. Turning into the future or even 
the past might be analyzed as a way to escape the present, as utopia or 
nostalgia, but it might also be a subversive way to look into the present. 
The title of George Orwell’s novel Nineteen Eighty-Four is an inversion 
of its year of publication 1948, and because of this it can be interpreted 
as a criticism to the post-war period in which Orwell lived. If as 
Huyssen observes memory has its temporal status in the present, so does 
utopia. This is the reality of science fiction films: to create imaginary 
scenarios in order to discuss the present.  
The next chapter begins exploring science fiction with 
Modernism, its history, its time and its cinema. 
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THE MODERNIST  
  
This chapter discusses the modernist movement and its relation to 
time and technology; more specifically the process of modernization vis 
a vis cinema as a new technology. Modernism has been defined as a 
complex and long lasting aesthetic period, comprising approximately 
one hundred years (Jameson,“Postmodernism” 53). A myriad of well-
known and distinct aesthetic movements comprised it, including cubism, 
impressionism, fauvism, expressionism, dadaism, surrealism, futurism, 
to mention a few. In spite of the alleged position of modernism as 
belonging to an elitist view of the arts, films produced in the 1920s and 
30s put into question such perception. In the analysis of Metropolis 
(1927) by Fritz Lang, we will investigate how different modernist 
aesthetic traits can be combined and situated along Mirian Hansen’s 
definition of vernacular modernism, a conceptual venue further 
developed in this chapter.   
 
TIME, MACHINES AND MODERNISM  
 
The subject of time was of particular interest to modernism. The 
social, economic and historical perspectives associated with this period 
add a level of complexity and materialism to the investigation of time 
within a modernist context. As David Harvey asserts in his well know 
study of modernism, “neither time nor space can be assigned objective 
meanings independently of material processes” (204). In this way, a 
conceptualization of time in modernism is here presented followed by 
an analysis of its various representations within cultural productions of 
the period.  
The theoretical approaches to time vary, but they all converge in 
its relevance to modernism. Erich Auerbach observes that “there is 
something peculiar about the treatment of time in modern narrative 
literature” (537), while Jameson describes the predominance of “the 
great high-modernist thematics of time and temporality, the elegiac 
mysteries of durée and of memory” (64). Jürgen Habermas summarizes 
that this special attention to time relates to the vanguard’s and avant-
garde’s propositions of newness, of fresh and original ideas, of a future 
to come and the innovations it would bring:  
 
Aesthetic modernity is characterized by attitudes 
which find a common focus in a changed 
consciousness of time. This time consciousness 
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expresses itself through metaphors of the 
vanguard and the avant-garde. The avant-garde 
understands itself as invading unknown territory, 
exposing itself to the dangers of sudden, of 
shocking encounters, conquering an as yet 
unoccupied future. The avant-garde must find a 
direction in a landscape into which no one seems 
to have yet ventured. (Habermas 4)  
 
This avant-garde’s desire for newness created fictional notions of 
time never seen before. Paul Ricouer provides a revealing analysis to 
comprehend the fictional experimentation with temporality, when 
studying modernist novels. He resorts to literary theorist A. A. 
Mendilow division of “tales of time” and “tales about time”. The former 
concerns every fictional narrative, since they all occur in time. The latter 
are not as common, and deal with those tales that put time into evidence 
“the very experience of time that is at stake in these structural 
transformations” (101). Novels like Virginia Woolf’s Mrs. Dalloway, 
Thomas Mann’s The Magic Mountain, and Marcel Proust’s In Search of 
Lost Time exemplify the construction of “tales about time.” These 
narratives convey different temporal experiences, through flashbacks, 
ellipses, the collision between monumental and personal times, the 
converging perspectives on time, involuntary memory, accelerations and 
decelerations, remembrance and loss. All these demonstrate how 
modernist writing shed a significant attention to temporal construction, 
which emphasized the personal temporality of the characters and 
ultimately altered the way the reader experiences time through the 
reading process.  
In the centre of this new time consciousness is Henri Bergson’s 
concept of duration, which strongly influenced these “tales about time.” 
Stephen Kern explains that “Bergson’s philosophy forms the theoretical 
core of the argument for private time” (8). As mentioned, his concept is 
a return to the individuals’ consciousness, searching for a time that 
flows independently of public arrangements of future, present and past. 
These novels’ time interest also relates to a search for a private time, 
which generates multiples times through multiple consciousness. 
Such personal time, which generates multiple perspectives of 
time, seems to be a reaction against a growing globalism in the first half 
of the 20
th
 century. Auerbach explains that this “peculiar treatment of 
time” emerged during and after the World War decades, but that the war 
conflicts were not the sole reason (549). Harvey points that, besides the 
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world wars, global capitalism and world exhibitions are also causes for 
this experimentation with time (264), as globalism is at the core of a 
search for a single and universal time (GMT). As a reaction to this 
standardization, modernist artists looked for different possibilities in the 
individuality of each one’s time.  
Ricouer points out that in contrast to the image of the Big Ben, 
which in Mrs. Dalloway constructs the idea of a universal time (105), 
Clarissa’s reflection on time intertwines the latter and her own emotions, 
thus foregrounding an inner time as opposed to external time: “an 
indescribable pause; a suspense (but that might be her heart, affected, 
they said, by influenza) before Big Ben strikes. There! Out it boomed. 
First a warning, musical; then the hour, irrevocable,” and soon after she 
thinks about Peter and is “pulled back by memory” to her internal time 
(177). In cinema, the closest idea to “tales about time” is Gilles 
Deleuze’s description of time-image. As discussed in this dissertation’s 
“Introduction,” time-image films create time as duration. Deleuze’s 
main examples, Italian neo-realism and French New Wave, came later 
than the above mentioned novels.  
Nevertheless, early avant-garde films also experimented with 
time as Luis Buñuel and Salvador Dalí’s Surrealist short film Un Chien 
Andalou (1929). Scholar Malcolm Turvey mentions how objects appear 
and disappear, a cyclist occupies two places at the same time, random 
jumps in space from the apartment to a forest, to a beach occur, and how 
“intertitles point to gaps in time that are not verified by the image” 
(126). He further explains that “in Un Chien Andalou they [Buñuel and 
Dalí also] make strategic use of many of the standard continuity 
techniques employed in entertainment films from the 1910s onward” 
(119). His example is how an establishing shot begins the sequence in 
which the woman is reading, positioning her in the apartment, a dissolve 
transitions to a medium shot of her face sensing the cyclist’s approach, 
which cuts to him cycling outside. Other continuity aspects, lighting, 
costume and music, are also respected, emphasizing their intentions to 
follow film’s conventions. But as Linda Williams argues the pattern of 
surrealism is to first use standard modes and break with them. Such 
pattern creates expectations of conventionalities that are then 
transgressed (28). Turvey exemplifies how when the cyclist is arriving 
at the woman’s apartment, the viewer expects that he will run and go 
upstairs to see her, but instead he falls motionless; his behaviour 
changes suddenly, being discontinuous with previous actions.  
Another factor to the rising importance of time in modernist 
fiction is the consolidation of a money driven society, capitalism. 
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Harvey proposes that the cultural upheaval of modernism originates 
through an economic change, Fordism (141), which begins around 1914. 
Although its organization was not new, Fordism innovated because it 
understood that a new way to think mass production also meant a new 
way to think about mass consumption. This notion led to a new social 
organization, in which workers had money and time to spend money. 
Time is, thus, valued as a commodity in statements like “time is 
money.” Anthony Giddens refers to this process as commodification of 
time, “the clock, rather than power-machine as such, is the prime 
element in modern mechanical culture” (14-5). An example is how a 
worker receives for how long he works, and not for how many products 
he makes. On the other hand, space, which was the main geopolitical 
and economic interest in the Renaissance voyages of discovery, for 
instance (Harvey 242-4), loses its value to time. In this sense, time is not 
multiple and personal but singular and rationalized according to a new 
globalist notion of the world.  
The idea of change in modernist fiction is also influenced by 
notions of progress through technological advancements. Harvey 
explains that “[s]ince modernity is about the experience of progress 
through modernization, writings on that theme have tended to 
emphasize temporality, the process of becoming, rather than being in 
space and place” (205). Modernist time relates to how the subject 
experienced shifts in a new global world, and felt the instabilities of this 
ever progressing society. In view of this, I focus mainly on new 
technologies to explain time in modernist science fiction film, although I 
do not argue that technology is the single reason to understand notions 
of time, but it may be the strongest one in science fiction.  
Technological advancement is also a strong influence to the 
“peculiar treatment of time” because technological innovations allowed 
this new growing globalism and its modernization. “Telephone, wireless 
telegraph, x-ray, cinema, bicycle, automobile and airplane” (Kern 1) 
were some of the machines that deeply changed individual’s daily life. 
The notions of duration and private time originate from how some of 
these new technologies lead to a different perception of time and space. 
Harvey exemplifies how the sense of time and space changed radically 
through “[t]he expansion of the railway network, accompanied by the 
advent of the telegraph, the growth of steam shipping, and the building 
of the Suez Canal, the beginnings of radio communication and bicycle 
and automobile travel at the end of the [19
th
] century” (264).  
This influence of technologies over the experiences of time and 
space is not explicit in most of the avant-garde works. The artists were 
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rather explicitly reacting against this modernization, which includes 
globalism, capitalism and machines. A simple overview of these 
movements shows how Dadaism was an expression against logic and 
rationalism. Dadaist art embraced chaos and randomness because it 
rejected interpretations. Their own logic was that an excessive 
rationalism lead to the outbreak of WWI (Short 164). But as Sara 
Danius argues even though they so actively antagonized new 
technologies, they could not fully extract it from their art, since 
“technology can be shown to inform the founding myth of modernism” 
(9).      
The utmost technology of the beginning of the 20
th
 century 
appears to be cinema. Laura Marcus’s extensive study on the influence 
of cinema on early modernist writings demonstrates how even though 
not explicitly referring to cinema, if not rejecting it, modernist literature 
absorbed much of its techniques and ideas. Marcus focuses on Virginia 
Woolf’s relation to cinema, stating that “Woolf undoubtedly saw or 
found in film a relationship to reality that gave visible form to her own 
world-view, and her fascination with ‘the thing that exists when we 
aren’t there’” (Marcus 115). This idea relates to an invisible presence of 
watching without being there, as a film spectator. 
Marcus understands that some of Woolf’s novels had a 
photographic or cinematographic technique. Jacob’s Room conveys a 
sense of simultaneity through cross-cutting (139), Orlando exposes “the 
relationships between modernism, urban experience and cinema” (142), 
To the Lighthouse “overt concern is with pictorial representation, but its 
exploration of the ways in which images of the past function in the 
present bears a much closer relationship to theories of photography and 
cinematography” (147). The Years shows how sight gives way to sound 
in the way the character Maggie hears before seeing, which points to the 
period in which sound film was being established (162). To the 
Lighthouse and The Years also recall serialized and locomotion images 
as they construct time “as a series of passing objects, events and 
‘scenes’ [that] has a filmic dimension” (165). Danius extends this 
analysis by observing how James Joyce resources to an object-centred 
narrative, which appeals to close-up and framing (68), and Proust’s use 
of modes of representing speed and movement are cinematographic 
(75).   
The repercussion of cinema on avant-garde art is relevant because 
it highlights early cinema as an event to modernism. Even though not all 
films were part of the avant-garde movements, cinema as a genre was. 
Art genres were communicating. This chapter’s last subsection will 
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discuss Metropolis as a modernist film because of its traits of an avant-
garde aesthetic with a radical experience of time. Nonetheless Lang’s 
film is not a full example of the time-images defined by Deleuze since 
his mapping of modernist time-image films (around the 60s) comes after 
Metropolis (1927). My analysis shall then also rely on how cinema was 
already influencing the avant-gardes, since the medium of cinema in 
itself was modern and challenged time by radicalizing its importance 
and rendering of it.  
This brief theoretical framework tackled the convoluted relation 
between modernization, time and cinema in the period of modernism. It 
addressed an aesthetic of time experimentations that was influenced by a 
series of changes in the western society, including technologies, 
globalism, capitalism and world wars. The next subsection will discuss 
the Futurism movement which positioned differently from the ones 
explored so far.  
 
Futurism  
 
World wars, economic and technological changes stimulated a 
different artistic inclination in the modernist period, Futurism. This 
modernist movement foregrounds the notions of ephemerality and 
change, which relate to a discourse of future investment through 
progress and innovation. Machines, speed, trains, steam machines, 
urbanism were recurrent themes in the modernist narratives (Kern 2). As 
Filippo Tommaso Marinetti writes in the first Futurist manifesto, “The 
Founding and Manifesto of Futurism” (Le Figaro, Paris, 20 February, 
1909):14  
 
We shall sing the great masses shaken with work, 
pleasure, or rebellion: we shall sing the 
multicolored and polyphonic tidal waves of 
revolution in the modern metropolis; shall sing the 
vibrating nocturnal fervor of factories and 
shipyards burning under violent electrical moons; 
bloated railroad stations that devour smoking 
serpents; factories hanging from the sky by the 
twisting threads of spiralling smoke; bridges like 
gigantic gymnasts who span rivers, flashing at the 
                                                        
14 
Source for translation Rainey, Lawrence; Christine Poggi, Laura Wittman eds. 
Futurism: an anthology. New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 2009. 
49-53.  
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sun with the gleam of a knife; adventurous 
steamships that scent the horizon, locomotives 
with their swollen chest, pawing the tracks like 
massive steel horses bridled with pipes, and the 
oscillating flight of airplanes, whose propeller 
flaps at the wind like a flag and seems to applaud 
like a delirious crowd. (51-2) 
  
Marinetti was the founder of the Futurism movement and is still 
considered the preeminent futurist. This manifesto inaugurated the 
movement, which became a paradigm for other early 20
th
 century 
modernist currents, as Surrealism, Dadaism and Vorticism. Although 
not a prominent artist, he was a poet, his manifestos constituted a sound 
part of the Futurism movement. As the above quote shows, 
technological investment is a central issue in the mention of factories, 
shipyards, railroads, steamships, locomotives and airplanes. This subject 
was already part of 19
th
 century poets such as Walt Whitman and Emily 
Dickinson, but to Futurism, technology is not only the main theme to 
art, but the utmost solution to society. These machines lead to images of 
dynamism, speed, velocity and change in art. Time becomes an 
acceleration, an always-forward movement, an utopia in fiction.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Futurism was also quite aware of how technology affects humans. 
An example is Giacomo Balla’s futuristic painting “Dynamism of a dog 
on a leash” (1912, see Figure 1.2), which shows a clear perception of 
speed in an animal and a human, and not only in a machine, suggesting 
that speed is demanded from all. The urban citizen does not have time to 
walk the dog calmly, but have to accelerate and follow the new social 
Figure 1.1 – Giulio Bragaglia, The Typist/Il dattilografo (1911) 
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scenario. The feet, leash, and tail become multiple; as if existing 
simultaneously. Still the image does not reject speed, but accepts it as a 
new condition of the modern man, and animal.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This futuristic drive comes mainly from the optimistic scenario of 
the industrial revolution and the development of new technologies, 
which impelled the utopias of many artists, who fantasized about the 
future as a solution for their contemporary problems. In this context, 
science fiction literature appropriates this imagined future with the 
promises of technology, and as Kern acknowledges:   
 
Science-fiction writers reached out for the future 
as if it were a piece of overripe fruit. Their stories 
came into vogue on a grand scale, indicating that 
the future was becoming as real to this generation 
as the past had been for readers of the Gothic 
novel and historical romance. There had been 
utopian writings before, but they generally meant 
to identify current problems rather than delineate 
a world to come and the processes by which it 
would evolve. (94) 
 
Figure 1.2 – Giacomo Balla,  
Dynamism of a Dog on a Leash (1912) 
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Futurism and its science fiction were reflecting enthusiastically 
about what was to come and change in society. They bet on technology 
as a savior, and they were hopeful. But Habermas complexifies this 
issue, defending that much of the future impulse was indeed a reflection 
on the present, that the fast changes in society were not raising hopes for 
tomorrow, but rather creating anxieties in and about today. The future as 
a metaphor for the present.     
 
But these forward groupings,  this  anticipation  of  
an  undefined  future and  the  cult  of  the  new,  
mean  in  fact  the  exaltation  of  the  present. The 
new time consciousness, which enters philosophy 
in the writings of Bergson, does more than 
express the experience of mobility in society, 
acceleration in history, of discontinuity in 
everyday life. The new value placed on the 
transitory, the elusive, and the ephemeral, the very 
celebration of dynamism, discloses the longing for 
an undefiled, an immaculate and stable present. 
(Habermas 5)  
 
Futurism also had one darker side that cannot be ignored. Their 
ideas of liberation from tradition, technological innovation and mass 
mobilization made them sympathetic to politics that praised war as 
society’s cleanser. Item nine of Marinetti’s first manifesto states that: 
“We intend to glorify war—the only hygiene of the world—militarism, 
patriotism, the destructive gesture of anarchists, beautiful ideas worth 
dying for, and contempt for woman” (in Rainey, 51). Marinetti was also 
not a feminist. In fact, Futurism’s war politics found an alliance with 
Mussolini’s Fascist vision (Miller 170). An aggressive militarism 
combined with nationalism were dangerously part of their political 
agenda. In such radicalism, an opposition to the economics and 
development of capitalism also grew. Historian Emilio Gentile explains 
that a liberal democracy contradicted modern life “because the very 
process of the development of mass democracy, both in socialism and 
the expanding economy of capitalism led to an affirmation of ‘the 
primacy of force and the necessity of an ever vaster and deeper 
domination’” (57).  
Walter Benjamin in “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical 
Reproduction” asserts how this combination of Fascism and Futurism 
beautified war as an aesthetic pleasure. He further explains that they 
justify war through the idea that “The destructiveness of war furnishes 
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proof that society has not been sufficiently developed to cope with the 
elemental forces of society” (15). Benjamin’s argument is that Futurism 
finally reached l’art pour l’art when humankind’s elimination becomes 
an element of art: “Mankind, which in Homer’s time was an object of 
contemplation for the Olympian gods, now is one for itself. Its self-
alienation has reached such a degree that it can experience its own 
destruction as an aesthetic pleasure for the first order” (15). Their use of 
art as war propaganda cannot be denied, but their artistic significance 
should not be dismissed. The investigation of this movement should 
work as a reminder of the dangers of its political position.   
 
Modernist Time and Cinema, or Vernacular Modernism      
 
In the previous section, I presented two variants of modernist 
time, which Mary Ann Doane refers to as “abstraction/rationalization” 
(10). The first is Ricouer’s “tales about time”, relating to the multiple 
and personal times of the avant-garde, in which the experience of time is 
radicalized in literary fictions as Ulysses (1922) or Mrs. Dalloway 
(1925). In film, Deleuze finds examples that were produced later, as 
Hiroshima Mon Amour (1959) or Last Year in Marienbad (1961), but 
earlier examples can be found as Un Chien Andalou (1929). The second 
variant is “the rationalization of time characterizing industrialization and 
the expansion of capitalism” (Doane 11), which relates more 
specifically to Futurism’s acceleration, forward and utopic thinking. A 
simplified understanding is that both variants reacted to the same 
aspects of modern life, industrialism, globalism, wars, but the first 
rejecting and the later expanding them.   
Metropolis bears both of these variants, an experimental and a 
rational side. This subsection attempts to deepen this issue, as it 
positions Metropolis within the film context of its period, resorting to 
Hansen’s concept of vernacular modernism.  
Cinema was the modern device of art because it provided a new 
way of perception, according to Benjamin (4). Similarly, Francesco 
Casetti states that “Film was the medium of choice in a profoundly 
‘mediated’ era” (11), being the eye of the twentieth century. Hansen’s 
reading of vernacular modernism also associates modernism and 
cinema, but she argues for the rise of classical Hollywood cinema15 as an 
aspect of modernity, as it fitted into the expansive capitalism mode of 
                                                        
15 
David Bordwell classifies classical Hollywood cinema from 1920s to the 
1960s (17), a period that corresponds to the modernism period.  
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Fordism. She writes that “American movies of the classical period 
offered something like the first global vernacular” (340), which could 
only be possible through the capital system and because these films 
were received and accepted differently in each location. To Peter 
Wollen, the consolidation of modernism came with Americanism, “[i]f, 
in the early years of the century, Orientalism was crucial to the 
emergence of modern art (fashion, ballet, decorative art), the period of 
consolidation was marked by Americanism (cinema, architecture, 
applied art)” (35). The issue is not that economy was guiding the 
cultural production, but rather that both are somehow integrated. Thus, 
“even the most ordinary commercial films were involved in producing a 
new sensory culture” (Miriam 344), the modernist culture.  
The science fiction film analyzed in this chapter can be 
considered in terms of Hansen’s concept of vernacular modernism, as a 
popular film of the modernist movement:  
 
[M]odernism as “vernacular” (and avoiding the 
ideologically overdetermined term ‘popular’) 
because the term vernacular combine[s] the 
dimension of the quotidian, of everyday usage, 
with connotations of discourse, idiom, and dialect, 
with circulation, promiscuity, and translatability 
(60). 
 
Metropolis is not a Hollywood film and it is commonly 
associated to the Expressionist avant-garde movement, but as Thomas 
Elsaesser explains UFA16 was economically and institutionally similar to 
the Hollywood industry. According to him, Metropolis tends more to an 
Americanized and commercialized market with special effects and 
futuristic visions than an innovative Expressionist position.  
 
The German cinema of the Weimar Republic is 
often, but wrongly identified with Expressionism. 
If one locates Fritz Lang, Ernst Lubitsch and F. 
W. Murnau on the mental map of Berlin in the 
twenties, home of some of Modernism’s most 
vital avant-garde directors, then Expressionist 
cinema connotes a rebellious artistic intervention. 
If one sees their films grow from the studio floors 
of the Universum Film Aktiengesellschaft (UFA), 
                                                        
16
 Metropolis’s production company.  
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the only film company ever to think it could 
compete with Hollywood, this golden age of silent 
cinema takes its cue more from commerce and 
industry than art. (Weimar 1)   
 
Tom Gunning also notes that Lang attempted to make Metropolis 
into a statement of how German’s cinematic production could be as 
great as Hollywood’s. Nevertheless, “Metropolis so overspent its budget 
that it drove Ufa into the red” and because no original print was 
preserved, “the print most commonly circulated is based, ironically, on 
cuts made for the American distribution” (The Films 53). At the same 
time, the long theoretical tradition that considers Metropolis’s 
expressionist characteristics cannot be denied.17 But in the following 
analysis, I consider Metropolis through Hansen’s vernacular modernism, 
because of this film’s proximity to a Hollywood idea of global market 
and popular audience, focusing more on the characteristics of vernacular 
and rationalization than on the expressionist.  
 
METROPOLIS 
 
This section discusses Metropolis in the light of modernist 
aspects to understand it as an emblem of modernity. My argument is that 
Metropolis builds a complex idea of modernism, in which both 
experimental and rational modernist tendencies are present. Metropolis 
tells the story of how Freder (Gustav Fröhlich), a rich young man and 
son of the city’s owner Joh Fredersen (Alfred Abel), manages to 
conciliate hands and head, or rather workers and boss, through a literal 
hand shake. When the workers rise against Fredersen’s harsh working 
conditions, his son becomes the Mediator. Maria (Brigitte Helm), who 
preaches change among the workers, shows Freder that he should be the 
heart because “HEAD and HANDS require a Mediator. The Mediator 
between head and hands must be the heart” (00:55:37). In the middle of 
this utopia, human like robots, demon like machines, mad scientists, 
upward cityscapes and deliriums construct the modernist use of time and 
the film’s futuristic and technological drive.  
 
 
                                                        
17
 See Lotte H. Eisner’s chapter “The Handling of Crowds: Metropolis; the 
influence of the Expressionist choruses and Piscator” in The Haunted Screen.   
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Metropolis’s Metropolis  
 
The spaces in Metropolis illustrate the combination between a 
vernacular modernism that constructs a futuristic idea and an avant-
garde modernism that tends to an expressionist aesthetic. Peter Ruppert 
describes Lang’s film as an “aesthetic of ambivalences” (“Fritz” 22). 
The city of Metropolis indicates the modern look, while Rotwang’s 
(Rudolf Klein-Rogge)–the film’s mad scientist–house exposes a baroque 
construction, an archaism in the middle of the urban city.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the opening sequence, the futuristic tendency of the film 
emerges in the image of the city as a bright and upward utopia. The 
modern city of Metropolis is revealed in its glamorous illumination and 
high skyscraper buildings with elegant if not ostensible design (see 
Figure 1.3). To Anna Notaro, it reminds much of the New York’s urban 
space with its “skyscrapers and its image as the paradigmatic modern 
metropolis” (162). Other frames show suspended highways and planes 
flying through the buildings, thus, signalling a prosperous city.  
The cityscape’s modern appeal reveals Metropolis’s utopic and 
futuristic tendencies. A comparison between Figure 1.3 and Figure 1.4 – 
Fortunato Depero’s futuristic painting Skyscrapers and Tunnels (1930) – 
exposes their similarities. Both emphasize the grandeur of the 
skyscrapers and how the buildings interpolate and superimpose one 
another. The first has one main skyscraper, where Frederson’s sole 
Figure 1.3 – The city of Metropolis – 01:59:11 
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power lies; while in the second, the buildings seem to bend towards and 
over each other, as if competing for space or forming one pyramidal 
shape. Both construct the same ideas of power and prosperity in the 
buildings’ centrality and vertical lines. In both, the lights, which focus 
on and come from the buildings, highlight the urban feeling of cities that 
never sleep.  
 
 
Tubes comes out of the lower part of Depero’s painting, 
suggesting an underground and different aspect of the modern city. 
Sewers or machines that sustain the upper city.  Similarly, Lang’s film 
also shows a contrast between its upward city and underground world. 
The latter is where the workers inhabit squared and monotonous 
buildings (see Figure 1.5). This space is a metaphor of what should be 
hidden, where the sunlight does not reach, where society excludes the 
unfortunate ones. The city can only sustain itself on top, literally and 
metaphorically, of the underground, exploiting other people’s lives. 
Lighting is a relevant aspect to this film’s ambivalent criticism, 
which has a striking chiaroscuro lighting scheme. In the upper part of 
the city, the contrast between light and dark areas create flattening 
shadows, which combine into complex and detailed patterns. The beams 
of light suggest the city as a spectacle. The show is the city in itself, and 
where a beam light focus: the main extravagant building called New 
Tower of Babel. This tower accommodates the Son’s club complex 
“with its lecture halls and libraries, its theaters and stadiums” 
(00:06:53), and Joh Fredersen’s office, from where he commands the 
whole city. In the lower part of the city, lighting reveals nonuniform 
patterns from unknown sources, which rather highlight the uniformity of 
the buildings, all alike as the workers themselves. The workers’ uniform 
Figure 1.4 – Fortunato Depero’s Skyscrapers and Tunnels (1930) 
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march suggests how their plight and life conditions are similar, not 
allowing for individual identity. The low camera angle in the first figure 
enlarges or magnifies the cityscape, while the frontal angle on the 
worker’s buildings provides a more neutral image. Despite this 
criticism, different scholars18 have pointed to the film’s problematic 
resolution, in which Fredersen acquires even more power through his 
son’s mediation. He makes peace with the workers offering no solution 
to their plight.  
 
 
 
Peter Ruppert observes three different spaces in Metropolis. The 
first is the surface of the city, which exposes the utopian effects of a 
highly developed city with its skyscrapers, aerial highways, stadiums, 
gardens, airplanes. The second is the underground world that shows a 
contrasting image with workers enslaved by machines through a 
mechanical rhythm, the dark scenario, the crowded elevator, the 
devouring Moloch machine. The third space represents the escape from 
technology, where the eternal and sublime emerge: the catacombs. 
There, Maria preaches to the workers, whose utopia detaches from 
technology, and implies a bond to nature, to a feminine space, the womb 
(Ruppert, “Fritz” 21). These three spaces construct a layered view of the 
futuristic city. The catacombs allow the nourishment of new ideas, 
which will lead to the revolt; they are deeper than the factories and the 
                                                        
18
 For more information, see the research of Tom Gunning’s The Films of Fritz 
Lang: Allegories of vision and modernity, Peter Brooker’s Metropolis, or 
Thomas Elsaesser’s Metropolis.   
Figure 1.5 – Metropolis’s underground – 00:06:37 
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workers’ buildings. The factories are dark scenarios of exploitation, and 
the uptown is where a few people delight on pleasure and happiness.   
In this layered and divided city, nature is a positive element in 
both the underground vaults and in the uptown gardens. The vaults are a 
religious place, where Maria preaches her sermons, where Freder 
understands his mediator role, and where the workers decide to raise a 
revolution. The catacombs’ caves seem ancient and hand sculptured, 
they are carved in stone in a labyrinth construction, even maps are 
necessary. The uptown gardens are called Eternal Gardens, where 
Freder can choose among the most beautiful girls to play with and have 
fun. Although Freder’s gardens look artificial and too scenic with their 
water fountains, exotic plants and animals, they definitely imply 
happiness. These gardens come from the benefits of a mechanical 
production, as the narration describes “Fathers, for whom every 
revolution of a mechanical wheel meant gold, had bestowed upon their 
sons the wonder of the Eternal Gardens” (00:07:35).   
Metropolis has one intriguing space, Rotwang’s baroque house. 
The latter works as a mirrors and an extension of its owner. Rotwang is 
the main villain of the story; a mad, but ingenious scientist, who wants 
revenge against Joh Fredersen because of an old love affair. His main 
issue is that, despite his intelligence, he cannot forget, as Fredersen says: 
“A mind like yours, Rotwang, should be able to forget” (00:40:22). 
Searching for revenge, Rotwang uses robot-Maria to create a 
disagreement between son and father, using Freder’s love for Maria. 
 
 
Figure 1.6 – Rotwang's house – 00:38:10 
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By its turn, the house is also something from the past (see Figure 
1.6). An old house in the middle of a cosmopolitan and modern city, 
which should have been forgotten. As the description goes: “In the 
middle of Metropolis, there stands a strange house that the centuries had 
overlooked” (00:38:05). Its curvy shape is obsolete compared to the 
other squared and pointy buildings, reminding us of an old cabin in the 
woods. A small single door stands in its front, and quite different from 
the tall buildings from both the city and the underground, it has no 
windows. What is inside cannot be revealed to the outside, bad 
illuminated and filled with evil intentions. It seems to be constructed out 
of clay, implying a more organic and older power than the Babel Tower. 
Fredersen and Rotwang can also be compared. If both are the 
villains of this story, the former has a capital, rational and progressive 
impulse, while the latter is moved by his old and organic rancor towards 
Fredersen. Rotwang’s attachment to the past, his nostalgia and baroque 
mind, strangely leads to futuristic innovations. He creates the robot 
Futura, because of his desire to reproduce his gone love, Hel. But his 
attachment to the past leads to his unhappy ending, dying, mad, 
believing that Maria is Hel; while Fredersen has a most happy ending, 
reconciling with the workers without ever attending their initial 
demands.   
A supernatural force also emanates from Rotwang’s house. Like 
Felix’s magic bag or Doctor Who’s TARDIS, it looks small from the 
outside, but it is big in the inside. Secret vaults lie underneath the house, 
connected to the catacombs, where Maria preaches, attaching the future 
to an even older past. It is the only house in a story full of apartments 
and tall buildings. But its uncanny force emerges mostly from how 
Rotwang’s technologies emit a magical aura.  
 
Futura  
 
The theme of technology in Metropolis is associated with 
sentimental, mystical and supernatural forces. For instance, Rotwang’s 
house is not surprising only because it is a kind of medieval cathedral in 
the middle of a futuristic city, as Alan Williams observes (24); it is 
because inside this peculiar place inhabits the most advanced 
technologies. Why would a genius scientist conduct his experiments and 
create his inventions in such a peculiar space? Because, as already 
mentioned, this house represents an attachment to the past. Futura or 
robot-Maria, despite its name, is an intention to recuperate the past in 
the image of Hel, and not to progress into the future. This scientist is not 
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driven by rationalism, but by a sentimental fantasy of recuperating a 
long lost love.      
Peter Wollen observes that previous to the film Metropolis, in 
science fiction   “[e]arlier versions of robots were […] semi-magical 
beings” (44), as they had a personal relation to their makers. Similarly, 
Robot-Maria is an extension of Rotwang’s love for Hel. In this sense, 
the transformation of the robot into a replica of Maria also carries a 
magical aura, as if Rotwang were casting a spell. Nonetheless, this 
sequence does rely on strong technological elements: it is full of 
machines and devices, Rotwang walks around turning gears and wheels, 
pulling levers, pushing buttons, checking cables and measuring 
instruments.  
 
 
When the transformation of the robot initiates a supernatural 
atmosphere floods the sequence through the cinematic effects of 
dissolves and fast cutting. The camera focuses on the robot, that is 
sitting on a high chair, like a throne; on top of its head lies an inverted 
pentagram,19 beams of cycled lights surround it, going up and down. 
                                                        
19
 A reverse pentagram, as the pentagram in itself, has a number of different 
meanings, which I do not consider relevant to this discuss, but a wide-known 
interpretation is its association with evilness and black magic, as an opposition 
to the pentagram, which symbolizes the human being and its five points (head, 
arms and legs).  
Figure 1.7 – Robot’s Transformation – 01:24:51 
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Intense lighting is hitting Maria, who is lying inside a glass chamber 
(see Figure 1.7). The pace of the cuts increases, Rotwang’s speed in 
adjusting buttons and turning gears also intensifies, followed by extreme 
close-ups of the bubbling tubes, flashing lights, the potions changing 
tones, and the shots dissolve one into another. Then a beating heart 
appears on the robot’s chest, followed by luminous veins, and finally, a 
close on the robot’s face gradually fades into Maria’s features. The 
robot opens her eyes, and it is alive. The shot cuts to real Maria, who 
lets her head fall, as if dead. Rotwang’s sorcery and necromancy is 
done; he is a scientist magician, as Peter Wollen refers to him (46). The 
robot will now be used as a dangerous tool, enhancing the bewitched 
force around this technology. 
The Moloch is 
also a dangerous 
machine, emanating a 
supernatural power. In 
the first time Freder 
sees this machine, it 
breaks, the explosion 
throws him to a wall, 
and he hallucinates. 
What he sees is a 
demon that eats 
humans as sacrifice. 
At a certain point of 
his hallucination, the 
machine resembles an Egyptian statue, similar to the Great Sphinx of 
Giza. The first humans to climb the stars towards the Sphinx are clearly 
slaves. They are bold, squalid and tied up by ropes; a reference to the 
construction of the Egyptian pyramids, and other monuments (see 
Figure 1.8). The demon’s mouth swallows the slaves, who are pushed 
by the Guards.   
This sequence implies that modernity is even worse with its 
workers. Following the slaves, the workers go up the stairs, but 
differently from the slaves, they do not seem to contest their sacrifice; 
they do not need guards to push them inside the monster’s mouth. They 
march up in an organized pace, complacent with their own death. These 
modern slaves or laborers are rather too tired to contest or have just 
given up fighting. Andreas Huyssen summarizes that this sequence 
“presents technology as an autonomous deified force demanding 
worship, surrender, and ritual sacrifice” (“The Vamp” 222-3).       
Figure 1.8 – Moloch Machine – 00:15:45 
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Besides this supernatural aura, dystopia also emerges in the film’s 
rendering of the ways in which technology can be used to evil 
intentions. The Moloch machine swallows the workers as an incarnation 
of evilness. This is not only part of Freder’s hallucination but a 
metaphor to how the machine enslaves and exhausts the workers. The 
robot-Maria was also a sorrowful substitute for Rotwang’s long lost 
lover, Hel. However, he changes his mind, and decides to use the robot 
as a revengeful tool. Such view inverts the human-machine logic, in 
which the human uses the machine as tool. The inversion is that the 
human body, the feminine, is used as a tool by the machine. 
Another inversion is that while robot-Maria actively incites the 
workers into an aggressive strike, the workers passively follow the 
manufacturing machines and the robot. The human is reduced into an 
object, while the objects gain life. Both indicate the distortions caused 
by this technological society. Nonetheless, evilness does not arise from 
the robot, but rather from the patriarchal and revengeful intentions of the 
scientist Rotwang and the businessman Fredersen (Ruppert, “Fritz” 31) 
intentionally manipulate the female body and the machine as objects to 
reach their goals.  
The film’s imagery of technology is also ambiguous, bearing both 
utopic and dystopic tendencies. Siegfried Kracauer writes that three of 
Lang’s films, Metropolis, The Spy (1928) and The Girl in the Moon 
(1929), “dealt with thrilling adventures and technological fantasies 
symptomatic of the then current machine cult” (149). What Kracauer 
argues is that despite the negative implication these machines suggest, 
Lang’s reliance on a “pompous ornamentation” of technological icons 
implies his own fascination with technology. The creation of the robot is 
the utmost example (see Figures 1.9-1.12). In this sequence, the 
transformation of the robot becomes a kind of spectacle, which is 
certainly, if far from realistic, fascinating.   
The Heart-Machine also conveys an ambiguous perspective 
towards technology. When the workers rebel and destroy it, their houses 
are flooded, putting their children in danger. This machine was 
preventing the flooding. But Mary K. Leigh argues that the structure of 
the city “is a calculated move by the masters to make the continued 
existence of the proletariat dependent upon their enslavement to the 
machine” (20). The Heart-Machine is actually Fredersen’s conscious 
move to keep the workers enslaved to his system, sustaining the 
aboveground luxury and preventing the underground flooding. 
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Figure 1.9 – Robot’s Transformation 
Figure 1.10 – Robot’s Transformation 
Figure 1.11 – Robot’s Transformation 
Figure 1.12 – Robot’s Transformation 
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Robot-Maria is also an interesting machine, being destructive in 
two aspects: as a machine and as a woman, as Wollen explains 
“[t]echnology and sexuality are condensed in the figure of the robot 
Maria” (46). The robot would not be able to deceive if it were not a 
copy of Maria’s body. The machine has a harmful end; while the woman 
body leads to a lustful sin. Huyssen correlates how the idea of a robot 
out-of-control is extended to the woman out-of-control (After 74). 
Compared to Robot-Maria, Human-Maria represents the other side of 
womanhood, the motherly figure, who protects instead of harms. Maria 
as a woman represents redemption; she preaches the workers, she brings 
them hope, she saves the children from the flood. Huyssen proposes a 
quite revealing argument20, that the film’s dual position toward 
technology is similar to the image of the woman (“The Vamp” 224). 
Maria and her bad cyborg version represent male projections of the 
virgin and the vamp. Her maternal and solicitous side comes out when 
she preaches and takes care of the children, while her robot version 
reflects the rebellions and sexual destructive side, as she leads the 
workers to an insurgence and men into madness.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In these oppositional roles, we can see how great an actress 
Brigitte Helm was. When Robotic Maria dances in such a lustful and 
provocative way, I cannot but agree with Tom Gunning, who mentions 
that either Helm “has ball bearings in her joints, some sort of special 
effect was used, or, alternatively, that there are more mysteries in 
creation than [we] have yet experienced” (Films 72). Figures 1.13 and 
1.14 show the two versions of Maria. In the first image, she is shown as 
being the protective mother, as she holds the defenseless children. In 
this frame, a hallowed fog focuses her, giving her an angelical aura. The 
                                                        
20 
In his article “The Vamp and the Machine: Technology and Sexuality in Fritz 
Lang’s Metropolis.”  
Figure 1.13 – Maria as Mother – 
00:10:31 
Figure 1.14 – Maria as Vamp –
01:41:08 
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second picture shows Maria in the same clothes, looking fantastically 
perverse, which is more than her eye shadows, but her gestures, her kink 
smile and her twitching eye.  
Within these roles, Patricia Mellencamp states that “the equation 
of the female body with technology, including sex, represents the female 
body as special effect” (66). Robot women, like Maria, are literally 
objects of fascination and spectacle. Annette Michelson has already 
described a complex relationship between the female body and 
mechanical reproduction, in which “[T]he female body then comes into 
focus as the very site of cinema’s invention” (20). Michelson’s intricate 
argument is that since the Renaissance the female body has been 
mapped, fragmented and fetishized; and mechanical reproduction was 
born within this mode of representation that came out of fetishizing 
female bodies. The camera’s obsession with the women’s body is more 
than a cinematic iconography of repression and desire, as Laura Mulvey 
describes (“Visual” 843), but the very “fantasmatic ground of cinema” 
(19). Cinema was born out of the same Renaissance desire to (re)create 
the perfect woman, as Rotwang trying to recreate Hel in Robot-Maria.       
 
A Tale about Time and Power  
 
To understand Metropolis’s modernist interest in time, this 
subsection analyzes the sequences in which Freder, the main character, 
hallucinates. This brief sequence is close to the idea of “tales about 
time” of the modernist narratives. First, he sees the lustful robot-Maria 
with his father, Fredersen, and thinks she is the real Maria, which affects 
him so violently that he loses his balance and has hallucinatory visions. 
This scene begins with Freder losing his sight as he sees  exploding 
lights, then a fog gradually blurs his father and Maria (see Figure 1.15), 
and what follows is a fast cutting editing composed of fade-ins, fade-
outs, superimpositions of faces (see Figure 1.16) and angular lights, 
which indicate Freder’s delusional moment. He then seems to be falling 
in a never-ending space (see Figure 1.17), and after a cut, he is lying in 
his bed with his father besides him.  
The superimpositions, juxtapositions, and unexpected cross-
cuttings destabilize the spectator’s coordination of Freder. A 
metaphorical interpretation enhances the artistic inclination of the film, 
implying that he is not literally falling, but that his expectations are, and 
that he is falling to his ruin. The multiple images of Maria and his father 
infer Freder’s new and disappointed perspective over them; as if they 
had being hiding their malevolent personalities from him. By its turn, 
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Figure 1.16 – 01:28:54 
the exploding lights indicate the shock he suffers by this revelation, 
which has a bombastic effect in his emotions, as he literally struggles to 
remain standing.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The editing of this sequence distorts the spectator’s perception of 
the film. Freder is the focalizer, and as he loses control of himself and 
his senses the spectator also loses the capacity to coordinate the 
character in time-space. For instance, the sequence begins in his father’s 
office, he is suddenly falling in a surreal void, and in the next scene, he 
is lying in his bed. Such composition compresses time, because similar 
to Freder, the spectator cannot precisely follow the jump cuts. Richard 
Figure 1.15 – 01:28:43 
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Murphy describes 
this uncertainty as 
a modernist 
rejection of a 
classic realistic 
aesthetic, arguing 
this aspect as an 
anti-
representational 
mode of German 
expressionism 
(106). In this 
sense, these 
hallucination 
sequences would 
tend to an avant-garde modernist construction. Despite this dislocation, 
the spectator does not lose the consciousness of the hallucinatory 
instance. Therefore the second scene of delusion is what really intrigues 
me.  
The following sequence portrays a similar instance of 
hallucination. Freder seems to be ill in his bed, when he starts entering 
in another void of hallucinations and sees robot-Maria dancing in a 
brothel. The problem is that he again confuses the robot with the real 
woman. The dislocation and confusion are enhanced since in this 
delusion, he is not alone. Other men, including his father and Rotwang 
are also admiring her dance. Later, a friend of Freder confirms the show, 
implying that the lustful dance actually happened, and that he somehow 
witnessed it, although he was never there. He was always in his bed. If 
this collision is a memory of Freder, he is experiencing two 
temporalities at once. If his mind is in the brothel and his body in bed, 
then he is in two places at the same time.  
Although referring to a later period of films, Deleuze provides a 
useful analytical tool, referring to this collision of times as 
incompossible presents. His argument is that the possibility of different 
presents at the same time separates narration from successive action 
(Cinema 2 101). The movement-image cinema, which comprises time’s 
dependency on action, was replaced by the time-image cinema, in which 
time can be detached from space and actions can become autonomous. 
In the latter, narration can be composed of distinct presents and actions. 
These multiple presents do not compose a parallel universe, rather they 
comprise different presents happening to different characters, as 
Figure 1.17 – Freder’s Fall – 01;28:59 
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mentioned. But these different presents together are “incompossible.” 
Deleuze’s example is Robbe-Grillet’s work, in which “there is never a 
succession of passing presents, but a simultaneity of a present of past, a 
present of present and a present of future, which make time frightening 
and inexplicable” in films like Last Year in Marienbad and 
L’Immortelle. In his words, different presents existing at the same time:  
 
Abstracts it [narration] from all successive action, 
as far as it replaces the movement-image with a 
genuine time-image. Thus, narration will consist 
of the distribution of different presents to different 
characters, so that each forms a combination that 
is plausible and possible in itself, but where all of 
them together are ‘incomposible’, and where the 
inexplicable is thereby maintained and created. 
(Cinema 2 101)   
   
Freder momentarily presences an incompossible present. When 
he lives two presents at the same time, being in bed and watching the 
show, these two moments could not be happening to the same person. 
Still he feels both. Although, it is true that he is not there, at the cabaret 
show, he only sees it. Therefore, could Freder be only dreaming or 
having a vision? The two interpretations are not exclusive, rather, they 
are both possible: there is a supernatural element in Freder’s vision and 
also a narrative dislocation. Both possibilities emerge in how time and 
space do not correspond.  
Murphy argues that this incompossible present is a narrative 
dislocation. He understands that classic realist films or classic 
Hollywood narration provide a reliable narrative authority (109). 
Nonetheless, Metropolis, as a modernist film, lacks a narrative source, 
“a narrative agent” (Murphy, 106), since its narration is not single and 
fixed. The spectator cannot distinguish if the perspective over Maria’s 
dance is from Freder’s hallucination or from other people. The 
superimpositions, cross-cutting, and fades enhance this lack of 
orientation. In fact, the shot that shows many eyes superimposed (see 
Figure 1.18) gives the clue that both answers are correct, which actually 
encumbers our capacity to distinguish the narrative source. These eyes 
seem to come from robot-Maria’s dazzled audience, which implies that 
their different perspectives compose this scene. Moreover, the 
synecdoche image suggests the fragmentation of the being, which could 
contribute to madness (see Figure 1.19).  
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Freder is not the 
only one affected by a 
hallucination. Robot-
Maria’s audience is so 
mesmerized by her 
sexuality that they are 
also in trance. The same 
way she is able to move 
the workers into a riot 
later in the film, she now 
moves these men into 
madness (see Figure 
1.19). The parallel 
montage shows that while 
the audience is seeing the 
show, Freder is 
hallucinating in bed. In 
his illusion, he even sees 
a picture of a demon in 
the Bible, which is 
exactly the same as robot-
Maria. In the sequence, a 
statue of death starts 
moving and playing a 
flute, which awakes other 
statues, each representing 
one of the seven deadly 
sins. Robot-Maria is the double of the death’s statue, as she provokes 
people to sin. Similar to the statues, she awakes Freder’s and the 
audience’s sins. One of the members of the audience even says “all 
Seven Deadly Sins, on her behalf!” (01:33:22). The supernatural 
element, that I have noted, also arise from this evilness in robot-Maria, 
which confuses the characters, distorts the narration and editing, and 
leads to the spectator’s displacement.   
The analysis of Metropolis demonstrates Neale’s argument in 
“Questions of Genre” that the audience also contributes to the formation 
of the genre. Metropolis’s editing and narration distorts continuity 
through a time and space displacement. Such distortions generate 
ambiguities in the spectator, who is not always able to coordinate time 
and space. In order words, they affect the viewer’s consciousness to 
relate a time to a space. By doing so, the public embodies the characters’ 
Figure 1.18 - 01:32:34 
Figure 1.19 – 01:32:31 
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displacement. Similarly to what Ricouer describes in relation to the 
modernist novels of Woolf, Joyce and Mann, and differently from what 
the spectator experienced in a realistic aesthetic. In this sense, Murphy 
concludes that:  
 
Through the text the audience is confronted with 
its own lack of knowledge and lack of mastery in 
the face of a terrifying, technologically-driven and 
irrational form of modern reality. And the shock 
produced in the audience is a challenge that not 
only undermines this traditional expectation of 
mastering the text but more importantly forces it 
to confront a psychological reality that upsets the 
sensible, sheltered, bourgeois construction of the 
world that the audience inhabits (Murphy 118). 
 
Lastly, Metropolis bears a certain fascination with time. Symbols 
of time appear throughout the film and they are mostly related to power. 
An example is the double clocks on Fredersen’s office (see Figure 1.20). 
These are peculiar, because none of them are regular clocks. The smaller 
has 24 marks, while the bigger one has only 10. These clocks appear in 
the opening sequence, in-between shots of the machines. When the 
bigger one reaches the 10 o’clock, the factory whistle blows, signing the 
workers change of shift. They march orderly, their heads down, their 
clothes worn out, all looking the same. Similar to the GMT, which was 
created to impose a uniform time, Fredersen’s time stripes the workers’ 
individuality. Time is the power to control these men, which cyclically 
makes him richer, which increases his power. Peter Wollen refers to this 
as the fordist time, a rationalized and goal oriented time (35). This 
perspective on time differs from the previous one – which is more 
experimental and avant-garde – as it tends Futurism’s ideas of progress 
and rational orientation.  
A more explicit sequence of time as control is when Freder 
decides to help one of the workers and takes his place controlling the 
machine. This machine looks like a clock, and needs to be constantly 
regulated. When Freder is too tired, bright clock numbers dissolve 
within the machine (see Figure 1.21), making an explicit reference to 
time and to Fredersen’s office clock. Worker Georgy 11811 (Erwin 
Biswanger) and Freder’s work is to move the machine’s pointers as its 
lights turn up. The operation seems quite random, but the whole idea is 
that they need to follow up with the machine’s rhythm. Elsaesser 
reminds us that Freder’s postures in this sequence recalls Atlas 
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supporting the Globe or a half-suspended Christ at the cross (Metropolis 
64). Freder’s attempt to follow this machine is a massive effort. In this 
unhuman sacrifice, men are stripped of their identity and submit to the 
power of time in Fredersen’s greed hands.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
These 10-hour clocks that appear throughout the film show that 
the city of Metropolis has its own time, regulating its own pace. 
Elsaesser observes the irony and self-referential gesture when Fredersen 
waiting for Rotwang looks at his 12-hour Swiss watch, showing that 
Figure 1.20 – Frederson’s Clocks – 00:03:38 
Figure 1.21 – Factory’s Machine – 00:47:23 
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“the master of Metropolis and watchmaker of its universe declares 
himself both part of his world and standing apart from it” (Metropolis 
65). Metropolis shows that its boundaries are more than space, but time. 
It is not only the underground or the modern city that separates workers 
and their employers, but how time is different for them.    
   
Metropolis can be seen as a convoluted example of modernist 
film, which intricately combines an avant-garde and a Futuristic 
tendencies. Researcher Anton Kaes takes a different view, but also 
argues that the machines, woman’s emancipation and sexual liberation 
(in the robot-Maria) and the Fordism critic makes Metropolis a 
modernist film. Kaes concludes that utopian Expressionism is undoubtly 
part of this film, but that it can be historically explained as a modernist 
tendency to fight cruel and dehumanizing tendencies of modernity (10). 
Maybe because of or despite of this ambiguity, Lang’s film is an 
example of popular, or vernacular, modernist science fiction, that 
becomes a prototype to further science fiction films, to ideas of modern 
cities, automatized machines, and complex times.  
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THE POSTMODERNISTS  
 
This chapter analyzes postmodern science fiction films, 
specifically in its relation to modernism, considering aesthetics and 
epistemological continuities between modernism and postmodernism 
rather than its alleged cultural ruptures. The following dialogical 
discussion of these two periods highlights their similarities and 
differences, considering their nuances and intertwinements. The 
postmodern films present a dystopic view of the future, bearing rather 
nostalgic plots, which is reflected in the films’ structural and aesthetic 
constructions. Two films illustrate these characteristics: Blade Runner 
(1982) by Ridley Scott and Twelve Monkeys (1995) by Terry Gilliam. 
Before analyzing these films, this chapter discusses theoretical 
frameworks regarding time and postmodernism. 
  
TIME AND THE POSTMODERN PERIOD  
 
Postmodern theorists tend to point out space as a more relevant 
subject than time. Fredric Jameson, for instance, argues that “it is at 
least empirically arguable that our daily life, our psychic experience, our 
cultural languages, are today dominated by categories of space rather 
than by categories of time, as in the preceding period of high modernism 
proper” (“Postmodernism” 64). This chapter is an attempt not to dissent 
from such argument, but rather to add a different dimension to it, to 
include the importance of time within a discussion on postmodernism.  
Despite the emphasis on space, time in postmodernism is seen as 
accounted in memory and its nostalgic rendering of the past. Jameson 
himself asserts that “the products of culture have nowhere to turn but to 
the past: the imitation of dead styles, speech through all the masks and 
voices stored up in the imaginary museum of a now global cultural” 
(“Postmodernism” 65). In Twilight Memories, Andreas Huyssen 
proposes a similar idea; he investigates issues of time and memory, 
because “discussions about postmodernism focused on issues of space, 
relegat[e] the thematics of time and temporality to an earlier cultural 
moment of high modernism” (2). Additionally, Linda Hutcheon comes 
up with the term “historiographical metafiction”, which is illustrated by 
“those well-known and popular novels which are both intensely self-
reflexive and yet paradoxically also lay claim to historical events and 
personages” (Poetics 5). But while these theorists focus on the past, this 
research probes into other aspects of time, its relevance within a 
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postmodernist context, comprehending its theoretical and cultural 
aspects.  
Firstly, the caesura between modernism and postmodernism is 
hard to mark. Their intersection is visible in the latter’s name. 
Postmodernism evinces a transition but also a connection, its existence 
and much of its understanding depends upon its predecessor, since many 
of postmodernism’s qualities relate and respond to modernism’s 
anxieties. Most theorists, as Jameson, Huyssen and David Harvey, are 
inclined to describe postmodernism from an economic perspective. 
Their argument is the occurrence of a simultaneous change in capital 
organization and aesthetic production. For instance, Harvey refers to the 
economic change from Fordism to flexible accumulation (147), while 
Jameson mentions the transition from early to late capitalism (55). To 
Harvey, the economic change is a result of Fordism’s rigidity, which he 
sees as Fordism’s most problematic aspect (142). Its system of 
accumulation and growth reached its apogee in the 60s, the same period 
in which counter-cultural critics and minority movements started 
growing (Harvey 139), culminating with “the strike waves and labor 
disruptions of the period 1968-72” (Harvey 142). Therefore, the 70s and 
the 80s were a period of economic restructuring and political 
adjustment, when flexible accumulation emerged (Harvey 145). Harvey 
explains that “it [flexible accumulation] rests on flexibility with respect 
to labour processes [flexible hours, sub-contracting, self-employment, 
temporary and part-time jobs], labour markets [dynamism that allows 
gigantic corporate power and also small specialized production], 
products, and patterns of consumption [the exchange of products 
between different regions increases; the corporations are no longer 
national but transnational]” (147). Labour and money exchange became 
more autonomous from governmental or national policies, which led to 
a growth in the service-sector, to new highly specialized markets and 
sectors of production, and to a compression in time-space (Harvey 147).  
This time-space compression is what interests me in this research 
project. Harvey’s words are that “we have been experiencing, these last 
two decades, an intense phase of time-space compression that has had a 
disorienting and disruptive impact upon political-economic practices, 
the balance of class power, as well as cultural and social life” (284). The 
main idea is that different social practices bear different time and space 
notions. Time is compressed because people need to be, to learn, to 
produce, to arrive, to follow technological improvements faster; space is 
compressed because of the virtual space and how technology allows us 
to go to places faster. These social practices arise from emerging 
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material processes, which, for Harvey, include the creation of new 
technologies, such as the mobile telephone, the internet, easier access to 
fast means of transportation–such as cars, subways, airplanes (285).  
Corporate industry and global market demand the creation of 
these new technologies, which end up affecting social relations. In 
Harvey’s words: “Through such mechanisms […] individuals were 
forced to cope with disposability, novelty, and the prospects for instant 
obsolescence” (286). Money changes technologies, which alter social 
relations, which comprise time-space. How this differs from early 
capitalism is that the mode of production was not so dynamic, and in 
this way, the changes did not occur as fast as we are witnessing 
nowadays. The postmodern economic context establishes ephemerality, 
as a steady change and affects cultural production. Whereas “Fordism 
[…] build upon and contributed to the aesthetic of modernism–
particularly the latter’s penchant for functionality and efficiency–in very 
explicit ways” (Harvey 136), in postmodernism, “[w]hat has happened 
is that aesthetic production today has become integrated into commodity 
production generally” (Jameson, “Postmodernism” 56). Art becomes a 
product, and starts being produced as such.  
The problematic according to this perspective is that mass 
production eliminates the cult in art. In the early 20
th
 century, Walter 
Benjamin already proposed that man-made reproductions hold a sense 
of uniqueness and aura, while mechanical reproductions lose the same 
connection with the original and authentic (Illuminations 2).21 A few 
decades later, Jameson also delivers a sound explanation. His argument 
is that as mechanical reproduction depletes affect from objects, it also 
blurs our temporal relation with things (“Postmodernism” 64). In other 
words, reproduction eliminates the sense of unique, and such uniqueness 
is dependent on time; repetition trivializes time. Because of this lack of 
cult value due to a repetitive and mechanical production, postmodern 
attention deviates from a focus on temporality, since the individual no 
longer has an affective relation with time.   
 
Time and Future  
 
The waning of affect observed by Jameson leads to a dismissal of 
time in Postmodernism. The general understanding is that modernism 
                                                        
21
 On the other hand, reproduction enhances economic value; the more 
Leonardo da Vinci’s Mona Lisa is copied, the more expensive the original 
becomes. See Frederic Jameson's "Reification and Utopia in mass culture."  
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emphasized time, since becoming and the future were relevant issues, 
Futurism being the model example. Postmodernism seems to lose 
ground with this perspective, because of its disenchantment towards 
change and the future. For Harvey, postmodernist loss of faith in the 
future is due to an emergency of minority discourses that generated an 
awareness towards injustices and prejudice and a general disillusion 
towards technology that is seen as no longer being capable of saving 
humanity (305). Rather, it has contributed to further corruption 
(Huyssen, Twilight 2). Huyssen enumerates some of the catastrophic 
reasons for such pessimism:  
 
For this twentieth century was simultaneously a 
century of indescribable catastrophes and of 
ferocious hopes, and often enough the hopes 
themselves ended up legitimizing some 
dictatorship of the future (the pure race, the 
classless society, the pacified consumer paradise), 
turning a blind eye to persecution and mass 
destruction, voracious exploitation of resources 
and environment, migrations and dislocations of 
whole populations to an extent the world had 
never witnessed before. (Twilight 2)  
 
Some science fiction films illustrate this tendency as Total Recall 
(1990) by Paul Verhoeven and Johnny Mnemonic (1995) by Robert 
Longo. Both portray a dystopic future in which technology confuses 
rather than solves problems, and memories appear to have answers. In 
the former, Quaid/Hauser (Arnold Schwarzenegger) decides to pay for a 
vacation memory implant to Mars, because he has constant dreams 
about this planet. During the experience, he discovers that none of his 
memories are true; they were erased along with his true identity, and 
without true memories he is completely lost. In the second film, Johnny 
(Keanu Reeves) is a data courier, who transports information that is 
literally uploaded to his brain. He erases his personal memories to 
protect his family, but is caught in such a dangerous situation that his 
entire mind could be erased.   
This dystopic inclination makes postmodernism a little bit too 
ironic, too sarcastic, it bears “a strange quasi-Sartrean irony a ‘winner 
loses’ logic” (Jameson, “Postmodernism” 57). Therefore, if modernism 
proposed functionality and efficiency because of a tendency to 
productivity that was future oriented, than postmodernism cannot cope 
with this notion anymore. The latter favors a hopeless future, since we 
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do not seem capable to imagine alternative futures (Huyssen, Present 2). 
Moreover, according to Jameson, an image addicted society–
Baudrillard’s simulacrum society– based on advertisement, television, 
film, infinite and undistinguishable copies hinders any future 
imagination:   
 
[T]here cannot be but be much that is deplorable 
and reprehensible in a cultural form of image 
addiction which, by transforming the past visual 
mirages, stereotypes or texts, effectively abolishes 
any practical sense of the future and of the 
collective project, thereby abandoning the 
thinking of future change to fantasies of sheer 
catastrophe and inexplicable cataclysm. 
(“Postmodernism” 85)  
 
Jameson’s explanation on how the future is left behind leads us to 
the next topic, because as Huyssen states “the future seems to fold itself 
back into the past” (Twilight 8).  
 
Time and Past  
 
If the postmodernist’s fictional texts obliterate the future, than a 
new position towards the past emerges, which, for Huyssen, expresses a 
fundamental crisis in our imagination: the absence of alternative futures 
lead to a current memory and history debate (Present 2). Jameson refers 
to this event as pastiche (“Postmodernism” 64) and nostalgia mode 
(“Postmodernism” 66), in what he observes as “the random 
cannibalization of all the styles of the past, the play of random stylistic 
allusion” (“Postmodernism” 66). His argument is that industrial demand 
of art recycles history into kitsch copies (“Postmodernism” 55), as 
George Lucas’s American Graffiti (1973), implying a lack of creativity 
due to excessive demand and financial interest. This appeal to history 
substitutes the modernist utopian drive for a postmodern nostalgia.  
Jameson’s negative perspective on postmodernism can be counter 
balanced by Hutcheon’s perspective. For Hutcheon, postmodern culture 
is reflexive through subversion, as it criticizes dominant ideas by 
highlighting multiplicity and border discourses. She writes “The 
postmodern attempts to negotiate the space between centers and margins 
in ways that acknowledge difference and its challenge to any supposedly 
monolithic culture” (Poetics 198). This inclusive and multicultural 
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position questions imperial notions through a revision of history. 
Hutcheon recalls how postmodern architecture rejects the “ahistorical 
purism of the modernism of the International Style” (Politics 12). She 
recognizes, however, that postmodern culture is highly concerned with 
temporality, as it rethinks history. Her proposition of historiographic 
metafiction de-naturalizes temporality, since it revisits the past through 
a conscious contemporary perspective. The return of the past exists, but 
it bears an awareness that can only be accomplished through a 
contemporary perspective.  
Similarly, Huyssen proposes memory as a key issue in the 
postmodern context, as a central cultural and political concern in 
Western societies since the 80s, in his words: “the world is being 
musealized” (Present 25). For Huyssen, contemporary society suffers 
from a hypertrophy of memory, because the faster products improve and 
become obsolete, the more computer and public memory has to expand 
(Present 22). The products are musealized due to the market’s fast 
innovation. This way, the present is reduced, increasing our hunger for 
remembering. The speed of change raised by technology, which by its 
turn was raised by economic demand, has called for memory and 
musealization.  
Huyssen reinstates that it is difficult to elucidate historically if the 
excess of memory, allowed by technology, leads to forgetting (Present 
3). One of his hypotheses is that public and private strategies of 
memorization come from fear of forgetting, due to the massive 
commodities and instabilities in time, in the very questioning of history. 
Notwithstanding, he acknowledges that the issue is not simply to 
criticize cultural industry and point to market commodification as the 
unique cause of amnesia (Present 28). For Huyssen, the threshold 
between memory and media lies on media as it also creates auratic art–
such as photography–and also shapes structures and forms of memory. 
Such complex and oscillating threshold recalls Benjamin’s reading, for 
whom aura can exist in some situations of mechanical reproduction–
those should be carefully and individually analyzed.22 
 
Space, Postmodernism and Temporalities  
 
The dystopic postmodern future has led us to a nostalgic empty 
remembrance. Nonetheless, the past becomes a mixture of our 
                                                        
22
 For further discussion, see Walter Benjamin’s article “The work of art in the 
age of mechanical reproduction”.  
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contemporary anxieties and a recycled and repetitive memory, implying 
a breakdown of the temporal order. History becomes the result of the 
present memory and continuity loses relevance. In such a context, Bruno 
Latour inquires that “[w]e cannot return to the past, to tradition, to 
repetition, because these great immobile domains are the inverted image 
of the earth that is no longer promised to us today: progress, permanent 
revolution, modernization, forward flight. What are we to do, if we can 
move neither forward nor backward?” (76).  
When both future and past are doomed in postmodern art, what 
seems to remain is a skepticism in relation to time, which results in an 
iterative present, “a series of pure and unrelated presents” (Jameson, 
“Postmodernism” 72). Harvey writes that “Eschewing the idea of 
progress, postmodernism abandons all sense of historical continuity and 
memory, while simultaneously developing an incredible ability to 
plunder history and absorb whatever it finds there as some aspect of the 
present” (54). Everything becomes a somehow distorted reflection of the 
contemporary. This present orientation conveys a “search for 
instantaneous impact” (Harvey 59), through the repetition and the 
simulacrum media guided society, which, for Jameson, culminates in a 
loss of depth (“Postmodernism”76) and a prevalence of surface or 
multiple surfaces, often called intertextuality (“Postmodernism”62). We 
live in “unrelated presents in time” (Jameson, “Postmodernism” 72). 
Space gains meaning as time loses ground. The former becomes a 
way to express the postmodern feelings of fragmentation, pragmatism, 
schizophrenia, confusion, nostalgia, to mention a few (Jameson, 
“Postmodernism” 64). Architecture starts offering “some very striking 
lessons about the originality of postmodern space” (Jameson, 
“Postmodernism” 80), and exemplifying postmodern main 
characteristics, as it incorporates the maze feeling of being lost through 
a media simulacrum and the recycling of the past through a 
contemporary perspective.  
Jameson refers to this postmodern space as a hyperspace 
(“Postmodernism” 80). This space mutated and transcended “the 
capacities of the individual human body to locate itself, to organize its 
immediate surroundings perceptually, and cognitively to map its 
position in a mappable external world” (Jameson, “Postmodernism” 83). 
Postmodern hyperspace creates such convoluted and complex 
environment, that the individual gets lost, similar to how s/he was once 
confused in high-modernist’s loops of time.  
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BLADE RUNNER 
 
Blade Runner seems to be the postmodern film par excellence. 
Different scholars have already analyzed the postmodern features of 
multiculturalism, simulacrum, nostalgia, dystopian urbanism, pastiche in 
Scott’s films, such as Giuliana Bruno, Scott Bukatman, Annette Kuhn, 
Vivian Sobchack and Peter Ruppert. Kuhn curiously informs us that a 
1997 survey revealed that Blade Runner was “far and away the most 
widely assigned film” in North American universities and colleges, 
followed by 2001: A Space Odyssey and Metropolis (Alien II 1). In 
addition, it is an adaptation of Do Androids Dream of Electronic Sheep? 
(1968) by renowned science fiction author Philip K. Dick.    
As the exemplary science fiction and postmodern film, Blade 
Runner could not be left out of this research. Nonetheless, this film’s 
popularity among scholars and public opinion hampers its study, since 
not much can be added to a subject that was so thoroughly and 
extensively discussed. This chapter attempts to propose new relations 
and commences a dialogue with other theoretical perspectives about 
Blade Runner.  
In its story, Rick Deckard (Harrison Ford) is a blade runner, 
whose job is to hunt and kill replicants. These are robots, which are so 
human like, it is utterly hard to distinguish them from humans. They 
became a problem because Dr. Eldon Tyrell (Joe Turkel), their creator, 
implanted human emotions, so they would be more stable beings, but 
this also gave them wishes for autonomy. They are so dangerous that 
they are not allowed on the planet Earth anymore, used as heavy labor 
work in other planets. But four of them escape and when Deckard goes 
after them, he falls in love with Rachael (Sean Young), who is the latest 
replicant model, and is faced with the question of his own humanity. 
 
Urban Cities  
 
Blade Runner’s first shot shows a 2019 Los Angeles. The city is 
wide, tall, dark, and in flames. It is night and the city is all alight; it does 
not seem prepared to sleep and shines as the sky. A flying vehicle comes 
in the direction of the aerial shot, yellow like a New York cab, and a 
thunder light strikes in the horizon. A cut approximates the camera to 
the flames, which bursts dominating the frame. This city is not a 
peaceful place, rather, it is loaded with energy, bursting in every 
direction. More flying cars pass by and the sequence cuts to an extreme 
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close shot of an eye, looking at the city, reflecting its dotted lights and 
flames, and cuts again to the Tyrell pyramidal towers.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2 – Tyrell’s pyramid – 00:03:49 
Figure 2.3 – Inside the pyramid building – 00:17:03 
Figure 2.1 – Los Angeles in 2019 – 00:03:18 
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Dr. Eldon Tyrell lives and controls his business in these towers, 
as Fredersen in Metropolis. Their pyramidal shape refers to the Egyptian 
pyramids and the power they express through their size, the amount of 
money, time and lives spent to build them. But the Egyptian pyramids 
were not dwelled in, they are like the Taj Mahal, a big mausoleum. The 
pyramidal shape might also be a foreshadow of Tyrell’s doomed and 
Oedipal destiny, to be killed by his creation, the replicant Roy Batty 
(Rutger Hauer), in his own bed.  
Other Egyptian references also appear evident from the interior of 
the buildings (see Figure 2.2). When Deckard meets Tyrell and Rachael 
(Sean Young), who is one of the latest replicant models, in the Tyrell 
building, the sun is shown at the center of the composition. Its hard light 
creates shadows on the pillars and reflections on the floor. This frame 
emphasizes the strong aesthetic appeal of Blade Runner, in which 
Deckard is just another yellowish figure. The composition is valuable in 
itself, since it is quite different from the commercial emptiness 
proclaimed by Jameson (“Postmodernism” 60). The sun seems trapped 
by the composition. Indeed, we hardly see natural lighting during the 
film, as if it were a luxury item afforded by few. As Deckard says “its 
too bright in here” (00:18:52).   
This opening sequence evinces how these pyramidal towers keep 
the power of the city, as the New Tower of Babel does in Metropolis. 
These buildings stand out in the city with no comparing authority or 
power. Both Tyrell’s and Joh Fredersen’s companies do not emanate a 
political but an economic and industrial power. This information is 
relevant to a postmodern reading, since these industrial and commercial 
powers start regulating society in postmodernism. As Jameson clarifies 
“every position on postmodernism in culture […] is also at one and the 
same time, and necessarily, an implicitly or explicitly political stance on 
the nature of multinational capitalism” (“Postmodernism” 55).  
Blade Runner’s space also evokes a collision of cultures. A 
bonsai tree lies on Tyrell’s desk in his Egyptian like room, Japanese ads 
interchange with Coca-Cola adds, Deckard has communication 
problems with his Japanese cook, Roman and Greek columns appear in 
the city, Atari advertisements share space with Chinese signs, and 
Deckard’s apartment has a Mayan style (Bruno 67). Bruno refers to this 
combination as “a synthesis of mental architectures,” and argues that 
this is Jameson’s spatial pastiche “as an aesthetic of quotation, [it] 
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incorporates dead styles; it attempts a recollection of the past, of 
memory, and of history” (67). This research does not focus on the 
negativity of pastiche, but rather on how this collection of styles could 
also invite us to rethink alleged notions of postmodernism.  
Bruno explains that this synthesis of mental architectures in “the 
metropolis of Blade Runner quotes not only from different spatial 
structures but from temporal ones as well” (66). Thus, this coalition of 
cultural references also means a merging of times. This society merges 
the Mayan with the Egyptian and the high-tech; different periods and 
cultures with a noir aesthetic, (Staiger, Alien Zone II 112). Such 
diversity leads to Bruno’s idea that even if the city is professedly Los 
Angeles, it could be anywhere else, since “Blade Runner’s space of 
narration bears, superimposed, different and previous orders of time and 
space” (66).    
Similar to Metropolis, the city is the main space in Blade Runner. 
Bukatman provides a historical overview of the city’s portrayal. He 
argues that films from the 20s started portraying the city as utopian, but 
in earlier pictures “utopian aspirations were focused on agrarianism, the 
city was pictured as a negative space” (Blade 42), as F. W. Murnau’s 
Sunrise (1921). But then “the alienation and disease of American culture 
in the 50s, coupled with the postwar white flight from urban centres, 
yielded science fiction cities that were claustrophobic and isolating, 
outsized monadic structures sealed off from their surroundings” 
(Bukatman Blade 43), as Blade Runner’s dark LA.    
An absence of nature reveals a dystopia in relation to the city, 
where even the humans are replicants. Even the animals that appear–an 
owl and a snake–are robots. Blade Runner has different versions; their 
most prominent difference is the ending. Nature does emerge as a 
positive aspect in the “happy ending” version, in which Deckard and 
Rachael manage to escape the other blade runners as they drive through 
green landscapes, while his narration informs us that Rachael has no 
termination date. In the “ambiguous ending” version, the story ends 
earlier. They are still trying to run away, when he finds an origami 
unicorn and remembers detective Gaff’s line “too bad she won’t live, 
but then again who does?” (01:52:15), the elevator doors close, and the 
spectator never knows if they managed to run, if she dies, or even if 
Deckard himself is not a replicant. 
Thus, the city is the ultimate landscape of Blade Runner, and it is 
a convoluted one. Bruno argues that “The city of Blade Runner is not 
the ultramodern, rather it is the postmodern city. It is not an orderly 
layout of skyscrapers and ultracomfortable, hypermechanized interiors. 
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Rather, it creates an aesthetic of decay, exposing the dark side of 
technology, the process of disintegration” (66). Similarly, Ruppert 
acknowledges that “Blade Runner evokes in vivid images contemporary 
anxieties about life in a postindustrial city–images of urban decay, 
waste, pollution, racism; images that leave us with a sense of the despair 
and the alienation associated with contemporary American urban life” 
(“Blade” 8). The crowded and dirt streets of multicultural people create 
the decay atmosphere. The neon signs, the international ads, and 
skyscrapers aided by the noir aesthetic (Staiger, Alien Zone II 112) 
construct the urban look to the city, with the constant rain and night 
time, along with the detective theme story, the hard lighting, dark 
scenarios, and again Rachael’s 40s outfit. Bukatman concludes that 
“Blade Runner is, in many ways, the quintessential city film: it presents 
urbanism as a lived heterogeneity, an ambiguous environment of fluid 
spaces and identities” (Blade 12). 
Bukatman reveals that “[t]he dominant strategy in designing 
Blade Runner’s future was ‘retrofitting’, which, according to Mead [the 
film’s designer], ‘simply means upgrading old machinery or structures 
by slapping new add-ons to them,’” a steam-punk design. Such an 
aesthetic enhances the relation between the dystopic future and the 
present. The latter is somehow responsible for the former’s tragedy, 
which leads to Bukatman’s conclusion that “the future[…] is a 
combination of the new and the very, very used, just like the present: the 
utopian fantasies of Things to Come (1936), with its gleaming new 
Everytown, are no longer economically, ecologically or politically 
supportable, even in dreams and fictions” (Blade 21).     
Lastly, the flat occupied by J. F. Sebastian’s (William 
Sanderson), the replicants’ genetic designer, can be compared to 
Rotwang’s house in Metropolis. If the latter’s laboratory was inside an 
old-fashioned house to the rest of the film’s aesthetic, the former’s 
apartment would work in a similar way. He lives in an old and 
abandoned building, fully ornamented, but dirty, flooded and not 
illuminated. Such contrast demonstrates the decaying characteristic 
described above. As Rotwang, Sebastian is also a scientist, who could 
not leave Earth–planet Earth seems to be inhabited only by unfortunate 
ones, poor and deceased–because of his disease, Methuselah syndrome, 
which makes him looks like sixty, when he is only twenty-five years 
old. He could not pass the medical exams, and just like the building he 
was also abandoned.  
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Replicants  
 
Technology is an ambiguous theme in Blade Runner. The 
previous chapter demonstrated how this theme was charged with a 
supernatural aura in Metropolis, which was also dubious but mostly 
because of its relation to this mystical aura. Blade Runner’s ambiguity is 
due to a humanization of the cyborg, called the replicant. A comparative 
analysis between Metropolis’s Futura and Blade Runner’s replicants 
shall evince a layer of complexity that postmodern reproduction brought 
to technology.  The analysis of the replicants shall suggest that the 
future is dystopic and the replicants are nostalgic for a past they never 
had. Time comes up as a desire, never to be achieved. This postmodern 
film appears to mourn the loss of time through the replicants.  
In terms of technological display, Blade Runner can be quite dull. 
Mainly if compared to Metropolis, in which the images of machines, 
steam, pumps, gears and movement is so important. Even the flying 
cars, or the small planes that appear along the film are not as impressive 
as for instance Back to the Future’s (1985) DeLorean or the Time 
Machine in George Pal’s classic The Time Machine (1960) inspired in 
H.G. Wells’s homonymous novel. There is no propensity to machineries 
in Blade Runner. In opposition, there is a blend in which technology 
looks organic in the replicants, and not mechanical as robots. Such 
nomenclature is relevant because robot does recall the ideas of 
equipment, parts, engine and mechanics. Whereas replicant refers to 
replication, reverberation, echo, reproduction. Thus, robot in Blade 
Runner is not simply a machine, but it is also a reproduction of a human. 
As Bruno states the replicants are “a literalization of Baudrillard’s 
theory of postmodernism as the age of simulacra and simulation” (67).            
Futura is also a reproduction of a person, Maria. What 
differentiates her from the replicants is her lack of will. She is simply a 
vessel to Rotwang and Joh Frederson’s malicious intentions. She has no 
personal goal. The replicants, on the other hand, not only have their own 
desires, but they also rebel against their masters. As the replicant Pris 
says “I think Sebastian, therefore I am” (01:17:50). The message 
throughout the films is that replicants are perfect humans, and if so, they 
are humans (Ruppert, “Blade” 12). But are there perfect humans? 
Tyrell’s company motto suggests that the answer is no, because 
replicants are “more human than human” (00:22:03).  
The Oedipal relationship between Roy and Tyrell, even if without 
a mother, for example, shows the conflict between creation and creator 
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that does not happen in Metropolis. Roy searches for his maker to 
increase his life span. He refers to Tyrell as father, “I want more life, 
father”, and then the latter says “You are the prodigal son” (01:23:52). 
When the replicant discovers his god’s limitations, he kills Tyrell by 
crushing his skull and poking his eyes. In this Oedipal relation, no guilt 
hunts the son who killed his own father.  
This search for more life and defiant position highlights Roy’s 
human dimension. Not to mention that he also shows sensitivity and 
empathy towards his hunter. Deckard has just shot Pris dead, but the 
replicant saves the blade runner from falling the roof top. On the brink 
of death, Roy ponders about his memories and dies. Saving Deckard 
signifies that the replicant is more than the machine, that he is not only 
driven by cruelty and revenge, as we might have thought when he killed 
Tyrell. His memories also humanize him. After saving Deckard he says 
“I have seen things you people wouldn’t believe. Attack ships on fire off 
the shoulder of Orion. I watched C-beams glitter in the dark near the 
Tannhäuser Gate. All those moments will be lost in time like tears in 
rain. Time to die” (01:47:05). It seems like he prevented Deckard’s 
death to narrate these collection of memories, to show that he feels and 
understands their beauty, that these lost moments made him sensible, 
that his fight for more life proves his humanity. The inversion is that the 
blade runner becomes the cold inhuman, hunting and killing the sensible 
machines. Another insensible human is Tyrell, who creates replicants 
with feelings but does not care how they feel; as when he stops talking 
to Rachael after she discovers what she is.       
Another symbolic simile between Roy and Deckard is that both 
have their right hands injured in this sequence. The replicant’s right 
hand starts hardening because his time is ending. He takes a nail and 
pierces it to prevent it from closing, a reference to Jesus’s crucifixion 
and sacrifice. Later this same hand lifts Deckard from the edge of the 
building. Deckard almost falls from the building, because Roy broke his 
right-hand fingers. Both twisted hands expose their fragility rather as 
replicant or human.  
Another humanized replicant is Zhora. She is running from 
Deckard among the crowded city of people and cars in a rainy night. He 
dangerously shoots her among the pedestrians, but he misses. His 
second attempt hits her and she breaks through glasses of window 
shops. In this moment, the sequence enters into a slow motion and 
saxophone music sets the mood. Zhora falls but soon stands up on the 
broken glass, and starts running. She is hit again, and once more she 
breaks into other layers of glasses. Her breaking the glasses symbolizes 
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her breaking invisible walls that separate replicants from humans. They 
are transparent because utterly they are meaningless. She dies breaking 
these, because she dies bleeding and suffering, as a human would.      
Animals are also reproduction in Blade Runner, as Zhora’s snake 
and Tyrell’s owl. It is revealing that when Deckard affirms that the owl 
must be expensive, Rachael answers “very” (00:17:22), and later when 
he asks if the snake is real, Zhora answers “Of course, it’s not real. 
Think I would be working in a place like this if I could afford a real 
snake?” (00:54:24). If the reproductions are expensive, the real ones are 
even more, and apparently rarer as well. Human beings in the sense of 
humanized are also rare in the film.     
Other 
revealing 
machines are 
Sebastian’s 
dolls. When 
Sebastian and 
Pris enter in 
his empty 
apartment, a 
teddy-bear 
and a soldier 
come to greet 
him, “home again, home again, jiggidy-jig. Good evening J.F” 
(00:40:53). These little and comic doll robots enhance the critic of the 
replicants by reminding us their insignificance. To Tyrell, Rachael is as 
silly a companion as the dolls. Sebastian himself says “I make friends, 
they are toys. My friends are toys. I make them” (00:40:25). Hence, it is 
easy to Tyrell to dispose of Rachael, when she realizes her replicant 
nature, she is not a fun doll anymore. If the replicants are human robots, 
then these dolls are vintage robots. So similar is Pris to Sebastian’s dolls 
and mannequins that when Deckard is hunting her, she manages to hide 
among them (see Figure 2.4). 
The last aspect I analyze in relation to the machines in Blade 
Runner is the Voight-Kampff test. I find intriguing how the method to 
find a replicant is psychological rather than mechanical. In this test, the 
interviewer asks questions and evaluates the interviewee’s reactions: an 
empathy test. Tyrell describes that the expected reactions are: “Capillary 
dilation of the so-called blush response, fluctuation of the pupil, 
involuntary dilation of the iris” (00:18:17), if the interviewee does not 
Figure 2.4 – Sebastian’s dolls – 01:32:03 
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match these, he or she is most probably a replicant. The implication is 
that if she or he does not show emotions, she or he does not feel as a 
human. Nevertheless, it is contradictory how Deckard takes “more than 
a hundred” to discover that Rachael is a replicant. Does that mean that if 
he keeps asking a human, he or she will eventually get bored and be 
spotted as a replicant as well? At the same time, the test cannot select 
those who are robots, but those who are not humans. This test does not 
define or have a premise of what a robot should be, which leads to the 
argument that if the replicants are too similar to humans then they must 
be humans, because there is no definition of what a replicant is, there is 
no concept to distinguish a replicant from a human. Again, the film 
constructs this technological and futuristic world, but without an 
impulse to machines. The replicants’ psychology is more revealing to 
Blade Runner than their mechanical parts, which they do not have. 
When Zhora and Pris die they bleed because they are biological 
machines. These replicated humans want more time, future and past, 
that is lost in reproduction, in repetition, replicants.      
 
Nostalgic Future 
 
The analysis of space in Blade Runner exposed a conflation of 
cultures, Roman, Greek, Egyptian; while technology showed a 
humanization of machines. This subsection investigates how Blade 
Runner’s time relates to both these aspects space and technology, 
emphasizing the construction of a future that looks backward, nostalgic 
(Bukatman 17). Time is again problematized in the search for past and 
the difficult to envision a future, which does not indicate an emphasis on 
the present and presentness, rather a loss of time that is translated as a 
loss of identity.       
Blade Runner’s nostalgia is unquestionable. Riddley Scott 
himself commented that “Blade Runner is a film set forty years hence, 
made in the style of forty years ago” (in Bukatman, Blade 17), it is a 
futuristic film, but using a nostalgic aesthetic. Some examples are how 
Rachael’s clothes and hair are a 40’s reference, while Pris and Roy have 
punk styles. It not only recalls the past, but blends different pasts. The 
future emerges as a convoluted image of previous styles.  
More than nostalgia Blade Runner also seems to problematize 
history and memory. The past is then manifested as a difficulty, almost a 
social pathology, in which the characters are constantly struggling to 
understand. For instance, in the film’s first sequence a blade runner is 
interviewing a possible replicant, Leon Kowalski (Brion Jones), through 
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a Voight-Kampff test. In the second question, Leon is asked to 
“Describe in single words only the good things that come into your 
mind about your mother.” His response is at first doubt: “my mother?,” 
then he says “let me tell you about my mother” and shoots the 
interviewer (00:07:10). Such violent reaction shows how Leon does not 
have a good “emotional response” to remembering. A mother implies a 
past, and as a replicant he does not have one. The figure of a mother 
represents history, which is denied to replicants. Indeed, Tyrell explains 
that he has added memories to the new models as Rachael:  
 
We began to recognize in them a strange 
obsession, after all they are emotionally 
inexperienced, with only a few years in which to 
store up the experiences which you and I take for 
granted. If we gift them with a past, we create a 
cushion or a pillow for their emotions, then 
consequently we can control them better. 
(00:22:30)            
 
What Tyrell informs us is that without a history replicants are 
unstable. They cannot cope with their emotions, which explains Leon’s 
reaction to such a simple question. Similarly, Rachael suspects she is a 
replicant, she goes to Deckard and shows him photos of her mother in a 
desperate attempt to confirm that which she cannot, her own existence. 
Deckard then repeats two of her most intimate and old memories, when 
she played doctor with her brother and a spider she saw as a kid. These 
stories turn out to be implanted memories of Tyrell’s niece. Even the 
past that she regards as hers is somebody else’s. Rachael cries, because 
maybe she is as human as a human can be. When both Leon and 
Rachael are faced with their lack of history they suffer as humans do, 
turning the Pinocchio machines into real people.      
Photographs are also used in the film for a reliance on the past. 
They are reproductions of reality as the replicants are. When Rachael 
brings her mother’s pictures to Deckard, they should be a proof of her 
childhood, however, they are not. They can be as fake as she is. These 
pictures do not hold the past but they are rather projections of her desire 
to have a past, a pure nostalgic feeling. Within this perspective, the 
photos at Deckard’s apartment increase our suspicion about the 
possibility of him being a replicant. On the other hand, neither Tyrell 
nor Sebastian have pictures in their homes. Instead they have robots. In 
this reading, the machines would search for identity in memories as 
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Roy, and the past as Rachael, while humans lose theirs while making 
machines that are more human than themselves.  
Another interesting photo appears when Deckard is hunting for 
Leon. The blade runner looks for clues on a picture that he zooms and 
moves in a screen. This sequence clearly quotes Michelangelo 
Antonioni’s Blow-up sequence, in which the photographer Thomas 
discovers a crime through enlarging and revealing the same picture. 
When Deckard examines this picture, he finds a little mirror, in which 
through an enhancing process he finds a woman replicant. This 
questionable discovery, rather than contradicting technological 
possibilities, reveals that photos can also correspond to reality, and lead 
to facts, even if it is a deep hidden true.  
Time is also problematized in Sebastian’s disease. He has 
Methuselah syndrome, which makes him look like a sixty years old 
man, even though he is only twenty-five. Such disease approximates 
Sebastian to the replicants, as Roy says “We have got a lot in common” 
and Pris finishes “accelerated decrepitude” (01:18:20). They all need 
more time, which also mean that some of the humans are very alike the 
replicants.   
Time is the replicants’ major problem. Roy is not only trying to 
escape and live his four-year life in peace. He is trying to expand his 
life. Roy wants a future, while Rachael is searching for her past. In this 
context, Ruppert acknowledges that “Paradoxically, then, it is their 
desire for a meaningful past and for an unlimited future that replicants 
invoke the only utopian potential of this degraded, indeed fallen, world” 
(“Blade” 12). Blade Runner is mostly dystopic, and that the possibility 
of utopia emerges from the hopes and expectations of these machines, 
which are in fact already quite doomed. Ruppert acknowledges this 
search for time as a critic to a system that could bring so much utopian 
possibilities through such technology, but that only functions to 
strengthen dystopian failures (“Blade” 12).  
Blade Runner represents the future, but it is a tomorrow strongly 
linked to the past in the replicants’ need for history and the city’s 
retrofitting aesthetic. The future in itself is doomed, there is no way out 
of the dystopia. What remains are lost characters in search for identity. 
In this sense, Bruno considers that “The replicant affirms a new form of 
temporality, that of schizophrenic vertigo. This is the temporality of 
postmodernism’s new age of the machine” (69), meaning that this lack 
of time, future and past, causes a schizophrenic identity, which as 
Jameson argues is characteristic of the postmodern period 
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(“Postmodernism” 72), which will be further discussed in the next 
subsection with Twelve Monkeys.      
 
TWELVE MONKEYS  
 
Before introducing Twelve Monkeys, let us acknowledge its 
inspiration Chris Marker’s La Jetée (1962). The latter is a remarkable 
short film (28 minutes) about time traveling. The context is a post-
apocalyptic World War III, where the Man (Davos Hanich) is sent to the 
future and the past to save the world. La Jetée’s most striking 
characteristic is its still images, since they highlight time rather than 
movement in film. The characters do not move because of the “static 
quality of the images” (Del Rio 383) and what constructs continuity is 
voice over narration. This short film is an example of Gilles Deleuze’s 
idea of a classic modernist time dislocation, a time-image, and of how 
the 60s European avant-garde focused on the thematic of time and the 
forms of temporality. This modernist science fiction inspired Terry 
Gilliam’s postmodern anomaly.            
Twelve Monkeys (1995) tells the story of James Cole (Bruce 
Willis), who is sent back to the past in an attempt to save the future. He 
lives in a post-apocalyptic future in 2035, in which the few remaining 
people live in the underground due to a plague that devastated the 
Earth’s population. His time travel objective is to collect information 
about the virus spread, and not exactly to prevent it from happening as it 
already had. Cole’s conflict begins when he realizes that the past may be 
a better place to inhabit than his future. To breath the fresh air and walk 
free on the streets are small pleasures he never felt before; he opts for 
this past even though, he knows the tragic future is coming. 
 
Underground/Past City?  
 
Twelve Monkeys’s space is dystopic and nostalgic at the same 
time. An analysis of cities’ landscapes can reveal much about time in 
science fiction as this dissertation has previously demonstrated. 
Different postmodern theorists, such as Jameson (“Postmodernism” 64) 
and Huyssen (Present 2), point to space as the main motif in postmodern 
fiction. In addition, Staiger already attested to the importance of the 
cityscape to the science fiction genre. She states that “One of the most 
immediate signifiers of the genre of science fiction is the representation 
of a known city,” (in Alien II 20) whose identity is revealed through its 
cityscape, but presented with a different atmosphere. Twelve Monkeys’s 
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city illustrates her argument quite well, showing a future and desolated 
version of Philadelphia with empty buildings, shattered windows, 
abandoned parks and streets (see Figure 2.5).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This 2035 Philadelphia is a deserted and destroyed city. The 
initial sequence shows this dystopic feeling in how dead branches 
occupy the inside of the buildings, animals run free in the city, a lion 
appears on a rooftop, a bear roars at Cole and an owl is watching him, 
no humans inhabit this space. This devastated city echoes Huyssen’s 
concept that in the postmodern period the future is no longer a space for 
illusions, it rather becomes a time for desolation (Present 6). Such 
description contrasts heavily with the modern, illuminated and utopic 
city of Metropolis. Modernism also tended to imagine utopic cities, 
while Twelve Monkeys’s dystopic Philadelphia and Blade Runner’s Los 
Angeles are specific references of our contemporary world. The 
modernist dreams appear not to fit into our world, but the catastrophies 
of postmodernism are actually too close to our history and need to be 
Figure 2.5 – Philadelphia in 2035 – 00: 05:54 
Figure 2.6 – Philadelphia in 1996 – 01:51:11 
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transversed into futuristic tales not to become historical reproductions.23 
Utopia constructs a broad and generalized future, as if optimism cannot 
be too specific. Otherwise, it will fail.  
Cole’s plastic suit also reminds us of other futuristic suits–as 
Cabal’s in Things to Come. The difference is that the former’s suit is for 
protection against the plague, while the latter’s expresses his modernity. 
Cole’s transparent suit reflects his dystopic future; it should be a 
protection against the outside germs, but it is made of plastic and looks 
quite fragile. Ultimately, the abandoned Philadelphia and Cole’s delicate 
suit do not only point to the decay of the space, but also the decline of 
society in itself. They represent what it used to be, a prosperous city, 
and what it has become, a plastic suit in a disposable person.    
Such decaying and dystopic society is also evident in how the 
surface city was abandoned and substituted by a subterranean city. Not 
only was the city devastated, but people were forced to live 
underground. This belowground city is dark, rusted and dirty, prisoners, 
including Cole, live in prison cells that resemble animal cages. Ian 
Christie cleverly argues that the “subterranean connotes the subhuman” 
(168) in Twelve Monkeys. Even if both below and ground level cities are 
dystopic. The former is worse; because if the latter is empty and 
dominated by nature, the other one is claustrophobic and metallic. The 
close shots intensify this feeling of being imprisoned, and the grey and 
brown rusted colors pervade in the screen. This Philadelphia confirms 
Hutcheon’s statement that postmodern architecture “has called into 
question the messianic faith of modernism, the faith that technical 
innovation and purity of form can assure social order” (Politics 12). The 
metallic, electronic and future city do not recall progress but 
imprisonment. 
The cityscape of Philadelphia also seems to emphasize an auratic 
atmosphere in both its contemporary and future images, which raises the 
film’s nostalgia. When Cole time travels to the past, he is soon put in a 
hospice, because he says he is from the future and a virus will end 
humanity. There, he meets Jeffrey Goines (Brad Pitt), who is a bit crazy, 
                                                        
23 
Jerry Herron provides a useful example of how Detroit and other American 
metropolis decayed since the late 60s, when they were abandoned by the middle 
class due to the riots at that point. For a detailed reading see Jerry Herron’s 
Afterculture: Detroit and the Humiliation of History and “The Forgetting 
Machine: Notes Toward a History of Detroit,” Places Journal, January 2012. 
Accessed 19 Nov 2015. <https://placesjournal.org/article/the-forgetting-
machine-notes-toward-a-history-of-detroit/>. 
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but takes animal rights as a serious business. By the end of the film, the 
latter frees the zoo animals and locks his father, a scientist who 
experiments on animals in one of the zoo cages. This explains why 
animals run lose in the future city. The images of the giraffes and 
elephants running in the highways (see Figure 2.6) and the birds flying 
through the skyscrapers compose quite lyrical frames. The animals, 
somehow, do not seem lost or confused, but they are harmonically part 
of the composition. An aesthetic attractiveness emerges from this 
subversive mix of animals and civilization in both the 2035 and 1996 
Philadelphia’s. Such positive emotional charge shows that Twelve 
Monkeys’s nostalgia appears not only in the plot’s time travelling to the 
past, but also in its frames.   
In addition, both Philadelphia’s are in the winter time, and their 
snow contributes to the nostalgic feeling. Its whiteness illuminates the 
frames, which strongly contrast with the subterranean dark shots. Other 
colors are also revealing. The future city has a blue color filter, 
enhancing the loneliness and emptiness (see Figure 2.5). While the 
contemporary one has a red and purple color, which by contrast implies 
the city’s movement and warmth (see Figure 2.6).  
Twelve Monkeys’s 90s Philadelphia also presents dangerous, dirty 
and unpleasant spaces, which can be as dystopic as Brazil or Dark City. 
For example, the hospice does not favor its patients; it rather looks quite 
confining and pent-up with its rounded walls and low ceiling. 
Furthermore, when Cole escapes the hospice and takes his psychiatrist, 
Dr. Kathryn Railly (Madeleine Stowe), as hostage, they go through a 
Philadelphia with dirty alleys, graphite walls, homeless people and 
abandoned buildings. They even hide in the Globe Hotel, where one 
pays “Thirty-five bucks an hour” (01:35:20), as the desk man informs.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.7 – Decadent hotel – 01:36:29 
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This hotel also reveals a decadent nostalgia, as the building seems 
to belong to a more glamorous and heavily ornamented period, maybe 
the 1920s and 1930s. The walls are dirty and stained but are also tall and 
stylized, the furniture is an antique not preserved, the place needs to be 
dusted. Ironically, Cole reveals that he wants to stay in this shabby past, 
which, because of its lack of upkeep, reminds much of the future’s 
hopelessness. This hotel suggests nostalgia, but apparently one that 
cannot be recovered, one that is lost among the prostitutes and pimps. 
Coles’s attitude informs that even this decadent past is better than his 
time.  
As a matter of curiosity, the Globe Hotel is a real reference, as 
well as the Ridgeway library building (now Philadelphia High school 
for creative and Performing Art). In the film, the latter is also covered in 
graffiti, surrounded by trash, clothes hanging, thus implying that 
homeless people are living under its shelter as kids play on rotten 
mattress on the grass. These buildings foreshadow Earth’s doomed 
destiny and evince Gilliam’s critic of a decaying present. As Staiger 
argues “the mise-en-scène of cities in sf [science fiction] might be 
understood as utopian commentaries about the hopes and failures of 
today or, inversely, dystopian propositions, implicit criticisms of 
modern urban life and the economic system that produces it” (in Alien 
Zone II 22).     
While the city figures as nostalgia, nature emerges as a positive 
element. When Cole and Kathryn are in the forest, he demonstrates this 
optimism towards nature, saying “I love seeing the sun” (01:09:25) and 
“I could live right here, you got water, air, stars, debris […] I love the 
frogs, the spiders” (01:18:10). Ironically, when he wakes up in the 
future, he is looking at a beautiful landscape with a river in-between 
rock cliffs, deers on the bottom, trees along the river bank, and a blue 
Figure 2.8 – Underground future world – 00:08:56 
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and yellow sky indicates that the sun is rising. But this idyllic landscape 
forged in a painting hanging on the ceiling that only enhances the 
dystopic feeling towards what the future can offer him. Cole has just 
discovered where the virus comes from–although the information is 
wrong–and all he can get is a reproduction of nature, a group of 
scientists singing because he told them he likes music, and a pardon for 
previous crimes that looks like a diploma. This lack of nature also 
indicates the strong eco-activism discourse of the film, that is also 
present in Jeffrey’s Army of the Twelve Monkeys act of freeing the zoo 
animals.  
Like Metropolis, Twelve Monkeys also has a mad scientist and a 
laboratory where he can exercise his madness. The film’s irony is how 
Cole and Jeffrey are considered crazy and locked in the hospice, while 
the true mad man is in a laboratory. Such inversion demonstrates a 
disbelief in science, or in knowledge as Western society understands it, 
a stable, undeniable and proved information, which resonates 
Horkheimer and Adorno’s denial of positivism and science in The 
Dialectic of Enlightenment. Adding to this, Peter Marks also observed 
that “Twelve Monkeys generally questions the certainties and 
motivations of science and scientists” (167). Cole exhibits schizophrenic 
behavior, which is enhanced by camera movements. When he is trying 
to convince his psychiatrists that he is from the future, he is hysterical. 
The camera twists and extreme close-ups of his face intensify as his 
behavior becomes more and more aggressive.  
Other moments also point to Jeffrey as the spokesperson of the 
film. In several moments, he says thought provoking and relevant 
arguments, which agrees with the disbelief in an all-governing 
knowledge and reduces information to points of view. Such perspective 
deconstructs certainties, creates space for a sureness in doubt and an 
understanding that truth is constructed and consequently relative. Such 
idea relates to a poststructuralism thinking. Theorist Catherine Belsey 
explains that “common sense itself is ideologically and discursively 
constructed, rooted in a specific historical situation, and operating in 
conjunction with a particular social formation” (2), and Hutcheon 
clarifies that “for Lyotard postmodernity is characterized by no grand 
totalizing narrative, but by smaller and multiple narratives which seek 
no universalizing stabilization or legitimation” (Politics 24). As Jeffrey 
summarizes "there is no right. There is no wrong. There is only popular 
opinion" (00:27:40). Twelve Monkeys foregrounds fragmented views of 
reality, destabilization of reason, science and teleological certainties. 
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Surveillance Machines 
 
Like humans, machines also play a revealing role in the 
construction, or rather disorientation, of space in Twelve Monkeys. 
When the future scientists interview Cole, a machine that looks like a 
big eye intermediates their dialogue. Many small screens showing 
different scenes compose this technology (see Figure 2.9), it also moves 
as a rotating eye or a crane camera. Undoubtedly, this is the most 
interesting technological device represented in this film. Elana del Rio 
argues that “[b]y holding in a simultaneous, multiple image events that 
belong to different spatiotemporal contexts, the rotating eye collapses 
the irreducible difference of these events under its commanding gaze” 
(391). The small screens in this big eye condense different vision on the 
same space, which infers surveillance. The main character is followed 
no matter where or in what time he is. The camera movement in this 
sequence highlights the voyeurism feeling as its move accompanies the 
eye move in speed and direction, which reminds the spectator that he or 
she is also gazing. These eyes on the television screen are similar to the 
famous Nineteen Eighty-Four’s Big Brother and the Alpha-60 computer 
in Alphaville, who watch everything. The screen emphasizes the feeling 
of being watched.  
Del Rio also explains that this rotating eye “exemplifies the 
persistent attempt of Western metaphysics to coerce temporality – the 
unmanageable force of difference, mystery, death – into a manageable 
and stable picture” (391). The many screens indeed converge time and 
space into one and reduce multiple times into a disturbing single 
temporality; the machine is almost a Frankenstein monster, showing 
different and shattered parts of people. Ironically, the scientists that are 
projected in the small screens are not far from Cole, they are right 
behind the eye (see Figure 2.10). But they merge into the machines, 
which contributes to the distant and cold relation towards Cole. This 
apparatus functions as an extension of the scientists, who, in a way, 
become androids.  
This Western attempt to rationalize time into an understandable 
and steady force is rather unfortunate, because this eye is clearly 
imperfect, “an improvised piece that registers the surveillance-
determined world of the future” (Marks 169), build out of scraps, and as 
all the rest of the future equipment in this film. This idea recalls the 
notion of a Frankenstein, joining different and mismatching parts of 
people and technology. Another example of improvised technology is 
the time travel machine, which looks fragile and is also made of plastic, 
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as Cole’s suit in the opening sequence. This machine does not resemble 
H.G. Wells’s glamorous time machine, or any complex full of buttons 
and handles space ship, as Doctor Who’s Tardis, it is more like a plastic 
disposal bag. These recycled machines rather than implying an 
environmental consciousness suggest dystopia and the prevalence of the 
old in the future, as if the past cannot be overcame. Twelve Monkeys’s 
underground world is made of remains, garbage, left overs, and so does 
the future, which explains why they have to travel backwards in time: it 
is hard to forget the past if the characters still live among its debris.        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Media is another significant issue in Twelve Monkeys. The news 
and television are everywhere in this film and the characters pay 
attention to them constantly. But they are deceitful. The radio, for 
instance, informs that a boy disappeared, but the spectator later 
discovers it was just a prank. Another sequence shows Cole and Kathryn 
fighting, then cuts to a newsman in a television set announcing that 
Figure 2.9 – 00:40:33 
Figure 2.10 – 00:41:53 
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Kathryn’s probable body was found, but the next shot shows she is 
locked in a car trunk. This misleading trait is metareferential, because 
the film’s plot also deceives us to believe the Army of the Twelve 
Monkeys spread the virus, but by the end we discover they did not. As 
the characters believe on television, we believe on the film screen and 
we are all fooled.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Information abounds but mostly misleading ones. For example, a 
homeless man seems to be right when describing people watching and 
following Cole and Kathryn but he turns out to be just another crazy 
person. Christie proposes that “the film is very much about the twentieth 
century’s inundation of information and about deciphering what among 
all the noise and imagery is useful and important in our life” (228). The 
prologue lines are also distrustful, as Marks notices (162). The message 
is slowly typed in green letters accompanied by a typing machine sound: 
“…5 million people will die from a deadly virus in 1997… the survivors 
will abandon the surface of the planet… once again the animals will rule 
the world…” Then a white phrase appears, as a reference source and 
Figure 2.11 – 00:40:22 
Figure 2.12 – 00:43:19 
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disavows the previous one: “Excerpts from interview with clinically 
diagnosed paranoid schizophrenic, April 12, 1990 – Baltimore County 
Hospital.” From the beginning the prologue tells the spectators not to 
trust in first impressions.    
Although technology plays a major role in science fiction films–
Kuhn states the hand in hand of science fiction as the familiar icons of 
“spaceship, robots and aliens” (Alien Zone II 4)–Twelve Monkeys does 
not focus on these icons. Such characteristic appears to relate to its 
nostalgic view, which rather emphasizes disbelief in the future and a 
longing for the past. Within this understanding, human psychology is 
more revealing to this story than the possibilities of new technologies. 
Identity is in crisis, schizophrenic as Jameson argues (“Postmodernism” 
71), because it lacks a historical reference, or it suffers from an excess 
of information, which is deceitful and confusing.   
Twelve Monkeys’s plot reveals a disbelief in science, which 
relates to how the plot highlights human perception rather than 
technological issues. Twelve Monkeys’s scientists are somehow worse 
than Rotwang. The latter might be mad because of a past love affair, but 
he is still a genius. The 2035 group of scientists have no real clue about 
what they are doing. They get caught into loops of wrong information, 
they are portrayed as caricature characters, and the last sequence shows 
that Jones, who is the leader of the group, was an insurance person 
before the virus. She actually greets and holds the hand of the other mad 
scientist who releases the disease. The “insurance” title is at least ironic, 
in how she is far from insuring a better future to society. Thus, the film 
questions the authorial figure, and the science behind it. Kathryn doubts 
the legitimacy of her own profession, saying “What we say is the truth is 
what everybody accepts right? Psychiatry, it is the latest religion, we 
decide what is right and wrong, we decide who is crazy or not. I am in 
trouble here, I am losing my faith” (01:23:41).     
This exaggerated data is the apocalyptic plague that causes 
psychological breaks as Cole’s schizophrenia. In this context, Cole is a 
monkey experiment (see Figures 2.13 and 2.14), who is washed, caged, 
drugged, experimented on, and is involuntary volunteered. This plague 
of misinformation leads to an inversion of how people and animals are 
treated. The humans have to inhabit the underground, the animals reign 
sovereign on the surface, untouched by the virus, or when Jeffrey’s 
political act locks his father in a zoo cage and frees the animals. The 
latter says in his extreme and sometimes crazy but always assertive 
statements: “We are all monkeys” (00:29:47).     
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Hopelessness Past  
 
Time confusion and atmosphere of insanity contributes to a 
feeling of displacement and misunderstanding that pervades in Twelve 
Monkeys. This feeling creates an affect relation with the viewer, who 
follows Cole’s point of view and is as tricked as the character.  
Time travelling is not a quite precise science in Twelve Monkeys. 
The very “efficient” group of scientist sends Cole to the wrong period 
twice. First he is sent to 1990, which is too early for his mission and he 
ends up in the hospice and taken as crazy. In the second time he is sent 
to 1917 in the middle of World War I, and is shot – completely random 
time. In the third time he is finally sent to 1996, before the 
contamination of the virus. A dialogue between Cole and his 
psychiatrists in the asylum exemplifies this time confusion:  
Psychiatrist 1: “We are not in the present now Mr. 
Cole?”  
Cole: “No, 1990 is the past, this already 
happened”  
Figure 2.13 – 00:29:28 
Figure 2.14 – 00:13:16 
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Psychiatrist 2: “Mr. Cole, you believe 1996 is the 
present then, is that it?” 
Cole: “No, 1996 is the past too…”  
This dialogue reveals how the concept of time is a forward 
direction. Although, Cole can time travel, he cannot affect or change 
time and history, as Marty McFly and Dr. Emmett in Back to the Future 
or the robot Terminator in The Terminator. Such understanding shows a 
strong sense of a doomed future, which cannot be fixed, the dystopia 
feeling is stronger if there is no reversal or change. This one direction 
time is a succession of inevitable events, and it contributes to the 
cyclical narrative of the film.    
Cole has difficulties in locating time. The film’s cyclical story is 
that when he was a child, he saw a murder in an airport, and he 
repeatedly dreams about it. As an adult he time travels and realizes he 
saw his own death, which is happening again, but from this adult point 
of view. The past becomes part of the present, as his memory happens 
again. On the other hand, the future is such a picturesque scenario, the 
characters are so stereotyped that he might be dreaming about the future 
in as much as he dreams about the airport scene. 
Such difficulty in locating oneself temporally contributes to the 
characters’ schizophrenia. Jameson argues that schizophrenia is part of 
the postmodern syndrome, while hysteria relates to a modernist 
sickness.24 Schizophrenia emerges from the postmodern instability 
or/and lack of references. Jameson borrows Lacan’s idea on how 
meaning is constructed through the interaction between signifier and 
signified, when this chain breaks, “we have schizophrenia in the form of 
a rubble or distinct and unrelated signifiers” (“Postmodernism” 72). 
Jameson concludes that:   
 
The connection between this kind of linguistic 
malfunction and the psyche of the schizophrenic 
may then be grasped by way of a two-fold 
proposition: first, that personal identity is itself the 
effect of a certain temporal unification of past and 
                                                        
24
 “The great Warhol figures—Marilyn herself, or Edie Sedgewick—the 
notorious burn-out and self-destruction cases of the ending 1960s, and the great 
dominant experiences of drugs and schizophrenia—these would seem to have 
little enough in common anymore, either with the hysterics and neurotics of 
Freud’s own day, or with those canonical experiences of radical isolation and 
solitude, anomie, private revolt, Van Gogh-type madness, which dominated the 
period of high modernism” (“Postmodernism” 63). 
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future with the present before me; and second, 
that such active temporal unification is itself a 
function of language, or better still of the 
sentence, as it moves along its hermeneutic circle 
through time. If we are unable to unify the past, 
present and future of the sentence, then we are 
similarly unable to unify the past, present and 
future of our own biographical experience or 
psychic life. (“Postmodernism” 72)  
 
Thus, the individual’s identity depends on an understanding of 
time as past, present and future. In its turn, this temporal unification, 
chain, emerges from language, from how we arrange it. Consequently, 
language helps us organize time, and as such, our own temporality. But 
when the sequence of time breaks, when the chain of signifiers snaps or 
when the signifiers and signified do not match, our identity is bound to a 
state of schizophrenia, as we lose a stable temporal sense.  
This time confusion is Cole’s exact problem. When he travels to 
the past and does not want to come back is his attempt to recuperate the 
past and his own identity. His time travelling leads him to confusion. 
When he returns to the past a second time, and when Kathryn starts 
believing him, he stops believing in himself and thinks he is mad. 
Losing a stable temporality affects his identity, leading to a 
schizophrenic state. 
Despite of this schizophrenic perspective, Del Rio argues that 
Twelve Monkeys resources to a spatial-time (385), or, to use Deleuze’s 
term, a movement-image. Meaning that the film follows a Hollywood 
tradition in which time is spatialized, it is reduced to a stable and fixed 
narrative. The film’s plot can be arranged in a well-organized sequence, 
in which actions lead to responses. Time becomes a set of sequenced 
actions and attached to its specific space. In this respect, Del Rio 
criticizes the film: 
 
Such containment of time in the interests of 
linearity and closure is accepted as the norm in the 
majority of Hollywood films. Yet for a narrative 
of time travel such as Twelve Monkeys to engage 
in a similar spatial conversion of time speaks 
loudly and clearly to the fact that main stream 
cinema is uniformly and unconsciously colonized 
by a metaphysical world-view that coerces all 
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imaginative possibilities into a single and 
homogeneous product (385).  
 
La Jetée presents a linear and closed narrative, although it does 
emphasize non-spatialized time with its still images. Del Rio provides 
an insightful explanation comparing these two films. While Cole’s claim 
that he is from the future is interpreted as insanity; in La Jetée “the 
psychic reality is no less effective and productive than the measurable, 
external world” (386). In other words, Twelve Monkeys reasons the time 
disruption as madness, while the photoroman – Chris Marker’s own 
term according to Paul Coates (310) – does not attempt to rationalize the 
difference between these past and future realities, psychological and 
physical experiences, or to consider “presence and absence as a 
distinction between two ontological categories” (Del Rio 387); they are 
their own ontological realities. If The Man from the photoroman time 
travels in his mind it does not mean it is less physical or real.  
Therefore, the circular narrative contributes to Twelve Monkeys’s 
epistemological representation. As Cole explains to the psychiatrists the 
past cannot be changed, it already happened. But he attempts to escape 
with Kathryn in a hope that he might be crazy or that the tragic future 
will not come. What he accomplishes is nothing more than expected. 
His recurrent dream is a memory, which returns in this schizophrenic 
life. Such looped plot confirms that time cannot be changed, since it is 
logical. One event leads to the next, they are concatenated into a 
sequence that is time, bound to space that describes time’s path. Even if 
Cole tries, he will always be walking towards his destiny. This mind-
game plot, to use Elsaesser’s term, which deceives the viewers and 
looks for clues, is the sensibility that Del Rio might not grasp in her 
expectance of a time disruption.      
Within this loop narrative, Lashmet interprets that Cole might be 
the carrier of the cure (70). When he was a child he saw the virus being 
spread, but he somehow survived. His final death dismisses a hopeful 
end. Such interpretation leads to the reading of his time-traveling, and 
his possible schizophrenia as a consequence of that childhood memory. 
This temporal disruption allows him to have two temporal experiences 
of the same incident, which shows how a chronological time can be 
bound to experience and perception. Cole’s repeated dreams about a 
memory evince a longing for the past, but this memory is his death, a 
trauma from the future, an anticipation of the past. An iterative existence 
that cannot be changed.  
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Twelve Monkeys’s problematization of time relates to the 
contemporary context of its production. When I refer to the “past” in 
Twelve Monkeys, I am actually referring to the film’s contemporary 
period; the film was released in 1995 and Cole returns to 1996. Thus, a 
twist of this film is that the hopes are not necessarily in the past as 
Huyssen argues, but rather in the present, in the contemporary moment 
of the film production. The scenario in which the main character finds 
shelter and comfort is the present. The film’s social uneasiness also 
highlights animal experimentation, which became popular in the 90s 
(About Animal Testing). Dolly, the cloned sheep, for instance was born 
in 1996, a year after the film release. The infectious diseases and its 
media attention were also heated issues. New York’s Central Park was 
closed in 2000 because of a mosquito carrying the West Nile virus, 
SARS appeared in Hong Kong as a pandemic from 2002 to 2003, the 
avian flu (H5N1) reached Europe in 2005, and the swine flu (H1N1) 
spread in spring 2009. I do not defend that the number of infectious 
diseases increased, but that the western consciousness in relation to 
them has increased. This consciousness raises a state of alert and 
discomfort, which reflects much of the film’s concerns.  
This chapter demonstrated how time in postmodern film tends to 
nostalgia, which relates to a disposable invested society. The next 
chapter shall examine how time in contemporary films is an immersion 
in the virtual world.   
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THE POST-POSTMODERNISTS?   
 
This chapter analyses how recent science fiction films have been 
shaped by a different theoretical concept in what critical theory has 
called post-cinematic (Steven Shaviro), pseudo-postmodern (Alan 
Kirby) or even post-postmodern films (Linda Hutcheon). Contemporary 
science fiction films appear to have a distinct approach to postmodern 
aspects as nostalgia, dystopia and emphasis on space. Frederic 
Jameson’s, Linda Hutcheon’s and Andreas Huyssen’s arguments that 
postmodern fiction is concerned with nostalgic and/or space oriented 
narratives do not seem to fit into films like Source Code (2013) by 
Duncan Jones and Interstellar (2014) by Christopher Nolan. These later 
science fiction films focus on a notion of the present period, and 
emphasize concepts of time in their narrative construction and cinematic 
resources. New digital possibilities appear to be its main cause. This 
chapter begins discussing the issues that have put postmodernism into 
question, followed by three subchapters: a theoretical overview of 
contemporary cinema, a discussion of Source Code and another of 
Interstellar.  
 
POSTMODERNISM? 
 
This research hypothesizes that contemporary science fiction time 
might be a prolongation and an effect of the postmodern condition. 
Therefore, it does assimilate the term postmodernism, but it also 
considers its implications. Along the last chapter, I have given 
preference to the adjective “postmodern” instead of the noun 
“postmodernism”, because apparently theoretical discussion is still far 
from achieving an agreement. The noun would infer a finished 
discussion or a term that has a settled meaning. As a matter of fact, 
some theorists, such as Russell West-Pavlov, do not even observe a real 
break between modernism and postmodernism. He states for instance 
that technologies such as the internet, mobile phones, and Skype, “are 
not genuinely postmodern to the extent that they merely evince the 
intensification of trends present in modernity from the outset” (140), 
which implies postmodernism as “an accelerated, intensified form” 
(West-Pavlov 151) of modernism, and not as an autonomous movement.  
In the same direction, Bruno Latour states that we have never 
even been modern when emphatically declaring that “no one has ever 
been modern. Modernity has never begun. There has never been a 
modern world” (47). Such statement is explained with the argument that 
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modernity is grounded on a contradiction: the distinction between nature 
and man. Nevertheless, this dichotomy creates hybrids, which 
demonstrates that science, politics, nature, among others compose a 
delicate and intertwined complex of touching subjects. An example is 
the ozone hole, which is not only about how nature is being destroyed, 
but also how capital production has contributed to this destruction. The 
contradiction is that the more we try to separate, the more hybrids are 
created, since they dependent on each other. Thus, if modernity does not 
exist, neither does postmodernism, “the hint of ludicrous that always 
accompanies postmodern thinkers; they claim to come after a time that 
has not even started!” (Latour 47).  
Despite these arguments, this dissertation corroborates with 
theorists who agree with the postmodern time and whose observance of 
an effective break between the modernist and postmodernist periods 
helps distinguishing conceptual tendencies from one movement into 
another. In fact, postmodernism not only existed but Linda Hutcheon 
officially declares its death in the 2002 article “Postmodern 
Afterthoughts.” The upheaval of pastiche, nostalgia, and consumerism is 
now démodé. As she writes “The postmodern moment has passed, even 
if some of its discursive strategies and most of its ideological critique 
continue to live on – as do those of modernism – in our contemporary 
twenty-first century world” (“Postmodern” 11). Among the most 
striking reasons to this alleged death is “its pragmatic limitations in 
actual interventionist arenas” (“Postmodern” 6), losing space to theories 
as queer, postcolonial and feminism. Other issues is that Postmodernism 
was always accused of its American-ness, maleness and whiteness 
(“Postmodern” 7-8), even if we can find examples of Latin American 
and European postmodern writers (Gabriel García Márquez and 
Umberto Eco), woman postmodern writers (Angela Carter and Margaret 
Atwood) and postmodern Native American writers (Leslie Marmon 
Silko). Nonetheless, the postmodern death does not devalue its 
discussion, since there is still “space for debate” (Malpas 1). But some 
obvious questions emerge as what has been happening in the beginning 
of twenty-first century; how it differs from postmodernism; what has 
caused such changes. This dissertation has presented a chronological 
discussion from modernism to postmodernism  in an attempt not to 
answers but to pose these questions. In this way, the following 
subsection introduces recent theoretical discussions about the 
“descendants” of postmodernism.     
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POST-POSTMODERNISM? 
 
By the end of Hutcheon’s article on the death of postmodernism, 
she proclaims “Post-postmodernism needs its own label” (“Postmodern” 
11). In search of this label, Alan Kirby proposes the emergence of 
Pseudo-modernism, Garrett Stewart refers to a Postfilmic moment in 
cinema studies, while Steven Shaviro names a Post-Continuity film. 
Although these approaches are different, they offer significant aspects to 
this research. Because they point to the emergence of digital 
technologies as a main cause for this cultural break, since digitalization 
offers new possibilities of engagement with the world. I observe, for 
instance, a clear distinction between analogue and digital technologies, 
in how they affect our understanding of time differently. Take for 
instance how big companies like Apple do not demand a fixed schedule 
from its employees anymore, who can work from home or go to work 
whenever he/she can, and how you can go to 24-hour supermarkets, 
gyms, restaurants, hospitals. In such context, the individual no longer 
bounds to time, as the 9-to-5 worker once did, this contemporary person 
does not suffer from the imposed universal time as Clarissa did in Mrs. 
Dalloway, but he/she is lost or challenges the value of a chronological 
time as the character Pierre Menard from Jorge Luis Borges’s short 
story “Pierre Menard, Autor del Quijote”. Thus, this study engages in a 
careful analysis of the mentioned propositions, more interested in their 
content than in their nomenclature. 
Kirby’s proposition–pseudomodernism–agrees with Hutcheon’s 
argument, stating that we have already outgrown the postmodern age, 
and we are now in the pseudo-modernism.25 He explains that “Pseudo-
modernism includes all television or radio programmes or parts of 
programmes, all ‘texts’, whose content and dynamics are invented or 
directed by the participating viewer or listener” (32). In other words, the 
participation of the audience, reader or public allowed by new 
technologies characterizes the pseudo-modernism. For instance, when 
watching a movie I like to have my I-pad with me and check the actors, 
the soundtrack, the scenarios, I pause, go forward and backwards in the 
movie, in doing so I have a personal interaction with the movie, which is 
reconfigured through my experience. Kirby exemplifies his thesis with 
                                                        
25
 Later, Kirby reformulated his thesis, and renamed it the digimodernism period 
in his book Digimodernism: How new technologies dismantle the Postmodern 
and reconfigure our culture.  
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contemporary programs, which are built upon the audience’s 
participation directly or through emails and text messages. Such relation 
is not just interactivity, but the viewer or listener is understood as a 
segment of the program. Kirby’s theory of pseudo-modernism leads to a 
further point: the representation of reality. We are really entering the 
digital world, when the audience composes the shows. 
Kirby’s observation about this new participatory audience, which 
changes the public’s point of view from outsiders to insiders, also relate 
to other media. For instance, the video-games’ virtual world have 
improved considerably, providing an even more emerging reality to its 
players, while the internet has allowed and demanded a more engaging 
participation. 4Chan, Reddit, Twitter, Facebook, Youtube and blogs 
changed the way information is spread. The big news companies still 
exist and still dominate information and its propagation, but these new 
websites have opened space to the common citizen, who is integrated 
into media. I would suggest that even phenomena like the 2014 selfies 
relate to immediacy (Bolter and Grusin 315), in which the media is so 
immersive, that the consumer starts seeing himself or herself as part of 
it. One of the consequences is a blurring of boundaries between the real 
and the virtual, raising questions about our ontological realities.26 Before 
continuing the discussion of this new cultural tendency, I present a brief 
explanation on ontology, since it provides a possible alternative to 
contemporary science fiction films.  
 
AN ONTOLOGICAL REALITY     
 
This research has attempted to point further alternatives to how 
contemporary film has been dealing with time, which would be more 
than postmodernism’s lack of interest in time and focus on space. For 
instance, Mitchum Huehls proposes that recent literature also focuses on 
temporality, and it does so by creating new temporal experiences, 
“ambivalent temporalities” (8). This research’s particular position is that 
recent films have not only deconstructed time and space, but also 
disallowed any possibility of coordination, thus, presenting a radical 
experience in which one’s concept of ontology (one’s very notion of 
being) is also shattered. Although David Harvey (339) and Brian 
                                                        
26
 Jean Baudrillard’s idea on simulacrum (see Simulacra and Simulation, 1981) 
does relate to this ontological perspective, but I understand the latter as beyond 
simulation. The copy is no longer the issue, as in Philip K. Dick’s A Scanner 
Darkly (1977), but rather if anything real to copy exists.  
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McHale (180) have already observed that postmodernism presents a 
concern for ontology, the radical experience provided by recent films 
question the very notion of ontology. Therefore, this brief section 
discusses an ontology that, although it is still linked to postmodernism, 
it is a radicalization and eradication of such notion.  
Postmodernist perspectives of ontology react against the 
modernist belief that an individual can reach the “truth” about the world 
if he/she observes it carefully, as in an epistemological discovery. This 
position holds that a real world exists, and we can trust our perception to 
comprehend it. In this sense one can understand the very notion of 
epiphany, so dear to modernist writers such as James Joyce and Virginia 
Woolf. Will Moore describes that “Postmodern thinkers are bothered by 
the implication of modern ontology that since there is one world out 
there, and observation is not problematic, then there is only one 
reasonable interpretation of the world” (4). The postmodern position is 
that humans comprehend the world, and that each one, or each group, 
comprehends it differently; the predominant views are those formulated 
by more powerful or skilled people, who are able to impose their 
position over less fortunate ones. A universal time, for example, was 
implemented into the entire world because it was an interest of the 
market, of industry owners, of countries (West-Pavlov 16), but it may 
not work for farmers and fishermen who live a different kind of time, a 
cyclical time, for instance.  
Annemarie Mol clarifies postmodern ontology as a practice, 
performed by the individual. In a political ontology, reality does not 
precede practice, but reality is molded through these practices (Mol 1). 
In other words, the way people act and think construct reality, as it is not 
something fixed, or even real. The consequence is that reality is made, 
and can be localized historically, culturally and materially. Since we 
perform reality, as we act upon it, it becomes realities that can collide 
and complement one another (Mol 4).  
To Kirby, postmodernism only questions “reality”, and that what 
he refers to as pseudo-modernism constructs reality through the 
audience: “Whereas postmodernism called ‘reality’ into question, 
pseudo-modernism defines the real implicitly as myself, now, 
‘interacting’ with its texts” (33). I do not fully embrace Kirby’s pseudo-
modernism, but his differentiation is relevant. If reality is once again 
constructed by the self in its interaction with the text, then we have the 
recuperation of the personal time, and space.  
I hypothesize that this personal time does not collide with the 
universal one, as in the modernist period; when Clarissa internal time 
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from Mrs. Dalloway could never fit into the social demands around her. 
Now, personal time is accepted and integrated into the social digital and 
virtual world. Modernism showed the problem, Postmodernism 
questioned and tried to escape it in nostalgia, and post-postmodernism 
embraced the problem/confusion. If this personal time generates 
multiple times, then it also constructs undistinguishable spaces and 
realities. Therefore, the issue does not seem to be if reality proper was 
dissolved, but rather that it has been constructed through the individual’s 
perspective on time and space.  
 
POST-CONTINUITY, POSTFILMIC CINEMA(?)  
 
The questioning of postmodernism, confirming its end or denying 
its existence, has overlapped with a change in cinema. In this section, I 
discuss theoretical perspectives on the relation between digitalization 
and film, which does not aim at how this medium can evolve or 
hybridize, but rather on how this relationship affects time on film. 
Shaviro states a new tendency in Hollywood cinema in which 
digitalization plays a major role in the twentieth first century 
(Postcinematic 2). He argues that the transition from analogue to 
digitalization transformed the film media, which has become post-
cinematic (Postcinematic 2). Such transformation does not mean the end 
of cinema but a change in focus; if before film was a cultural dominant 
over television, now the digital, computer, video-game world dominates 
cinema. Similarly, David Rodowick notices how digital worlds and 
computer gaming is at the core of narratives such as The Matrix, 
Thirteenth Floor and eXistenZ (Virtual 4). The intertwinement of 
different media emerges as a key feature of this digital cinema.    
One of the main changes observed by Shaviro is editing 
continuity (Postcinematic 77). David Bordwell already theorized such 
tendency as “intensified continuity,” in which the classic Hollywood 
rules of editing continuity are intensified. Although his perspective is 
not the most innovative thinking, his pragmatic readings are useful. To 
Bordwell, the Hollywood system of editing has not changed, only some 
of its devices slightly differ (Way 119), such as faster editing, exceeding 
the 180° degree line, less establishing shots, and more close-up shots. 
The viewer is not expected to fully comprehend the space of the 
sequence, but to experience the strong and fast intensity of the action 
scenes (Bordwell, Way 188).  
Shaviro has a more radical stand, as he observes these changes as 
key parts of the post-cinematic. The intensified continuity is “a radical 
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aesthetic ‘regime change.’ The New Hollywood of the 1970s may just 
have ‘intensified’ the conventions of continuity editing; but the 
Hollywood of today has exploded them, and reached the point of what I 
will call a stylistic of post-continuity” (Shaviro, Postcinematic 123). 
Such explosion relates to how trailers fast editing predominate in every 
action sequence. Further explaining post-continuity, Shaviro writes:  
 
[I]t’s not that we don’t read anymore, but rather 
that reading itself has been recontextualized, and 
subsumed within a broader 
multimedia/audiovisual environment. In the same 
way, it is not that continuity rules are always 
being violated or ignored; nor are the films made 
in their absence simply chaotic. Rather, we are in 
a “post-continuity” situation when continuity has 
ceased to be important — or at least has ceased to 
be as important as it used to be. (Shaviro, “Post-
Continuity”) 
   
Soundtrack seems to be the guiding element in these disorienting 
sequences. In traditional analogue cinema, sound works as “a support 
for the images, giving them emotional resonance and a guarantee of 
(seeming) naturalism” (Shaviro, Postcinematic 80). But in post-
continuity cinema, soundtrack provides the continuity effect, while the 
image illustrates the sound, “sound now operates overtly instead of 
covertly” (Shaviro, Postcinematic 80). Nonetheless, these post-
continuity moments do not prevail, and contemporary films still present 
many moments in which the Hollywood continuity editing patterns are 
carefully obeyed.  
Pursuing the same topic, Stewart tries to understand time in this 
digital cinema. He compares recent films’ manipulation of time, 
especially American science fiction, to European humanistic films. His 
main idea is that what Christopher Nolan’s Memento (2000) does in 
relation to time and special effects is not quite distinct than what the 
French Nouvelle Vague did in the 60s. In doing so, Stewart relays on 
Gilles Deleuze’s theory of time-image, since this concept focuses on 
European avant-garde, proposing a time that predominates over space, 
that is not spatialized, nor manipulated by movement, his pure time: 
duration.   
Stewart refers to this last decade films as postfilmic, because they 
do not relay on the materiality of the filmstrip. Recent cinema’s 
digitalization invalidates the moving frames that once constructed the 
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idea of cinema. These films do not use the movement criticized by 
Deleuze, the movement of the frames or the images that move, which 
generates moving images. The consequence is a “framed time”, instead 
of time framed, as Deleuze would explain movement-image films. In 
Stewart words:  
  
Increasingly, the temporal transit (mechanical) of 
the image, frame by frame, gives way to its 
temporal transformation (electronic) within the 
frame. This is obvious enough. What isn’t, or not 
without some further reflection, is the frequency 
with which the latter phenomenon is not only 
facilitated but inscribed by certain film plots of 
fantastic time travel. […] Framed time is a 
narrative inflection as well as a psychic 
topography operating across various genres. Its 
effect draws on the new cultural dispensation of 
virtual space and time as much as on any specific 
digital instrumentation. (Framed 2)  
 
What Stewart proposes is that digital cinema constructs a 
different cinematography, through a narratography,27 instead of 
narratology, as he prefers. The possibility of new special effects affects 
not only the form of cinema, the technical way it is constructed, but also 
its narrative. Therefore, fantasy narratives have paid a special relation to 
temporal twists. Stewart also argues how supernatural narratives, such 
as Donnie Darko (2001) or The Others (2001), resort to time subverting 
through special effects, but do not use technology as theme, “virtual as a 
psychological rather than a technological issue” (Framed 173). To 
demonstrate this tendency, he analyzes moments in which plot and 
special effects converge, that is when narratography prevails over 
narratology. An example is when Donnie Darko, who has psychological 
breaks, time travels, temportation,28 in a zoomed tunnel. The psychology 
and fantasy of the character combines with zoom special effects. In 
doing so, he connects narrative to form, and technology to story.  
                                                        
27 
Stewart explains that “[i]n this book, then, it is the writing on narrative’s 
graphic effects, either lexical or filmic or now electronic, their category of study 
(rather than the writing in and by them of screen effects), that the term 
narratography is meant to help focus” (Framed 22). Narratology maps as in 2D, 
narratography charts as in 3D, which means that the latter is more sociological 
and culturally driven, considering technological and formals aspects as well. 
28
 Garrett Stewart’s term to time travel (Framed 205).  
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Stewart explains that his time-image is a version of Deleuze’s, 
although not exactly the same. The digital cinema constructs a 
“timespace-image,” a spatialized time, but not in the movement sense 
attached to Deleuze’s idea (Stewart, Framed 205). It enables time to 
differ or detach from movement, since it does not depend on frames that 
move. In such new movement-image, or rather timespace-image, 
temporal categories such as past, present and future are looser in the 
sense that they do not demand a chronological order. Their 
independence allows the inborn to know his future as in The Butterfly 
Effect (2004). In other words, this digital technology, in which the 
action of the characters does not depend on the movement of the frames, 
configures a time and space autonomous of movement, and enables non-
chronological narratives. Stewart’s explanation is that:   
 
In the maturation of the cinematic medium, 
movement first implied time, then figured it as the 
troped import of the framed image. Now time 
often defers to movement. Temportation [to time 
travel] throws over the virtual time-image for that 
new movement-image I have been identifying as 
the (com)mutable figure of timespace, where past 
and future are willed into a motility and plasticity 
all their own. And where temporality, once having 
been spatialized, can itself be morphed. (Framed 
205) 
 
Such distinction between time-image and timespace-image helps 
elucidate the difference between European film’s and American science 
fiction’s experimentations with time. The first conveys Deleuze’s time-
image, the durée of a time that does not emerge from movement or 
space. The second explores Stewart’s timespace-image, in which time 
and space are independent of movement, the frames’ movement. The 
issue is not simply that American science fiction stretches Deleuze’s 
time-image. They are, for example, drastically culturally different. 
Stewart points that Deleuze’s time-image relates to “modernism’s 
unique way of giving fictive form to a cultural understanding of 
consciousness” (Framed 209). In this way, modernism’s time-image 
connects to memory, projection, mind, and consciousness; it is strongly 
bound to the subject, and to his or her perception, as when Freder 
confuses robot-Maria and hallucinates in Metropolis. When postmodern 
thinking emerged, it questioned not only the individual’s consciousness, 
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but also his or her own existence, as the replicants’ and humans’ 
ontological differences in Blade Runner.  
To Thomas Elsaesser, the difference between the American 
contemporary cinema and the humanistic European is basically their 
context of production, since “cinematic storytelling has in general 
become more intricate, complex, unsettling, and this not only in the 
traditionally difficult categories of European auteur and art films, but 
right across the spectrum of mainstream cinema, event-
movies/blockbusters, indie-films, not forgetting (HBO-financed) 
television” (“Mind-Game” 19). Shaviro also compares such violation of 
continuity with the 60s European cinematography, especially the 
Nouvelle Vague, and finds unmistaken similarities. The difference is 
that violations “were at the center of a film like Godard’s Breathless 
more than half a century ago. Today, neither the use of continuity rules 
nor their violation is at the center of the audience’s experience any 
longer” (Shaviro, Postcinematic 2008).    
Thus, modernist time-image is epistemological and the time 
instabilities are mental related, subjective. While Hollywood fantasies 
do “so within circumscribed stories that, again and again, surprise us 
with a revelation before dismissing it from all urgency within the 
mechanisms of the unreal: the fact that all is artifice or delusion, 
posthumous or electronic” (Stewart, Framed 209). Contemporary 
Hollywood films, especially science fiction, tends to an ontological 
proposition, rather than an epistemological view, in which no reality is 
real, or all realities are real. Chris Marker’s La Jetée never questions if 
the future is real or not, if the time-travel is possible, or if the past is 
virtual. After ten days of experiments with time travelling, the voice-
over narration describes “a real room, real children, real birds, real cats, 
real tombs.” This French short film from the early 60s built in 
photomontage does not problematize the possibility of reality; it 
epistemologically takes it for granted. Even if its technological resource 
inquires on the movement of the image, even if its photo roman 
technique emphasizes how time in conventional cinema may depend on 
movement, and how in this particular case time is literally freed from 
movement, since the images do not move in the photomontage. The 
spectator does not see a “man walking”, but rather a still man, in a 
position of walking.  
Following this perspective, Rodowick observes a “strange effect 
of the curious ontology of digital worlds”: the loss of durée (Virtual 
171). Similary, the cinematographer Babette Mangolte wonders “why is 
it so difficult for a digital image to communicate duration?” (263). 
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Rodowick explains that since “nothing [physically] moves” in the digital 
world, “the sense of time as la durée gives way to simple duration or to 
the ‘real time’ of a continuous present” (Virtual 171). A perpetual 
present seems to substitute durée, as a time that lingers, instead of a time 
that lasts. Such substitution appears to wave the emotional possibilities 
of time.29   
Mangolte acknowledges that digital has no sense of time because 
there is no 24 frames per second, as analog cinema, time is then in the 
layers of digital image. She describes that “[t]ime is not transformation 
anymore, [it] is inscribed in layers on a set screen with bit-size slots. 
When you dig into these bit-size shots to see what is there, you find bits 
of time memory one on top of the other without chronology. You travel 
through time now by traveling through layers of pixels” (264). But it is 
precisely these layers of the digital that allow the intricate and complex 
constructions of time, since the “silver-based film is structured by time 
as entropy, therefore unrepeatable” (264) in the passing time from one 
frame to the next.   
Shaviro explains that such loss of emotional time, or durée, aligns 
with Mark Fisher’s idea of capitalist realism, in which capitalism 
becomes the ultimate social constraint, being easier to imagine the end 
of the world than of capitalism. In such world, the future cannot escape 
dystopia, since it cannot avoid the repetitive empty commodity relations. 
The result is that “[i]n capitalist realism, duration implodes; it shrinks 
down to a dimensionless, infinitesimal point. Time is emptied out, or 
whittled away” (Shaviro, Postcinematic 88). But this empty time of 
capitalism in digital cinema is not necessarily negative.  As Shaviro 
proposes “if we have lost a certain humanist pathos of lived duration, in 
return we have gained the sheer profusion and density of ‘real-time’ 
innovation and invention” (Postcinematic 87). As mentioned, this real 
time condenses into a continuous present.  
Elsaesser reinforces Stewart’s and Shaviro’s arguments in favor 
of a post-continuity or post-cinematic cinema and points that even 
themes seem to become more intricate (“Mind-Game” 19). To Elsaesser, 
some recent films construct mind-game stories. They present “a delight 
in disorienting or misleading spectators” (“Mind-Game” 15), proposing 
“new forms of spectator-engagement and new forms of audience-
address” (“Mind-Game” 16), due to an apparently crisis in the 
                                                        
29
 Maria Pramaggiore argues that aesthetics of time can contribute to the 
production of emotions, and critical thinking. See Making Time in Stanley 
Kubrick`s Barry Lyndon, 2014.    
114 
 
voyeuristic relation, in which the audience expects more than simply 
watching, but participating at some level as in Kirby’s argument. Once 
more, “the changes brought by digitalization” (Elsaesser, “Mind-Game” 
17) are in the core of the possible explanations. These films address 
diverse issues, including “epistemological problems (how do we know 
what we know) and ontological doubts (about other worlds, other 
minds) that are in the mainstream of the kinds of philosophical inquiry 
focused on human consciousness, the mind and the brain, multiple 
realities or possible worlds” (Elsaesser, “Mind-Game” 15). Christopher 
Nolan’s Inception (2010), for example, plays with the characters’ 
ontological world in the possibility of living in one’s dream and also 
plays with the viewers’ narrative expectations of finding the truth of the 
story.     
Shaviro’s explanation of the relation between space and time in 
continuity further contributes to Elsaesser’s: to the former, continuity 
structures “work to provide a certain sense of spatial orientation, and to 
regularize the flow of time.” He explains that “[i]n classical continuity 
styles, space is a fixed and rigid container, which remains the same no 
matter what goes on in the narrative; and time flows linearly, and at a 
uniform rate”  (“Post-Continuity”). Things to Come’s (William Cameron 
Menzies, 1936) narrative, for example, unrolls in the city of Everytown. 
This city transforms and evolves through a period of one hundred years, 
becoming more relevant than the characters or a character in itself, and 
being an example of a fixed space where narrative is constructed upon 
through the layers of time. On the other hand, in post-cinematic films, 
“plot is no longer stabilized by temporal progression […] the ‘new 
cinema’—as innovative as it is involuntarily caught up in historical 
change—has arrived at a point of temporal crisis where ‘chronos is 
sickness itself’” (Postcinematic 166-7). In other words, chronology 
becomes the disease. This sick chronos transverses into the mind-game 
stories, and reiterate Stewart’s idea that the digital form changes the 
narrative content. In investigating Source Code and Interstellar, I hope 
to illustrate the flexibility of space and a non-linear or not-fixed time, 
and how these forms relate to the assimilation of the digital into the 
film’s narrative and structure. Before investigating the films, the 
following subsection presents one last aspect that contributes to this new 
cinema and its framed time.      
 
 
 
115 
 
THE INDEX ISSUE  
 
A recurrent theme in critical views of digital image is the loss of 
the index (Mulvey 18). The photographic index is the referent, the real 
objective that is projected through light into a virtual image; indexical 
signs “are causally or existentially connected to their referents” (Prince 
28) or “an index […] is a sign produced by the ‘thing’ it represents” 
(Mulvey 9). Lev Manovich defines that “Cinema emerged out of the 
same impulse which engendered naturalism, court stenography and wax 
museums. Cinema is the art of the index; it is an attempt to make art out 
of a footprint” (250). Such idea is strongly bound to André Bazin’s 
notion of a realistic cinema, which defends film as a way to preserve the 
time and space of an event, to put “faith in reality” (43) and to not 
manipulate the image.  
But computer graphics have achieved a sound ability to simulate 
reality without any sort of indexical relation, which led some to question 
if this is really cinema. Tom Gunning counter-argues and explains that 
the index does not differentiate analogue from digital cinema, as “the 
indexical and digital need not to be opposed” (“What’s” 44). Analogue 
photo does not mean transparency and lack of mediation or 
manipulation, in as much as, digital recording does not mean a lack of 
referent (Gunning, “What’s” 40). For Gunning, the difference lies on 
storage, on how the digital transforms images into numerical data, but 
the ultimate results of both are similar. His argument is hard to deny in 
relation to a realistic aesthetic cinema, which is only trying to copy the 
world. But other genres, which are trying to create new worlds, appear 
to benefit greatly from the digital.   
Similarly, Rodowick finds a useful solution to the issue of index. 
His focus is not on the strict relation between the object and its image, 
their indexical relation, but on how computer processing transforms 
images into number. The result is that “the process of quantification or 
numerization is irreversible, which is another way of saying that inputs 
and outputs are discontinuous in digital information” (Virtual 119). 
Digital technology changed picture into information.  
Intriguingly, Rodowick notices that despite its many aesthetic 
possibilities most digital processes are channeled into realistic images 
(Virtual 11), thus appealing for an indexical quality of the image. 
Indeed, in the article “Realism and the Digital Image,” W.J.T. Mitchell 
argues that digital is used mostly to optimize instead of challenge or 
subvert ideas of credible images. Mulvey remembers that this might be a 
transitional moment, “in which both technologies coexist, in which the 
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aesthetic of the digital still thinks with the idea of the index” (21). But 
this realistic expectation does not apply to science fiction and fantasy 
films, which attempt to extrapolate realism into imaginary spaces. In 
such narratives, the detachment from a realistic aesthetic allows digital 
cinema to be “less indexical and more iconic” (Rodowick, Virtual 
123).30  
The discontinuity between the input, what is registered, and 
output, what is processed and results, displaces the indexical value of 
the image onto the symbolic. Following this perspective, the possibility 
of a change in narrative because of the digital would emphasize the 
iconicity of the graphic images rather than realism. Stephen Prince’s 
concept of perceptual realism enhances science fiction’s iconic 
tendency. He explains that the notion of a realistic image is a matter of 
perception instead of a referent (28). Think for instance of Jurassic 
Park’s dinosaurs that look impressively real, although we have no visual 
register of dinosaurs, they might as well have been purple instead of 
green.  
This ability to create incredible perceptual realistic films leads 
Mulvey to recognize the lyricism behind the digital image: “In the 1990s 
digital technology brought back the human element and man-made 
illusions” (19). Adding to this, Manovich compares digital composition 
to painting. Digital as an animation cinema, as a return to a hand-made 
craft instead of simply mechanic. This return to cinema as a manual art 
traverses Walter Benjamin’s31 argument of film as a mechanical art, 
which might have lost an aura, bringing new theoretical perspectives to 
the study of cinema. It also explains science fiction film’s capacity to 
seduce its audience through the special effects (Kuhn Alien 7), rather 
than the narrative twists, reiterating the value of the image in itself. In 
Manovich words:  
                                                        
30
 In here, Rodowick refers to philosopher C.S. Peirce’s theory of signs in which 
the latter differentiates icon, index and symbol. Stam, Burgoyne and Flitterman-
Lewis explain that “The iconic sign represents its object by means of similarity 
or resemblance; the relation between sign and interpretant is mainly one of 
likeness, as in the case of portraits, diagrams, statues, and on an aural level, 
onomatopoeic words […] An indexical sign involves a causal, existential link 
between sign and interpretant, as in the case of a weather cock, or of a 
barometer or of smoke as signifying the existence of fire […] A symbolic sign, 
finally, involves an entirely conventional link between sign and interpretant, as 
is the case in the majority of the words forming part of ‘natural languages’” (5-
6).   
31
 “The work of art in the age of mechanical reproduction.”  
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The manual construction of images in digital 
cinema represents a return to nineteenth century 
pre-cinematic practices, when images were hand-
painted and hand-animated. At the turn of the 
twentieth century, cinema was to delegate these 
manual techniques to animation and define itself 
as a recording medium. As cinema enters the 
digital age, these techniques are again becoming 
the commonplace in the filmmaking process. 
Consequently, cinema can no longer be clearly 
distinguished from animation. It is no longer an 
indexical media technology but, rather, a sub-
genre of painting. (Manovich 250) 
 
Mulvey presents a further relevant argument, in which she revises 
Raymond Bellour’s concept of the pensive spectator. The latter proposes 
that the stillness within the moving image creates a “pensive spectator,” 
who reflects on cinema, since he/she becomes conscious of his/her role 
as a viewer. Mulvey suggests that “with the spread of digital 
technologies this kind of fragmentation of film [such as delay, 
repetition, return, mostly observed in experimental avant-garde 
cinematographers as Kiarostami] has become easier to put into practice” 
(144). Consequently, digital cinema can contribute to the delay cinema, 
which inspires the pensive spectator (Mulvey 186). I want to further 
stretch this idea, proposing that the fascination generated by the special 
effects and its narrative pause in science fiction films can also generate 
pensive spectators. They are not only dazed by the image, but can also 
brood on the visual implications of the computer graphic images.   
In sum, Deleuze’s pure time is reconfigured in the post-
postmodern American science fiction. If before it was an uncommon 
aesthetic value to Hollywood cinema, now it becomes a recurrent 
practice, morphing into Stewart’s timespace-image, detached from the 
literal movement of the filmstrip. Although this time perpetuates in a 
different cultural context, it still maintains similar aesthetic purposes of 
creating pensive spectators. The special effects call attention to the 
cinematic device and experience, causing what Paul Willemen refers to 
as an inflated narrator (11). The time of this post-cinema relates to 
digitalization, culturally and technologically, because although a sense 
of duration, durée, implodes, the layers of the digital allows a framed 
time that, as I hope to demonstrate next, creates Huels’s “ambivalent 
temporalities” (8) in science fiction films.  
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SOURCE CODE  
 
In analyzing Source Code, I expect to demonstrate how its 
representation of time reflects on the ontological relation between reality 
and digital reality, as it constructs a different concept of time within 
science fiction genre. Such duality is possible through the elaboration of 
a virtual world, which allows existence beyond one’s own body, time 
and space. Captain Stevens, the main character, confronts his disabled 
condition and dystopic world, reconfiguring the digital, and not the 
future, into a utopic possibility. Chronos sickness emerges in an iterative 
present, which is hunted by the past and defies the future, while a 
malleable and multiple space predominates. As before, I begin 
discussing space, then I move to the portrayal of technology and how it 
relates to our contemporary digital world, and finish with the subject of 
time.  
Source Code tells the tale of the American soldier Captain Colter 
Stevens (Jake Gyllenhaal), who is trapped in what seems to be a 
spaceship cabin or a training room. Within this room, he talks to his 
instructor Captain Colleen Goodwin (Vera Farmiga) through a video 
chat; she puts him in a virtual simulation (sim). His mission is to 
discover the bomber of a train before it explodes. Every time he fails, 
the bomb explodes, and Goodwin sends him back to the beginning of 
the simulation. But Captain Stevens is not comfortable in this apparent 
training section, he wants to leave it, and soon discovers that, despite 
being virtual, its consequences can still be real.  
 
Data Worlds  
 
Different layers of virtuality compose space in Source Code. The 
narrative reveals three main layers of existence, which superimpose and 
fold into each; they correspond to the different realities Captain Stevens 
finds along the film. The first is Captain Goodwin’s control room. The 
second is where Captain Stevens is locked in what looks like a 
spaceship cabin, the capsule. The third is the simulation where the latter 
travels to, the train. This convoluted space tricks our understanding of 
what is real in this film. The virtual worlds of the simulations challenge 
the characters’ and the viewers’ mapping of reality.  
The control room is where “reality” seems to be manifested, since 
this is the supposed real world. Captain Goodwin is part of a USA 
military program that invented a kind of time travel machine, the Source 
Code. This device is further discussed in the next section. Captain 
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Goodwin’s space looks more like a surveillance room than a scientist’s 
laboratory, as the many screens behind her shows (see Figure 3.1). The 
idea of surveillance pervades throughout the film as she is constantly 
watching and monitoring Captain Stevens, applying memory tests and 
exercises on him.  
Interestingly, Captain Stevens’s perspective predominates in the 
beginning of the film, which means that we only see Captain Goodwin 
through the small screen on the capsule (see Figure 3.2). We are 
watching her, instead of the other way around. This inversion is the first 
foreshadow of this film’s mind-game construction. More interesting is 
that the capsule, where Captain Stevens is trapped, is not real, being a 
virtual reality created by the program Source Code. Another inversion is 
that the real world where Captain Goodwin is located appears only on 
the virtual image of the screen in the virtual reality of the capsule.  
The story is that Captain Stevens is actually in a coma. His body 
is incubated in a machine, while his mind is projected into the capsule 
by the Source Code, and then again in the train. A virtual simulation 
inside a virtual simulation. In this third space, he has to discover the 
bomb and the bomber. But as he says “This looks so real” (00:12:05), 
that it is hard for him not to get involved with the characters and events 
of the train simulation. This notion of reality is relevant because the fact 
that the capsule is also virtual is only revealed much later in the story. 
The viewer and the main character believe that the capsule is real while 
the train is virtual.  
Comparing these two simulations leads us to a different 
understanding, another inversion in which the train looks real, while the 
capsule looks odd. The train’s aesthetic is very realistic. The only 
uncanny feeling is the repetitions, since Captain Stevens always awakes 
in the same situations, as Phil (Bill Murray) in Groundhog Day (1993). 
Christina Warren (Michelle Monaghan) is talking to the Captain, the 
ticket collector comes and a woman spills coffee on his shoe. He is also 
a different person, as he embodies a man named Sean Fentress 
(Frédérick De Grandpré). In the train sequences,  Bordwell’s classic 
Hollywood editing concepts predominates, lighting is realistic, shots 
follow the main character’s perspective, and stablishing shots orient us, 
some cuts are fast but they are recognizable within the space (see Figure 
3.3). The characters are on a moving train.  
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On the other hand, the capsule is surreal. He wakes up upside 
down with Captain Goodwin’s voice already giving him instructions. A 
lack of medium or stablishing shots contributes to the viewers’ 
disorientation, while a close-up on his face and a dark lighting does not 
Figure 3.2 – Captain Steven’s POV – 00:19:08 
Figure 3.3 – Train – 00:03:02 
Figure 3.1 – Goodwin’s room – 00:08:15 
121 
 
allow us to discover the surroundings. We receive as little information 
as he does about this second space (See Figure 3.4). A filter makes the 
colors paler and bluish, because the main light source is Goodwin’s 
screen. As the sequence proceeds the camera itself seems to be 
entrapped in this capsule, and cannot find the distance to open its lens 
and reveal more.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This difficulty in distinguishing the virtual and the real 
complicates space. As the main character, we are cheated into believing 
that the capsule is real, even though it looks odd, and that the train is a 
simulation that looks too real. But ultimately, both are not real. The 
twist of this mind-game film is to transform the ontology of these two 
virtual worlds into possible realities, as when Captain Stevens dies in 
the control room but survives in the train world by the end of the film.  
The capsule goes under a transformation that relates to the 
instabilities of Captain Stevens’s mind. The director Duncan Jones 
explains that at first “we designed the pod to resemble a helicopter 
cockpit. It’s a small, intimate environment where he has this bright 
white screen in front of him that he can’t really see through” (in 
Fordham, 54). In this first instance, he is belted to a chair as a pilot. As 
he starts suspecting the nature of this cockpit, it starts collapsing as well, 
a lot of fluid is leaking and the heating stops working. When Captain 
Stevens discovers that the capsule is a virtual projection of his mind, it 
expands around him into a big and restrictive space.  
Duncan highlights that “at that point, the pod environment is 
supposed to resemble a medieval prison cell with a window up at the top 
throwing light on him, like something out of an old Errol Flynn movie. 
Colter [Captain Colter Stevens] ends up thinking of himself as being in 
a kind of virtual prison” (in Fordham, 59). In this scene, the camera 
Figure 3.4 – Capsule – 00:07:05 
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begins with a close-up on his face, and opens the frame going upwards 
as the cell grows, enhancing the mentioned prison feeling (see Figure 
3.5). A single light beam focuses part of his body, which works as a 
foreshadowing, since later we discover that he is disabled in the control 
room world, and the light emphasizes exactly what remains of his real 
body. The capsule always looks unstable and unsafe, with exposed 
wires, rusts, and dirty, as would his disabled body and comatose state. 
This transformation of the space exposes its connection to the character 
and his body, being as malleable as his understanding of reality. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
When Captain Stevens discovers that he is trapped in these layers 
of simulations, he asks Captain Goodwin to disengage him from the 
Source Code. He wants to die, so that he would not be manipulated 
again. As he says “Any soldier I have served with could say that one 
death is service enough” (00:51:32). Touched by his appeal, she 
confronts her superior, Dr. Rutledge (Jeffrey Wright) and disengages 
Captain Stevens from the machine. But she does this while the latter’s 
mind is attached to the train reality because he wants to have a last 8-
minutes with Christina, with whom he felt in love with. When he dies in 
the control room, his mind survives in the train in Sean’s body.  
After his immigration from real to virtual, the train is no longer a 
virtual world but a parallel reality, with another Captain Goodwin and 
another version of his own body. He actualizes the virtual reality. As a 
consequence, the control room world becomes just another layer in a 
complex chain of existence. Similar to the replicants in Blade Runner, if 
the copy is as real as that which is copied, then they are all real. To 
make virtual into real, space becomes malleable, because it cannot 
constrain as Things to Come’s Everytown, it rather has to allow changes. 
Figure 3.5 – Foreshadowing Light Beam – 00:49:32 
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At first, the virtual scenarios, the capsule and the train are addendums to 
a stable reality and its hidden layers. Finally, these layers become 
foldable sheets of space and existence for the characters.  
Crucially, this space is not the fragmented postmodern space; as 
Blade Runner’s “a synthesis of mental architectures” (Bruno 67) that 
evokes a collision of cultures. Instead it is malleable, and such trait 
originates in the digital possibilities. A symbolical frame is when 
Captain Stevens and Christina are already safe in the alternative train 
reality. They stand in front of the Cloud Gate, popular known as the 
Bean sculpture, in Chicago. This city does not look different, only 
distorted (see Figure 3.6). The sculpture is a giant globe shaped metal 
structure with a bean format, which, through its mirrored view, folds the 
city image, thus making space malleable. And if we look carefully, we 
can see that the reflection of Captain Steve’s shows another man, 
because this is more than another version of the city, it is also a different 
body.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Invisible Machines 
 
The Source Code is in the core of the film’s narrative, but we 
never actually see this machine, only its tricks. Such invisibility 
complies with the digital configurations of recent technologies, which 
attempt to look as natural as possible–think about I-pad devices and 
their interfaces. In the control room, there are plenty of computer 
screens that monitor Captain Steven, and there is the incubator machine 
where he is kept alive, but no exceptional visual device stands out. 
Souce Code no longer focuses on the machines, as the female robot in 
Metropolis, the surveillance eye in 12 Monkeys and the replicants in 
Blade Runner, rather it focuses on its illusions.  
Figure 3.6 – Chicago from the Bean – 01:24:28 
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Although not markedly visible, the Source Code still impacts the 
film’s narrative. This technology allows the discussed malleability of 
space, creating two levels of simulation, first is the capsule, which 
englobes the second, the train. Its illusions interfere with the main 
character’s identity. Captain Stevens’s body becomes as malleable as 
space. In the capsule, it is not his real body, but a mind projection. 
Confused he asks “What about the rest of my body? I can see my hands 
and my feet. They still move” but Captain Goodwin reports that “They 
are just a manifestation. They are just a way of making sense of all this” 
(00:48:45). In the train, he embodies Sean’s body, as a ghost. To 
Stewart, Captain Stevens’s body is “a remote control cyberpresence” 
(Framed 124). He looks at himself in the mirror and sees the passenger 
(see Figure 3.7). The layers of virtual worlds confuse, and the character 
cannot recognize or find himself anymore. Captain Stevens is not simply 
a time traveler, he travels into a different body–almost as a spirit he 
uncannily possesses somebody.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Such uncanny aspect agrees with Stewart’s argument that recent 
films have appealed to time travel narratives with a fantastic twist (173). 
This change constructs the digital more as a supernatural form than as a 
technology, as if this technology is still uncanny for us. Similar to the 
tales in which photographs would trap the souls of the humans. 
Although this does not seem to be exactly the case in Source Code, there 
is an uncanniness in the lack of explanation to how we can create a 
parallel reality and survive in someone’s else body. New technologies is 
indeed science fiction’s utmost marvelous and threat; robot-Maria in 
Metropolis, the replicants in Blade Runner, the digital/virtual world in 
Source Code.  Furthermore, this desire of projecting oneself and 
believing the virtual to be real reflects the very contemporary 
technology of role-playing games.  
Figure 3.7 – 00:06:09 
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Role-playing games (RPG) as World of Warcraft (WOW) or God 
of War function by projecting the players into an avatar, a character in 
the game. The players are physically in a different reality (in their rooms 
in front of their computers), and they project themselves through the 
character they create into a different world. The immediacy in these 
games lies in their first-person perspective. Thus, despite the necessary 
mediation of the computer or video game, the individual is able to have 
a virtual experience that is quite immediate. As Bolter and Grusin argue 
“the viewer should forget that she is in fact wearing a computer 
interface and accept the graphic image that it offers as her own visual 
world” (316). The media needs to be immersive “which means that it is 
a technology of mediation whose purpose is to disappear” (Bolter and 
Grusin 315). 
Technology is in fact a strong point in the film’s hypermediacy. 
Bolter and Grusin explains that hypermediacy is the heterogeneous 
characteristic of digital media, the screen within a screen, and the 
combination of different and random media (315).  An example is how 
Captain Goodwin appears through a screen to Captain Stevens (see 
Figure 3.2), creating the illusion that she is in the virtual reality and not 
him. And behind her, other screens, that open minor windows, and these 
screens within the framed screen pose the question of how many more 
virtual realities can be unfolded in theses frames.   
Shaviro explains that this relation between video game–also 
television, video, and digital–and film convey the “structure feeling” of 
the post-cinematic affect. Source Code strongly appeals to the role-
playing experience. The players, as is the case with Captain Stevens, 
become someone else in this different reality; in the case of World of 
Warcraft, you can be a wizard, an orc, a dwarf, an elf, a female or male; 
in God of War, you are Kratos, a Spartan demigod warrior looking for 
revenge. In both, the gamers have some freedom to choose his/her 
actions; missions and objectives exist but they can be skipped, delayed, 
or even ignored. The former is called a massively multiplayer online 
role-playing game (MMORPG), due to its massive quantity of players, 
whose interactions with other players may have different motivations 
from accomplishing missions to simply making friends.  
The popularity of these games unveils their power in relation to 
the consuming public. The Guinness World Record gave the record to 
World of Warcraft as the most popular subscription-based MMORPG in 
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2010 for having over 12 million subscribers around the world.32 God of 
War is not as popular as WOW, but its long saga confirms its 
popularity–God of War II, God of War III, God of War: Chains in 
Olympus, and God of War: Ghost in Sparta. Many other names can be 
mentioned here, as contributors to the popularity of games in which the 
player assumes a first-person role in a virtual reality, Doom, Counter 
Strike, Diablo, Battlefield, Fallout, to mention a few.    
Besides the relation to the video game mode, Source Code is also 
a mind-game film, as Elsaesser defines it. The spectator within Captain 
Stevens is immersed in the layers of virtuality, or reality and has to 
unveil the secret behind the bomb. Every time Captain Stevens dies, he 
is revived in the capsule chamber, which is a striking remind of games 
like Counter Strike or Half Life, in which every time the players die, 
they are back to the base, where they can refuel, recharge and go back 
killing. This repetitive mode illustrates Elsaesser’s explanation of “new 
forms of spectator-engagement and new forms of audience-address” 
(“Mind-Game” 16). According to Elsaesser, the old forms of voyeurism, 
in which in classic cinema the spectator only watches passively, are not 
appealing anymore. Recent films engage the spectator in more than 
voyeurism since they immerse into a corporeal cinema.  
Through a social critical perspective, Source Code portrays the 
scenario of terrorism fear, which recalls 9/11, as the main character is a 
soldier who died in Afghanistan. On the other hand, more than 
terrorism, I suggest that fear arises from the loss of reality, as the main 
character is unable to distinguish which reality is real, as Stewart writes 
“That’s the real paranoia now: that there’s never been anything really 
there” (Framed 145).   
Source Code’s problematization of the Afghanistan War does not 
relate to space, but to the body. Captain Stevens is kept alive in an 
incubation room. He only has half of his body, and his body perception 
is part of the simulation incited by the computer program. He is in a 
state of a semi-consciousness or coma, which is maintained by this 
technology from the Source Code. This character is the contemporary 
hero, soldier, and time travel man (see Figure 3.8). Quite differently 
from Cabal in Things to Come and Cole in Twelve Monkeys, Stevens 
does not have an astronaut suit; he does not even have a complete body, 
                                                        
32
 See the website: <http://www.guinnessworldrecords.com/records-6000/most-
popular-subscription-based-massively-multiplayer-online-role-player-game-
(mmorpg)/> Accessed in 20/11/2012.  
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only the fair simulation in a computer projection, which is only part of 
his own brain.  
Claudia Springer describes a kind of new sci-fi hero: “rampaging 
muscle-bound cyborgs were replaced by slim young men and women 
jacked into cyberspace, inspired by ‘console cowboys’ in cyberpunk 
fiction of the 1980s” (in Alien Zone II 204). But Captain Stevens is more 
than a geek specialist, he becomes a virtual ghost. In Source Code, it is 
not the city that is degraded and hopeless but the person in itself. When 
the film’s perspective changes from Captain Stevens to Captain 
Goodwin, the spectator realizes how mistaken the main character is 
about his own being and condition. Even his voice is only green letters 
on Goodwin’s computer, he never really spoke in the story. Stevens is a 
ghost, a shadow of his own past; his consciousness existing in the 
virtuality of Goodwin’s computer.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In this utter video game, digital world, the human transcends the 
body and transforms the mind into data, which can be transferred and 
uploaded, as Dr. Rutledge says “let’s clear his memory and reinitialize 
Source Code” (01:12:45). The body, which was copied in Metropolis 
and replicated in Blade Runner, loses meaning, in as much as space. 
What remains is the numeral data of Captain Stevens’s memory in the 
digital world.  
    
 
 
Figure 3.8 – Captain Steven – 01:22:27 
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Chronos Sickness   
 
Source Code’s narrative exemplifies how Chronos is sick of its 
own chronological nature, as Shaviro explains: “plot is no longer 
stabilized by temporal progression […] the ‘new cinema’—as 
innovative as it is involuntarily caught up in historical change—has 
arrived at a point of temporal crisis where ‘chronos is sickness itself’” 
(Postcinematic 166-7). Time becomes multiple, the past hunts the 
present, the latter is an annoying iteration and the future can finally be 
confronted. The digital as a theme and a technology plays a major role 
in this multifaced time.  
That the past can haunt the present is no news. Captain Stevens, 
for instance, hears sounds of war–bomb explosions, missiles, helicopters 
and radio transmissions (00:02:31)–when awaking for the first time in 
the train simulation. But Source Code complicates this statement. To 
Stewart, this film’s postwar trauma is resolved through a multiple time 
in a postmortem environment (“War” 124). The past experience of the 
Afghanistan war lingers in his present as post-war trauma, one that 
apparently cannot be forgotten. But the film complexifies the idea of 
past, since the Source Code allows Captain Stevens to travel through a 
victim’s last 8 minutes of memories. Memories work as time travel 
tickets. In inhabiting Sean’s body and interacting with his memories, 
Captain Stevens makes someone’s past into his present, to reconstruct 
his future. Once more, we can compare him to a ghost possessing Sean’s 
past as his present.  
Time is also reconfigured from a linear doomed plot, into a 
utopian alternative reality. The train that Captain Stevens saves in the 
end of the film has already exploded. Captain Goodwin repeatedly tells 
Captain Stevens that he cannot change the bomb explosion, because it 
has already happened and it is a memory. She explains that “what you 
experienced was a shadow, an after image of a victim on a train. This is 
real life. Here […] the program was not designed to alter the past, it was 
designed to affect the future” (01:07:15). Nonetheless, he manages to 
realize this virtual past into a parallel reality, transforming past and 
virtual into a new dimension, bifurcating time, and creating Stewart’s 
multiple time (Framed 124).  
He also gives the past a new ontology. He saves the past, so it 
seems he changed the past, but this is actually a different reality. As he 
explains “you thought you were creating eight minutes in a past event, 
but you were not, you’ve created  a whole new world” (01:26:21). In 
fact, the past is not only not simply virtual, not an image of what had 
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happened, and it is much more than nostalgia; it is somewhen, we cannot 
only alter, but ultimately inhabit, a reality in itself.  
Captains Stevens’s present is a continuous repetition, as a video 
game resettling.  Trapped in the Source Code, he is repeatedly sent back 
to Sean’s last 8 minutes of memory. Until, he realizes that “it’s the same 
train but it’s different” (00:11:42). In this difference, he finds the 
possibility to change Chronos linear course, to make things different. 
Through his iterative present, he saves Christina, discovers about his 
death in the Afghanistan war, makes amends with his father, and saves 
the train.  
This repetition may initially imply the cyclical boredom of the 
suburban life in the train that is always late and crowded. Christina 
describes “they [the passengers] are all so utterly… normal. That’s 
what’s so terrifying about them” (00:22:45), and when the also 
incredible ordinary looking bomber is asked why, he can only answer 
“because the world is hell” (01:01:13). Terror is in the repetition of this 
prosaic existence, an iteration that explodes and can only be utopic if, as 
Captain Stevens and Christina–she has just changed her life by quitting 
a job and boyfriend–one finds a different track to the same train. 
Because this might also be a parallel to the Afghanistan war that has no 
significant explanation or justification. In this sense, terrorism is 
inscribed in the ordinary commuters’ everyday life from the suburban to 
Chicago.  
When the present repeats itself, the past collides with the future. 
Captain Stevens travels into Sean’s memories, confronts the future 
bomber, who has not yet detonated the bomb. The hero of the past is 
combating the enemy of the future (Stewart “War” 124). The latter 
trespasses its unreachable characteristic. In the end of every 8-minute 
memory cycle, for example, Captain Stevens and the train explodes, and 
in transitioning from the train back to the capsule, flash mixed images 
appear. One of these images is the Bean sculpture, which only appears 
by the end of the story, a foreshadowing and an anachronism.   
The future is no longer a distant one-hundred-years from now, as 
in Things to Come. It is already contained in the past and the present 
with no meaning attached to them, as in a computer game. Layers of 
time equal the digitalized images. As space in the digital world, time is 
meaningless–what really matter is the sheer sensation of the game, to 
start over again. 
Future also happens soon, if not now. The images of 
contemporary Chicago already construct an idea of future, progress, and 
even utopia, with its skyscrapers, highways, and modern designed 
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building (see Figures 3.9 and 3.10). Similar to Blade Runner or 12 
Monkeys, the city is an existing reference, which increases the appeal for 
a contemporary audience. At the same time, the future is hopeless in a 
scenario in which postwar becomes postmortem. Stewart believes that 
“this dystopian fantasy can certainly not be alleviated by its anodyne 
resolution in a prevented civilian threat” (124), because of the illusions 
of the Source Code, in which Captain Stevens’s own voice and body are 
only projections of his mind. His future can be better only because he 
changes his own body, space and time.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the last train simulation, Captain Stevens quickly saves the 
train, calls his father, and kisses Christina in their last minute. When his 
time is over, Captain Goodwin turns off his incubator, and when the 
bomb usually explodes, it does not. But time seems to stop. The image 
is frozen and the tracking camera slowly passes through the still 
passengers. This delay scene stops narrative and invites Mulvey’s 
pensive spectator, who reflects not only on the story but on the film’s 
technological resource, the digital immersion. This scene is also closer 
Figure 3.9 – 00:02:03 
Figure 3.10 – 00:00:37 
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to Gunning’s cinema of attractions, in which the image has no narrative 
function, but it is simply exhibitionist. In addition, Brown argues that 
this kind of construction recalls for the camera’s time, since “the camera 
makes visible its own temporality” (98). This narrative break enforces 
extra-diegetic elements, because this freeze moment is when Captain 
Stevens transcends a technology into an unexplainable parallel world, 
and when the spectator dismisses the story to immerse into the digital 
technology.  
In Source Code, narrative follows a logical organization, the hero 
is in trouble, he finds a solution, he changes his future. To find his 
happy end, time is complicated, since chronology is more malleable. 
The parallel worlds create alternative timelines and multiply space, 
present is iterative, past is relived and future is changed. As Dr. 
Rutledge says “Source code is not time travel, rather Source Code is 
time reassignment, it gives us access to a parallel reality” (00:34:36). 
Stewart summarizes that in recent war films: “[w]e’re asked to believe 
that computer science can overcome the laws of duration itself and 
recuperate lost time in a parallel universe, turning digital surveillance 
into electronic transcendence” (“War” 122-3).33  
 
INTERSTELLAR  
 
Interstellar (2014) is a Nolan brothers’ film, script by Jonathan 
Nolan and directed by Christopher Nolan. This big budget Hollywood 
film received varied reviews, but most critics recognize that the Nolan 
brothers aimed high. Mark Kermode in The Guardian wrote: 
“Interstellar is the work of someone who dreams with their eyes wide 
open. There is no one working in cinema today who has as much faith in 
the overwhelming power of the image as Nolan and who trusts their 
audience to be similarly awestruck.” Geoffrey Macnab from The 
Independent compared the director to Georges Méliès: “Nolan shares 
                                                        
33
 Source Code’s title was translated as Contra o Tempo in Portuguese, which in 
English would translate as “against the time.” This mistranslation dismisses 
time as digital or multiple, and only focuses on the train reality, where Captain 
Stevens fights against time. At the same time, it highlights the video-game 
intensity of repetition and time constrains. The original title advances a view of 
reality that can be changed; source code allows a great number of options to be 
constructed and, if needed, to reconstruct certain software. In this sense, the 
original title reinforces the idea of a possibility of rewriting one’s history, of 
starting again, of reconfiguring, and in doing so, tailoring new possibilities.       
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the desire of early movie pioneers such as Georges Méliès or DW 
Griffith to astound and entrance audiences,” while Peter Travers from 
Rolling Stone compared to Stanley Kubrick’s 2001: A Space Odyssey: 
“In 2001, Kubrick saw a future that was out of our hands. For Nolan, 
our reliance on one another is all we’ve got.” Such grandeur emerges 
from a fearlessness in presenting a digital cinema that does not think as 
analogue, but immerses into the virtual.  
The main character, Cooper (Matthew McConaughey), is a 
farmer and widower. His father-in-law Donald (John Lithgow) helps 
him raise his two teenage children, Murph (Mackenzie Foy) and Tom 
(Timothée Chalamet). They live in a farm in an end-of-the-world 
scenario; a disease is killing plantations throughout the Earth and dust 
pervades in the air, causing lung problems. A strange phenomenon in 
Murph’s bookshelf leads her father to a hidden NASA station, which is 
planning to save the human race by moving everybody into another 
planet. An unexplainable worm hole was opened near Saturn that can 
transport them into another galaxy. Cooper, who is also an ex-Nasa 
pilot, and a team of astronauts are send to investigate and possibly 
colonize this new planet.            
  
Farms   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Interstellar has no big city, no Metropolis, Everytown, Chicago, 
Los Angeles or Philadelphia. Instead, it has a small village, that is being 
Figure 3.11 – Cooper’s farm 00:14:02 
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abandoned and that we have a glimpse while the characters drive 
through, and farms. Unnamed, common agricultural fields are the main 
landscape in the planet Earth. Cooper plants corn, since this is the last 
crop that resists the blight disease, but he hates being a farmer. He gave 
up his career as an astronaut because of the hunger problems, when 
planting food was more important than exploring the universe. One 
afternoon, Cooper has to go to his children’s school and their principal 
summarizes that “right now, we don’t need more engineers, we didn’t 
run out of television screens or planes; we ran out of food! The world 
need farmers. Good farmers like you, and Tom” (00:11:11).   
The image of the farm does not imply bucolic notions of nature, 
but rather a dystopic future. If the clean, vertical and modern curves of 
contemporary Chicago imply utopia in Source Code, the farm lands 
construct the idea of a paralysis or retrogression in Interstellar. Cooper’s 
farm, for instance, looks like an ordinary North American ranch, but the 
film’s story is in the future, and at a first glance, there is nothing 
futuristic about it (see Figure 3.11). This ordinariness contrasts with the 
idea of the future time and makes the farm a symbol of decay. The 
human kind is not evolving or inventing anymore, but barely surviving. 
Farming is an obligation to Cooper, and worse because it is an utterly 
hopelessly one, as he describes “We farmers, we sit here every year 
when the rains fail, and we say: next year. Well next year ain’t gonna 
save us, nor the one after that” (00:36:49).  
Unexplainable events write coordinates in binary code on the 
floor of Murph’s bedroom, which direct Cooper and his clever daughter 
to a hidden NASA station. One of its members Professor Brand 
(Michael Caine) explains that NASA is kept in secret “because public 
opinion wouldn’t allow spending on space exploration. Not when you’re 
struggling to put food on the table” (00:28:35). The overt irony is that 
NASA is a show-off program, far from being a secret. Around the 60s, it 
represented glory and fame during the Cold War, emphasizing the 
nation’s accomplishments, boldness and investment in progression, 
exploring the vast universe and sending the first men to the moon.  
Earth in itself also carries a similar decay value as the farms and 
NASA. The dust bowl that engulfs people from time to time conveys an 
aged feeling to the planet (see Figure 3.12). Earth is an old home full of 
dust. In a farther future, elderly individuals explain how Earth was to 
those who never saw it in video. The first lady says “we had acres of 
corn, but mostly we had dust,” the second lady describes that “it was 
just constant, just that, steady blow of dirt,” and a third senior narrates 
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that “when we set the table we always set the plate upside down. 
Glasses or cups, whatever it was, upside down” (00:03:25).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Blade Runner and 12 Monkeys construct an idea of nature as a 
utopic space, but the individual is quite far from it, trapped in the big 
cities. Nature in Interstellar infers an almighty power, which humans 
Figure 3.13 – Endurance spaceship near Saturn – 
1:35:40 
Figure 3.14 – Dr. Mann’s planet – 00: 42:39 
Figure 3.12 – The dust bowl – 00:18:17  
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cannot confront or tame. Dr Brand’s, (Anne Hathaway, Professor’s 
Brand daughter) description of nature fits with the story’s perspective. 
When Cooper asks him if she believes nature is evil, she answers “no, 
formidable, frightening, but, no, not evil” and compares “is a lion evil 
because it rips a gazelle to shreds?” (00:52:09). Formidable and 
frightening are the images of dust bowls swallowing the horizon, the 
outer space (see Figure 3.13), the wormhole, the black hole and the 
planets (see Figure 3.14). But the humans have no power over nature, 
they contemplate and fear, none of their technological advancements is 
good enough to fight it. These spectacular visions contrast the 
monumental universe and the smallness of the humans, their old 
spaceship, their little understanding and power. 
At the same time, Earth also implies a certain nostalgia among 
the characters. When Cooper and Dr. Brand are in the Endurance 
spaceship, going into the wormhole, he cannot avoid looking into the 
planet, and nostalgically says “It’s a perfect planet and we are not gonna 
find another one like it” (00:50:47). Earth is a home, which although not 
habitable, they do not want to leave.  
The images of outer space, Saturn and its rings, the wormhole, 
the Earth spinning on the spaceship’s window, the black hole emitting 
light, the grandiose of the darkness, emanate awe and fascination. These 
latter feelings are affects, as defined by Shaviro: “affect is primary, non-
conscious, asubjective or presubjective, asignifying, unqualified, and 
intensive” (Postcinematic 3). Affect as an intensity, allowed by digital 
technology, that overwhelms the viewers. Special effects have always 
been at the core of the science fiction genre, but they have been 
upgraded into computer graphics, which intensified this affective 
relation.  
These images of space are affective because they generate an 
emotion. That is awe, which is primary to consciousness. This idea can 
be parallel to Dr. Brand’s explanation of love as purposeful. She wants 
to go to Edmunds’s planet, but Cooper believes she is biased by her love 
for Edmunds. But she explains:  
 
Maybe we have spent too long trying to figure all 
this out with theory […] when I say that love isn’t 
something we invented, it’s observable, powerful. 
It has to mean something […] something we can’t 
yet understand. Maybe it’s some evidence, some 
artefact of a higher dimension that we can’t 
consciously perceive (01:28:12).  
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Maybe this drive to technological awe is still to be explained. 
Maybe it is an artefact of the early cinema in which films were mainly a 
spectacle and not a narrative, as Gunning argues (“Cinema” 64). This 
awe instance is when science fiction stops its own rational oriented 
world and sides with the fantasy genre, in how it contemplates nature as 
a magical power.  
 
Old Technologies  
 
At a first glance, Interstellar’s technology looks different, but not 
much. This story’s futurism is not immediately understood, as 
Metropolis or Blade Runner. The first Earth sequences have the old and 
dust look already mentioned, and the farms, the school or the baseball 
camp are just ordinary. In general, the film’s machines do not seem 
quite advanced. They rather infer a sense of stagnation; the hunger 
caused by the blight retards the development of new technologies. 
Cooper deeply feels this paralysis when saying to his father-in-law 
Donald, “It’s like we have forgotten who we are, Donald. Explorers, 
pioneers, not caretakers” (00:15:58).   
Some items are the same as the ones we use nowadays, even 
older. Cooper, for example, has an old truck that his son inherits and 
continues using 20 years after his father has left Earth. In the principal’s 
office at the children’s school, there is a box television, that I dare 
affirm looks outdated even nowadays. When Cooper is preparing to 
investigate the coordinates pointed by Murph’s ghost, he tells her 
“Grandpa will be home in a while, tell him I’ll call him on the radio” 
(00:22:29), suggesting that internet and cell phones are at least not 
popular anymore. This society does not nurture a compulsion for 
newness and the modern technology anymore, which can also be 
observed in the mise-en-scène as a whole, in the characters’ common 
clothes, and in the house’s simple decoration. They are only trying to 
survive.    
Most of the technological advancements of the film seem already 
possible nowadays. The combine harvesters on Cooper’s fields look 
very much like any contemporary crop machine, but they are 
automatous, working without man’s direct operation. They orient 
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through a compass clock and a GPS, both common contemporary 
technologies.34  
Another modern contemporary technology but old or anachronist 
to Interstellar’s story is the surveillance drone. In an initial sequence, 
Cooper and his two children are driving to school when he spots it. They 
chase and put it down. Tom asks how long it has been flying by itself, 
and Cooper answer “Delhi Mission Control went down same as ours, 10 
years ago” (00:08:47). Apparently, they used the drone to reduce 
population when the hunger problem spread. Drones are not new, they 
are already vastly used by the US military forces in middle-east 
confronts. Interestingly, Cooper removes some of its parts to reuse in his 
combines. This recycling complies with the visual decay of this 
futuristic film, in which people become scavengers.  
As it is common in science fictions, the machines also seem to 
tell something about the humans. Robot-Maria reflects Frederson’s and 
Rotwang’s ambitions, while the replicants shows that time is what 
humans should really value in life. In Interstellar, Cooper explains the 
role of the drone to Murph: “this thing needs to learn how to adapt 
Murph, like the rest of us” (00:09:30). Adapting is what the human race 
will do to survive. The wormhole was mysteriously open by “they,” who 
want to help humanity. By the end of the film, Cooper discovers that 
“they” are in fact humans, who evolved into a fifth dimension existence. 
Nostalgia also lingers on the image of Interstellar’s machines, as 
if the future as represented in this story was strongly bound to our 
contemporary lives or to our immediate problems. Paul Franklin, visual 
effects supervisor, admits that the launching sequence in which Cooper 
and his expedition are send to the wormhole was planned to look like 
old space mission footages, “we studied a lot of archival footage of real 
Apollo launches, and we also looked at the launch sequence in Apollo 
13” (In Duncan, 17). The computer graphic group even “rusted” the 
footage a bit, to look more like the old mission images, to how we 
received these images. Recalling these footages and making them look 
as rusted as the real ones produce an effective appeal to people’s 
imaginary memory of space travels.  
This emotional sequence begins with Cooper saying goodbye to 
his family,   crying as he drives to NASA, while TARS’s voice, a robot, 
already starts the launching “go for main engines” and announcing the 
famous countdown “Start T minus 10, 9, 8,” Murph runs trying to catch 
                                                        
34
 We are already have cars that can park by themselves. I speculate that we 
only do not have auto-driving cars because some of us still like to drive. 
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her father and all we see is dust from his truck, TARS continues “7, 6, 5, 
main engines start, 4, 3, 2, 1, booster ignition, and” (00:42:16), cut to a 
shot of fire from the ignition explosion, ice particles cascading down 
from the rising rocket, cut to close-ups of the shaking astronauts and a 
camera outside the rocket shows it distancing from the Earth’s surface 
(see Figure 3.15), in very familiar angles.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.15 – Rocket leaving Earth – 00: 25:08 
Figure 3.16 – Tars and Cooper – 00: 39:28 
Figure 3.17 – Ranger Spacecraft – 02:22:47 
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TARS and CASE are robots with an artificial intelligence. NASA 
used these two most outstanding machines of the film in its expedition 
missions. Although they look the same, squared and robust robots (see 
Figure 3.16), their artificial intelligence impresses on how TARS 
understands before Cooper the story’s mystery. The robot discovers that 
the unknown “they” created a three-dimensional space to save 
humanity.  This machine actually has to explain what this astronaut, 
who lacks a lot of physics knowledge, has to do to save humanity. In a 
way, the hero is not Cooper, the space cowboy, or his scientist daughter, 
who solves the equation, but the robot and its insight. And TARS can 
even joke: “Everybody good? Plenty of slaves for my robot colony?” 
(00:42:45).  
Nevertheless, TARS and CASE are obsolete. Cooper tells us, 
they are ex-military security, and that the militaries do not exist 
anymore, “they are old and their control units are unpredictable,” which 
Dr. Brand clarifies that “[i]t’s what the government could space” 
(00:25:47). They are leftovers. In this sense, these robots emphasize the 
dystopia future, which relies on old technology to save humanity. The 
new machines presented to the audience are already old to the 
characters.  
Although TARS becomes a captivating character with its humour 
and cleverness–Cooper affectionately reconstitutes him when they are 
saved from the blackhole–the robot is not humanoid like Futura from 
Metropolis or the replicants in Blade Runner, and do not pose any 
threat. Technology in Interstellar does not infer any problem to the 
human race, as in the previous discussed films. There is no substantial 
suspicions about these robots. They may make inappropriate jokes but 
are not a real threat to the humans. In fact, Cooper believes that the lack 
of technological investment and advancement hinders humanity. 
Technology and its capacity to reproduce are no longer feared or 
questioned but taken for granted, not a problem or solution, just another 
piece of future’s life.    
Nature or time seems to put an end on humanity’s days, 
technology is too obsolete to save the human race from nature’s force, 
and a supernatural, or external force comes to help the humans. In this 
mysterious force, the uncanniness of mental hallucination in Metropolis 
and the paranoia in Twelve Monkeys acquires a scientific twist in 
Interstellar.   
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Time as Space, Worm Holes, Black Holes  
 
Interstellar is a time travel film. To save the human race, Cooper 
has to find a new habitable planet, but he also has to do it in time, before 
the blight kills all the crops on Earth, starving and suffocating the world 
population. A wormhole enigmatically appeared near Saturn 48 years 
ago, it is a door to another galaxy, a fold and a shortcut in space. Twelve 
brave explorers are send to twelve possible habitable planets. Their 
mission is to explore these planets observing life possibilities and send 
data back to Earth. Three planets on the same solar system show 
potential, where Cooper and his mission are going. They are named after 
their explorers: Millers, Dr. Mann, and Edmunds. If the story stopped 
here, we would have a film about space exploration, as the Star Trek 
series. But when their mission crosses the wormhole and they face a 
black hole, named Gargantua, time becomes the problem.  
Miller’s and Dr. Mann’s planets are too close to the black hole, 
which, as one of the astronauts, Romily (David Gyasi), explains, “a 
black hole that huge has a huge gravitational pull” (01:02:51), and Dr. 
Brand finishes by saying that “the gravity on that planet will slow our 
clock compared to Earth’s, drastically” (01:03:02). Every hour on 
Miller’s planet is seven years back on Earth, and the humans already 
have little time. Dr. Brand summarizes their problem “Cooper’s right, 
we have to think about time as a resource just like oxygen and food” 
(01:03: 49), when exploring Miller’s planet they lose more than 20 years 
on Earth. To save the humans, Cooper becomes the time traveller, 
entering into the Gargantua, which creates time as a forth dimension, a 
sort of spatializing time. This way, he is able to send information back 
to young Murph, and be her ghost, communicating through her 
bookshelf. Time is also the solution.  
A symbol of 
time as the main 
issue of the story 
is the watch that 
Cooper gives 
Murph before 
leaving Earth. He 
explains to her 
how their 
timelines will run 
differently, how 
she might be the same age as him, when he comes back. Inside the 
Figure 3.18 – 00:39:49 
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Gargantua, Cooper encodes the data of the black hole into the 
movement of the watch’s hand. The answer to save the human race is 
travelling through time, thus, merging Cooper’s future with his 
daughter’s past.  
If compared to Metropolis’s clock, it is easy to understand how 
the idea of a single and major time, one that prevails over the workers 
and the entire city, changes to a relative time, to the multiple watches in 
Interstellar. The latter’s time varies according to the space where the 
characters are, in a different planet, in a black hole, or in a different 
galaxy. Such change points to an awareness of the personal time, which 
does not necessarily falls into the subjective temporality of the 
modernists, because it resources to scientific explanations, 35 even if they 
were not always proper science. This sense of time challenges the 
notions of a single chronological time and a singular existence by 
opening the possibilities of alternative paths, or ambivalent 
temporalities. Although thematically the story appeals to Einstein’s 
timespace, to time and space relativity, structurally it constructs 
something else.     
As the problem and the solution, Interstellar stretches and folds 
time. Similar to Source Code, a single chronological time morphs into 
ambivalent times, detached from their stagnant positions. Such 
rearrangement questions the characters’ construction of time, history, 
future, and their very ontological existence as humans. The past, for 
example, has no strong value as an enduring and stable historical 
ground. In fact, it is rewritten. Murph’s teacher, Miss Hanley (Collette 
Wolfe), complains that Cooper’s daughter brought an old book to 
school, which was replaced by a new version “explaining how the 
Apollo missions were faked to bankrupt the Soviet Union” (00:11:58). 
In Interstellar, man has never been to the moon, it was an international 
tale used as a war weapon. If they actually went is not the issue, but 
rather that history is revised to fit better into the political interest of the 
moment. Humanity is struggling to survive, and the political position is 
to encourage basic labour work and not adventures, inventive 
professions. If the USA of the 60s used the Apollos missions as a boost 
to power, the future USA downgrades it to their immediate needs. What 
real history is does not matter anymore, what matters is to convince 
people into their current strategies.     
                                                        
35
 Theoretical physicist Kip Thorne from Caltech University was an active 
consultant and executive producer of Interstellar. He recently published The 
Science of Interstellar (2014).  
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Ghosts are generally tokens of the past, as the soul that is left 
behind and forgotten, but not in this story. Murph’s ghost inverts 
Chronos’ logic, since this supernatural force is not from the past, but 
from the future. It is her father who is trapped inside the Gargantua in 
the fourth dimension, which “they” created. Indeed, he somehow 
foreshadows his future, when he is saying goodbye to her: “once you are 
a parent, you are the ghost of your children’s future” (00:38:05). He 
means that when one has children, being a parent becomes more 
important, which turns parents into shadows of their children. This is 
precisely what happens. Cooper sends Murph the data from the black 
hole, and she solves the equation saving the world, because as he 
realizes “I thought they choose me, but they didn’t choose me, they 
chose her” (02:29:53).   
Another constant symbol of a challenged chronology is the story 
of Lazarus. The twelve scientists sent to twelve possible habitable 
planets were all part of the Lazarus mission. The issue is that they do not 
have enough resources to rescue these brave scientists, if their planet is 
not good enough to be inhabited they will die. But Lazarus’s story is 
that he “came back from the dead” (00:30:18), as Professor Brand 
clarifies. Laura Mulvey explains how the ideas of death and time are 
close (Death 9), the latter existing because we die. It puts an end into 
our existence, and highlights the importance of time, of that period in 
which we are living. But if Lazarus overcomes death, and finds a 
postmortem existence, as Captain Steven does in Source Code, then 
time is confronted. Death no longer means the end of time, and the latter 
becomes something else, a transformation, rather than an end.       
The characters find hope in time, their future is utopic. Murph 
manages to finish the equation with Cooper’s data, sending the last of 
the humans on a space station to Edmunds’s planet. The film ends with 
Dr. Brand removing her helmet and breathing the air in this new planet. 
But there is a further future implied in the story, in which humans 
transform into something else. Something that survives in the fifth 
dimension, that is not bound to time or space. Because a wormhole is 
not a naturally occurring phenomenon, the obvious conclusion is that 
“Someone place[d] it there” (Dr. Brand 00:32:10). Inside the Gargantua, 
Cooper realizes that “they” is actually us, he explains to TARS: “they 
have access to infinite time and space but they are not bound by 
anything” and continues “a civilization that’s evolved past the four 
dimensions that we know” (02:34:02). When people are no longer 
bound to time and space, our ontology changes, we find new ways of 
existence, in which death and time no longer relate. The uber humans of 
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the future can save humanity by sending a man from the present into his 
daughter’s past.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
When Cooper enters into the Gargantua, time is presented as 
space. Specifically, Murph’s room is multiplied into its many moments, 
as a filmstrip (see Figure 3.19). TARS explains to Cooper that “they 
constructed this three-dimension space inside their five dimension 
reality to allow you to understand it […] You’ve seen that time is 
Figure 3.19 – Inside the Gargantua – 02:28:20 
Figure 3.20 – Murph’s past mingles with Cooper’s future – 02:24:22 
144 
 
represented here as a physical dimension” (02:27:20). Cooper, and 
humans, can only understand time like this, shattered and bounded to 
space. Each specific moment represented into a slice of Murph’s room. 
This is the spatialized time that Deleuze considered constrictive, the 
movement-image. But there are other possibilities to this, because 
Gargantua joins past and future in the same screen (see Figure 3.20). Or 
rather the CGI, that Stewart endorses, allows this three dimension 
reality, in which time and space are together, as timespace, but are also 
free from Chronos limited combinations. Thus, when Cooper travels 
into the Gargantua, he travels in time, into the spatial time of Murph’s 
room, but he also travels into the digital world, into the digital 
possibilities.       
Moreover, space is not as distorting and confusing as in Source 
Code, because this film is really not about space, but time. The story’s 
problem is not about how far, since the wormhole allows them to 
shorten distances, but how long. In this sense, time becomes malleable, 
multiple and ambivalent. The past is a ghost from the future, or a history 
that can be rewritten. The story is in a non-futuristic, if not nostalgic 
future, as space and technology showed us. The characters’ present 
looks old and wasted, but their future is a challenge. It is beyond their 
own comprehension. It lies on a mode of existence that, as Source Code, 
transcends the human body. Such transcendence is the immersion into 
the digital, the denial of a fixed space and the possibility of a malleable 
time.  
The revelation that “they” are humans from the future does not 
diminish the heavy uncanny feeling of these super humans, “they” who 
inhabit a five dimension reality, and who become godlike creatures. An 
aura and almost religious sense surround these people along the film. 
They choose Cooper and Murph, as saviours. They send messages to the 
characters, which are promptly followed. They are trying to help the 
humans on Earth, but it is so hard for them to understand. Because the 
latter’s comprehension and master of the known realities is still so 
limited. How far can we travel into space? How much do we understand 
of time?    
As mentioned, Stewart observes that much of the digital 
possibilities is translated as supernatural in contemporary films. The 
uncanny of Murph’s ghost comes from the time distortion, from 
Cooper’s time travelling, from the father who is the same age as his 
daughter. This science fiction film concentrates on this fascination with 
the time subversions. Technology is no longer interesting, it is rather old 
and granted. What fascinates is this supernatural force, which emanates 
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from computer graphics and the new plot possibilities. A father and 
daughter with the same age. A ghost from the future. An ambivalent 
time. A Chromos sick of chronology.   
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FINAL REMARKS 
 
 
 
 
[T]ime is not merely the attribute of a subject, 
imposed by us on the world: it is a condition of 
what is living, of matter, of the real, of the 
universe itself. It is what the universe imposes on 
us rather than we on it; it is what we find 
ourselves immersed in, given, as impinging and as 
enabling as our spatiality. We will not be able to 
understand its experiential nature unless we link 
subjectivity and the body more directly to 
temporal immersion, to the coexistence of life 
with other forms of life, and of life with things, 
that is, until we consider time as an ontological 
element. (Grosz 5)  
  
This investigation attempted to describe a change in science 
fiction films’ construction of time. The modernist and postmodernist 
periods provided guiding lines to the demonstration of main differences. 
But when watching and comparing recent films, I felt that something 
had changed, which was not only caused  by the postmodern space 
orientation proclaimed by Fredric Jameson (“Postmodernism” 64), but 
also a whole new technological and conceptual frame of thinking. The 
emergence of a new theoretical aesthetic, which still lacks a proper 
nomenclature–the post-postmodern, the post-cinematic, the post-filmic, 
the new new cinema, the supercinema, or just the digital cinema–helped 
me understand time in more contemporaneous films.   
As discussed in this dissertation, the analyzed modernist film, 
Metropolis, constructs a linear and forward oriented time. Time’s 
concepts prevail as utopia and power, in which future along with 
technology will bring society to progress, if not exactly to peace. The 
futuristic theme predominates in this narrative, while the past is actually 
dangerous, as Rotwang’s revengeful feelings. In Metropolis, three layers 
compose space: the futuristic and utopic city of Metropolis, the 
underground buildings of the workers, criticizing the living and working 
conditions in this up-to-down society, where a mass mode of production 
predominates, and the catacombs, deeper into the ground, where hope 
still emerges.  
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The postmodern films, Blade Runner and Twelve Monkeys, 
present nostalgia, in addition to the expected futuristic look of science 
fictions. But that is maybe because they are utterly dystopic, given that, 
in these movies, the past emerges as a resource to claim a failed hope, 
which always fails. Since the past is gone, no pictures or time-travelling 
can change the characters’ doomed future. Time is also ambiguous since 
past and future mix, thus creating an ambivalent time to how the 
characters attempt to make sense of themselves. Surprisingly, these 
science fiction films do not focus on machines, but on the human and 
their weak boundaries with the replicants or on Cole’s quasi madness.  
Blade Runner’s Los Angeles demonstrates Frederic Jameson’s 
idea of a postmodern pastiche (67), a scenario composed of styles from 
different periods and cultures. This collision of styles indicates time’s 
schizophrenia, in the randomness of its nostalgia. Twelve Monkeys’s 
space is a future and a contemporary Philadelphia. As in Metropolis, the 
former version of the city has an underground world that is utterly 
dystopic; pointing to a sub-human. The latter Philadelphia finds some 
hope in nature, because the city in itself already seems doomed. A 
relevant aspect is how both postmodern films appeal to real cities to 
construct their dystopic futures, as if it is easier to associate tragedy than 
happiness to specific locations.   
Source Code’s story is located in Chicago, and Interstellar’s 
begins on Earth. Nonetheless, what comes to light in relation to space in 
these films is an assimilation of the digital notion, in which space 
becomes more malleable. The parallel universe of Source Code and the 
black hole of Intertellar challenge notions of rigid space construction in 
cinema, which corroborates with Steven Shaviro’s post-cinema, in that 
continuity rules have exploded and their violations are no longer a 
surprise.       
Metropolis showed how modernist science fiction’s time is 
mainly objective and causal, one event leading to the next in a reacting 
chain. Time is also associated to power as in Frederson’s big and 
dominating clocks. In this sense, technology is fascinating, creating 
sequences of pure spectacle, in which the films’ narratives halt to 
admire Futura’s transformation, but also threatening since it can be 
manipulated to follow Frederson’s and Rotwang’s desires. Technology, 
as time, becomes part of monetary power.  
In the postmodern films, technological issues intermingles with 
human ones. In Blade Runner, the fear of replicants is also a fright of 
humanity’s banalization. Twelve Monkeys, in turn, discusses 
surveillance in how observing and finding clues may actually lead to the 
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wrong information, and suggests how uncertain and random science can 
be. This turn into the human instead of the machine is magnified in 
Source Code and Interstellar, since human ontology transforms itself 
into data and fifth dimensions. The postmodern films start wondering 
about the human boundaries within time–replicants are humans if they 
have a past, Cole will always exist in his death’s loop of time. In these 
narratives, human ontology is still only a question. But the post-
postmodern films easily transcend the human body, its transformed 
ontology becomes as granted as technology. The physical body does not 
define the human anymore.       
In the post-postmodern films, technology is still essential, 
although not as a main issue rather as a granted part of society. New 
machines are not items to be feared as Robot-Maria, replicants or time-
travel machines, instead they integrate life and their resolution is not bad 
or good, only consequential. This position towards technology also 
relates to the scientific fascination with technology and an investment in 
special effects, which culminate in the digital form changing the 
narrative content. In such context, time is virtual and detached from 
chronological constrains, offering new narrative possibilities. Time is no 
longer singular and all-governing, it is transformed into multiple times, 
the time of the many realities created by the Source Code or the collapse 
between Cooper’s time and the many times in his daughter room.       
Source Code and Interstellar demonstrate their profound 
assimilation of the virtual idea, in which even the physical body is 
abandoned and the humans migrate to different forms of existence in 
distinct times and spaces. These films’ utopia is digital, because their 
final realization is due to an immersion into the virtual world, and not 
due to an advancing into the future or a recuperation of something lost 
in the past. Our drive to fantasize may not be enchanted in relation to the 
future as in the modernist period, and may be too aware of its 
impossibilities in the past as with the postmodernists, but it may have 
found direction in others unexpected spaces.  
I understand that this dissertation has strengths and limitations. A 
main strength is the acknowledgment of a new aesthetic tendency, the 
post-postmodernism. I expect that my analysis suggested how the digital 
affects the narrative, as the former is absorbed into the plot, not only as 
a structural tool but also as content. This proposition follows Brown’s 
useful observation that post-postmodernism should be seen as a 
tendency that is an intensity and an acceleration of postmodernism (96), 
and not a full differentiating aesthetic. A similar idea works for the 
modernist-postmodernist transition, in which Brian McHale proposed 
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that postmodernism is also an intensification of modernism 
(Postmodernist 4).  
A limitation in this dissertation is the number of films discussed 
here, due to space constrictions. However I favored a deep analysis of 
three main aspects–space, technology, time–instead of presenting a 
panoramic view. As I mentioned in the Introduction, I am interested in 
“what films can do” since “one talking pig is needed to prove that pigs 
can talk, then similarly only one example is needed to show what film 
can do […] whether or not all films do the same thing” (Brown 7). Once 
again, this research does not attempt to propose a grand theory, but 
rather suggest a possibility within this new digital cinema. Another 
limitation is a lack of cultural density, as the focus was on vernacular or 
Hollywood cinema.   
My analysis might be criticized for underlining the digital period 
to quite recent films, while different scholars such as Lev Manovich 
indicate the beginning of digital cinema as early as the 1970s. The 
explanation is that these recent films construct a much striking 
difference than previous ones. They really assimilate the virtual notion 
into their narratives. I suggest that, following Laura Mulvey who wrote 
that maybe digital was still thinking as analogue (21), contemporary 
films have finally started thinking as digital. I also want to point to 
Brown’s argument that all films show different temporalities, but the 
digital enhances this idea (96). The presence of digitalization as theme 
and form radicalizes the possibility of multiple times.   
Other limitation is that I might have analyzed more technical 
tools, since my analysis focused more on narrative aspects of the films. 
David Bordwell, for instance, uses ASL (average shot length) to discuss 
intensified continuity (in The Way). This approach gives him an exact 
average time of the films, if their editing has accelerated or prolonged 
the shots. This might be a suggestion for further research. I would also 
be interested on research about other genres, as science fiction appears 
to be the most obvious genre to analyze time and technology, but this 
change can also be observed in other genres, such as suspense and 
fantasy. Further research on the role of the spectator in this digital 
cinema might also generate interesting debates. Thomas Elsaesser 
already proposed a new role in the mind-game films, but there seems to 
be more in the fandom films or in the 3D films.       
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